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1. Introduction
One of the fundamental questions of perceptual theory is
whether the structured energy fields that are available to
perceptual systems are sufficient, in and of themselves, for
accurate perception. If potential sensory stimulation1 is not
sufficient, then accurate perception must depend upon op-
erations carried out by the animal, such as inferential pro-
cessing. Thus, the assumption that potential sensory stimu-
lation is insufficient for accurate perception leads to the
hypothesis that perception is indirect (i.e., accurate per-
ception requires the addition, presumably mental, of infor-
mation that is not available in sensory stimulation) which,
in turn, leads theorists to focus on internal processing as the
locus of the most important issues in perception. On the
other hand, if potential sensory stimulation is sufficient for
accurate perception, then perception can be direct, that is,
accurate without the addition of information beyond what
is available in sensory stimulation. The latter view is central
to the ecological approach to perception and action (Gib-
son 1979/1986). Proponents of the ecological approach
stress that ambient arrays are structured by the animal-en-
vironment interaction (that is, by the position and motion
of the animal relative to its environment), and that this
structuring is governed by physical law (i.e., laws of the
propagation, reflection, and absorption of energy) in such a
way that any given physical reality gives rise to a unique
structure or pattern in ambient energy. This leads to the hy-
pothesis that potential sensory stimulation is sufficient for
accurate perception because the animal-environment in-
teraction is specified in the spatiotemporal structure of am-
bient arrays. Specification refers to a lawful, 1:1 relation be-
tween patterns in ambient arrays and the aspects of the an-
imal environment interaction that give rise to them (Shaw
et al. 1982). The ecological approach to perception and ac-
tion is an established theory with broad empirical support,
and for this reason we do not review it at length here (for
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general presentations of the ecological approach see Gib-
son 1966; 1986; Goldfield 1995; Michaels & Carello 1981;
Turvey et al. 1981).
Specification is an hypothesis about the nature and sta-
tus of ambient arrays before the stimulation of sensory re-
ceptors. Thus, the debate about specificity is not a psycho-
logical debate. It is a debate about relations between states
of the world and the energy patterns to which those states
give rise, prior to and independent of sensory stimulation
or any psychological process (Gibson 1986; Kugler & Tur-
vey 1987; Reed 1996; Runeson & Frykholm 1983;).
In this target article we question existing approaches to
the concept of specification, which are based on the as-
sumption that specification exists (or does not exist) in in-
dividual forms of energy, such as the optic and acoustic ar-
rays. We present a novel argument for the existence of
specification. Because we question existing views that as-
sume the existence of specification, our analysis presents a
challenge to theories based on these views, such as the eco-
logical approach to perception and action. At the same
time, our argument for a new form of specification presents
a challenge to theories that assume that potential sensory
stimulation bears an ambiguous relation to reality. Thus,
our analysis has consequences for theories of perception
that are based on inferential processing. Our analysis im-
plies that all theories of perception derived from existing
views of specification are compromised by fundamental 
errors.
Discussions of specification, both pro and con, have fo-
cused on the structure of single forms of energy, such as
light. However, behavior produces simultaneous changes in
the structure of multiple forms of ambient energy. For ex-
ample, locomotion produces changes in the stimulation of
(at least) the visual, vestibular, and somatosensory systems.
Even the most elementary and pervasive acts, such as
breathing and controlling posture, produce changes in the
stimulation of multiple perceptual systems. This basic fact
has had little influence on general theories of perception,
and it has received little attention in discussions of specifi-
cation.
We suggest that the multisensory consequences of be-
havior may have fundamental implications for the nature of
perception. We propose that perceptual systems do not
function independently, and that any attempt to understand
them independently must be fundamentally incomplete.
Such a position has occasionally been argued (e.g., Sher-
rington 1906; Welch & Warren 1986); however, our argu-
ment differs from others in important ways. We will at-
tempt to redefine perception, not as a process of picking up
information through a group of disparate “channels,” and
not as a set of interactions among discrete modalities, but
as the pick-up of information that exists in irreducible pat-
terns across different forms of energy. Consistent with the
ecological approach to perception and action (Gibson 1986)
we assume that behaviorally relevant aspects of reality are
specified. However, we will argue that specification exists
only in patterns that extend across different forms of ambi-
ent energy.
Our position is inspired in part by James Gibson’s (1966)
theory of perceptual systems. However, we believe that
with respect to relations between the senses there are some
ambiguities in Gibson’s presentation. In some instances,
Gibson argued that information available to different per-
ceptual systems is redundant (we discuss this in sect. 3.3.2),
while in other cases he suggested that information exists in
relations across forms of energy (sect. 6.1). We will argue
that these positions are mutually exclusive. After present-
ing our view we discuss its relation to Gibson’s (sect. 6.2.2).
[See also Ullman: “Against Direct Perception” BBS 3(3)
1980.]
Our view of perception resembles contemporary dy-
namical theories of action, for which action consists of co-
ordination between distinct units, and should be defined at
the level of macroscopic variables, or order parameters
(e.g., Haken 1983; Kelso 1995; Thelen & Smith 1994; Tur-
vey et al. 1978). In dynamical theories of behavior, a given
action cannot be understood as the motion of a single mo-
tor “unit,” or as the additive contributions of the motions of
multiple units (Reed 1982). Similarly, for perception, we
propose that there exist macroscopic variables, consisting of
relations between different forms of ambient energy, that
these provide information about the animal-environment
interaction; and that information exists only in these macro-
scopic variables, that is, that it does not exist in the struc-
ture of individual forms of energy. In the present article we
do not claim that these informational macroscopic variables
are order parameters per se, exhibiting properties such as cir-
cular causality, enslaving, or time-scale conventions. Rather,
we argue that with respect to specification the whole is not
only greater than, but qualitatively different from, the sum
of the parts.
We begin with a discussion of the assumption that there
exists a set of distinct perceptual systems that operate more
or less independently of one another, which we call the as-
sumption of separate senses. We suggest that this assump-
tion may not be justified. This suggests the possibility of al-
ternative views of the senses. In section 3 we argue that the
assumption of separate senses leads to problems for exist-
ing views of specification. These problems arise from the
assumption that specification exists in individual ambient
arrays, that is, in structures that may be sampled by sepa-
rate senses. In section 4 we show that these problems ex-
tend to the level of physics. In section 5 we conclude that
the concept of specification is incompatible with the as-
sumption of separate senses, and we discuss some general
consequences of this for the interpretation of subjective
judgments about motion. In section 6 we present an alter-
native view of specification, which requires the rejection of
the assumption of separate senses. Our decision to begin
with the assumption of separate senses is for purposes of ex-
plication, not from logical necessity. The argument could be
presented in the reverse order, that is, our alternate view of
specification could be used to motivate a reconsideration of
the assumption of separate senses.
2. The assumption of separate senses
Throughout history, theories of perception have embodied
an assumption that perception is achieved via several sen-
sory modalities. The assumption of separate senses under-
lies virtually all theory and research on perception. It is as-
sumed that there are multiple perceptual systems (the
number typically is five, but this is of secondary impor-
tance). The senses are thought of as being “separate and in-
teracting modalities” (Smith 1994, p. xi; cf. Bekesy 1959),
such that the function of individual perceptual systems
“provides basic information” that is needed in “under-
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standing the interaction between or among these modali-
ties” (Welch & Warren 1986, p. 3; emphasis added). Boring
(1950, p. 182) referred to the division of perception by
senses as one of psychology’s “primary principles of classi-
fication.”
The assumption of separate senses may seem to be so
self-evident as to be atheoretical (i.e., free of implications
for theories of perception). We will argue that the assump-
tion carries profound theoretical implications. In section 6
we will present an alternative view, in which perception is
not divided into distinct perceptual systems. If there are
credible alternatives to the assumption of separate senses,
then some rationale must be offered to motivate its reten-
tion.
2.1. A pervasive assumption
The assumption of separate senses is so basic that it is im-
plicit even at the introductory level. Undergraduate text-
books on psychology are organized in terms of individual
senses, with chapters on vision, hearing, touch, and so on
(e.g., Matlin & Foley 1992). No justification for this parsing
is offered. The assumption of separate senses is reflected in
the existence of sense-specific journals (e.g., Vision Re-
search, The Journal of Auditory Research, The Journal of
Vestibular Research) and in treatises attempting to account
for perception within a single modality (e.g., Cutting 1986;
Gibson 1986; Handel 1989). It is implicit in theory and re-
search in areas of cognition such as learning, attention,
memory, and imagery, each of which is commonly consid-
ered in the context of individual senses (e.g., “visual cogni-
tion,” Pinker 1985; “auditory imagery,” Reisberg 1992). We
have been unable to locate an explicit justification of the as-
sumption of separate senses in the philosophical, behav-
ioral, or neurophysiological literatures (e.g., Ackerman
1990; Gibson 1966; Heil 1983; Milne & Milne 1962; Pieron
1952).
2.2. Historical origins
The assumption of separate senses has been handed down
to modern science from protoscientific natural philoso-
phers who received it, in turn, from pre-scientific episte-
mologists. Boring (1950) attributed it to Aristotle, Locke,
and Berkeley. Yet none of these scholars approached the is-
sue directly.
In the de Anima, Aristotle (1931, p. 425b) enumerated
the senses, and asked “why we have more senses than one.”
He answered in terms of special objects and common sensi-
bles. Each sense has its special object, “that which cannot
be perceived by any other sense than that one in respect of
which no error is possible; in this sense color is the special
object of sight, sound of hearing, flavor of taste,” (1931, p.
418a). This is in contrast with common sensibles, which are
“perceptible by any and all of the senses” (1931, p. 418a).
Among the common sensibles are movement, rest, number,
figure, and magnitude (Marks 1978; cf. Gibson 1983). For
Aristotle, multiple senses were required “to prevent a fail-
ure to apprehend the common sensibles . . . The fact that
the common sensibles are given in the objects of more than
one sense reveals their distinction from each and all of the
special sensibles” (1931, p. 425b). Thus, Aristotle’s view is
that multiple perceptual systems are required in order for
us to distinguish percepts that are general across senses
from those that are peculiar to any one sense. However, this
begs the question. Both his query and his argument assume
the prior existence of separate senses. Only under this as-
sumption does it make sense to ask why we have more than
one.
Later philosophers have not addressed the issue at all.
Locke (1689/1975), in discussing the origin of ideas, ap-
peared to take for granted the existence of distinct senses:
Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do
convey into the mind, several distinct perceptions of things, ac-
cording to those various ways, wherein the objects do affect
them: And thus we come by those ideas, we have of yellow,
white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which
we call sensible qualities, which when I say the senses convey
into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into
the mind what produces there those perceptions. (p. 105)
Berkeley’s position was similar:
Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along the street; I look
through the casement and see it; I walk out and enter it. Thus,
common speech would incline one to think I heard, saw, and
touched the same thing, to wit, the coach. It is nevertheless cer-
tain the ideas intromitted by each sense are widely different
and distinct from each other. (1709/1975 p. 22)
What is the source of this basic assumption? One source
is the existence of anatomically distinct receptor systems.
Another is the existence of different forms of stimulus en-
ergy. A third is neurophysiological differences between the
senses. We consider these in turn.
2.3. Anatomy
Sensory receptors have different anatomy and different
anatomical locations (e.g., eyes, ears, tongue, nasal cavity,
skin, muscles, joints). However, classification on the basis
of anatomy depends upon the prior acceptance of the as-
sumption that the senses exist and operate either exclu-
sively or primarily as independent units. The anatomical
differences do not, by themselves, mandate this assump-
tion.
Consider binaural sound localization. Sound often ar-
rives at one ear before it arrives at the other. The time de-
lay between arrival at the two ears constitutes an irreducible
relation that is caused by the location of the sound source
relative to the head (Gibson 1966). The two ears function
as a single, indivisible unit in picking up this informative re-
lation. Similarly, consider binocular stereopsis. The optic
array differs at any two points of observation, such that re-
lations between simultaneous samples of the optic array
taken at two locations are influenced by the shape of objects
and their spatial layout. The result is an irreducible relation
between the two array samples: “The two eyes are not sep-
arate sense channels for which signals must be compared;
rather they constitute a single binocular system” (Jones &
Lee 1981, p. 39).
In these examples, anatomically distinct structures func-
tion in a unitary manner. In general, it is possible for
anatomically distinct structures to work together to achieve
irreducible, coordinated end products. By irreducible we
mean that the activity in question ceases to exist, or is qual-
itatively altered, if not performed through the integrated
action of anatomically distinct units.2 The same may be 
true of stimulation of anatomically distinct structures in dif-
ferent perceptual systems (several examples of this are
given in sect. 6). Thus, the anatomical differences between
Stoffregen & Bardy: On specification and the senses
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the two ears, the two eyes, and so on, are not a sufficient
reason for parsing perception into distinct senses (cf. Gib-
son 1966, p. 42).3
2.4. Energy
A second possibility is that we might distinguish among the
senses on the basis of stimulus energy:
Seeing involves the activity of extracting information from light
radiation; hearing occurs when a creature gains information
from pressure waves of certain sorts; smell and taste involve the
extraction of information from chemical features of the envi-
ronment . . . touch incorporates the capacity to obtain infor-
mation about things via mechanical contact of some sort. (Heil
1983, p. 8)
However, this is problematic, also. One cannot generate a list
of stimulus energies without prior knowledge of perceptual
systems. For example, defining vision as the pickup of infor-
mation from light requires a definition of “light”. The elec-
tromagnetic spectrum is a continuum that has no inherent
partitions. Only a narrow band of the spectrum is associated
with vision and thus called “light.” Therefore, defining vision
in terms of electromagnetic energy requires an appeal to vis-
ible light, at which point the definition becomes circular.
Similarly, animals are sensitive to only a limited range of
acoustic frequencies, and the range of audible frequencies
differs across species. This means that defining hearing in
terms of acoustic energy requires an appeal to audible vibra-
tions, at which point this definition also becomes circular.
In addition, a given form of energy may stimulate ana-
tomically distinct receptor systems. For example, in many
species infrared radiation is perceived as warmth, but in
some species of snakes it is used to “see”; this is dependent
on receptors that are different and separate from both the
eyes and the skin (Hartline et al. 1978). Similarly, certain
forms of mechanical energy are involved in touch, while
others, differing only in frequency, are involved in hearing
(e.g., the concussion of fireworks can be felt as well as
heard). What is considered to be vision for one organism is
considered to be touch for another, and perhaps audition
for yet another. Thus, it seems unlikely that we can develop
an a priori argument for the existence of separate senses
from the existence of different types of ambient energy.
2.5. Neurophysiology
It might be argued that there is a neurophysiological basis
for the existence of distinct perceptual systems. However,
the nervous system does not appear to be organized in a
sense-specific fashion (cf. Alexandrov & Jarvilehto 1993).
Many structures in the nervous system respond to activity
originating in more than one sense modality (e.g., Fishman
& Michael 1973). This is true even for “seemingly dedi-
cated unimodal regions” (Stein & Meredith 1993, p. xi; cf.
Weingarten & Spinelli 1966):
Convergence of sensory inputs [has been found] in unicellular
organisms, comparatively simple multicellular organisms such
as flatworms, in the higher primates, and at all intervening lev-
els of complexity. In fact, we know of no animal with a nervous
system in which the different sensory representations are orga-
nized so that they maintain exclusivity from one another. (Stein
& Meredith 1993, p. xii)
For example, neurons in higher levels of the so-called visual
cortex (i.e., area V4) respond selectively to a preferred ori-
entation when a line is presented visually, but also when an
invisible line is felt with the hand (Maunsell et al. 1989).
Similarly, the so-called vestibular nucleus is known to re-
spond to activity in the visual system (Stein & Meredith
1993). Thus, our current knowledge of neurophysiology
cannot be used as an a priori justification for the assump-
tion of separate senses.
2.6. Summary
The previous discussion raises questions about the exis-
tence of separate perceptual systems. We use this uncer-
tainty to reconsider existing views of perception that are
based on the assumption of separate senses. In section 3,
we examine contemporary concepts of specification.
3. Multiple senses and specification
In this section we focus on relations between the assumed
existence of separate perceptual systems and the concept of
specification. We discuss three approaches to relations be-
tween the senses, which we refer to as the no specification,
modal specification, and independent specification views.
In many respects, these three views differ from one another
profoundly. However, we will argue that in the context of
intersensory relations the three views share much of the
same logic. We begin with a brief review of some conse-
quences of the hypothesis that there is no specification. We
then argue that these consequences are problematic for ex-
isting views that assume the existence of specification.
3.1. No specification
The oldest view of specification is that there is none. This
tradition is founded on the epistemological assumption that
there is an ambiguous relation between sensory stimulation
and physical reality (e.g., von Helmholtz 1962; Hochberg
1964; cf. Shaw et al. 1982): A given physical reality can give
rise to multiple patterns in ambient arrays, and a given sen-
sory pattern can be caused by multiple physical realities; the
mapping between physical reality and patterns in sensory
stimulation is many:many (Fig. 1A). In this section we pre-
sent some general corollaries of the assumption of separate
senses which we discuss here because they are most widely
acknowledged and discussed within the no specification
view.
3.1.1. Independent percepts. An implication of the assump-
tion of separate senses is that each perceptual system gener-
ates an independent indication of reality. There are “visual
percepts” of an event, “auditory percepts,” and so on. A per-
cept generated by one system is simultaneous with but inde-
pendent of a percept generated by a different system (e.g.,
Clifton et al. 1994; Marks 1987). One example would be per-
ception of a person speaking, where it is assumed that there
is a visual percept of the moving lips that is independent of
an auditory percept of the speech. By independent we mean
that speech can be heard without being seen (i.e., with the
eyes closed), or seen without being heard (i.e., when viewing
a television with the sound turned off). Interactions between
such independent percepts could occur (e. g., in the McGurk
effect, in which “seen” activity of a speaker influences per-
ception of “heard” speech; McGurk & MacDonald 1976),
but these are logically posterior to the existence of a “visual
Stoffregen & Bardy: On specification and the senses
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percept” and an “auditory percept” of speech. Another ex-
ample would be perception of one’s own walking, in which
there is stimulation of the visual, vestibular, and somatosen-
sory systems, each of which is thought to be stimulated in-
dependent of the others (e.g., Lackner & DiZio 1988). “The
multisensory nature of self-motion permits investigators to
de-couple the relationship among sensory modalities in or-
der to assess each one’s contribution to perception” (Car-
penter-Smith et al. 1995, p. 36). Interactions between the
senses occur in the nervous system (i.e., “sensory conver-
gence”), and are not properties of sensory stimulation.
In the McGurk effect, the influence of sight upon what
is heard is believed to result from an internal, inferential
comparison or matching of the visually perceived activity of
the face and the auditorily perceived activity of the vocal
tract. McGurk and MacDonald (1976, p. 747) argued that
the visual-auditory interaction was produced by integration
of “information from the two modalities.” Green et al.
(1991) argued that the presumed audio-visual integration
occurs relatively late in phonetic processing, after the ex-
traction of information about the voice characteristics of the
speaker. Kuhl and Meltzoff (1984; Meltzoff & Kuhl 1994)
discussed two mechanisms that might explain the McGurk
effect. Each of these (identity matching and supramodal
representations) is based on the assumption that integra-
tion of vision and hearing occurs within the observer. Eco-
logically based accounts of the McGurk effect stress that
the speech event naturally structures both the optic and
acoustic arrays, but continue to accept the assumption that
the resulting patterns are detected via “integration of the
information from the two modalities” (Fowler & Dekle
1991, p. 822; Rosenblum & Saldana 1996). These examples
from divergent research domains illustrate the general im-
plication of the assumption of separate senses, that initially
(at least) each perceptual system generates an independent
indication of reality.
3.1.2. Frames of reference. Perception can be understood
as a form of measurement and, like any system of measure-
ment, it must be conducted relative to some referent or
metric. Ideally, the referents for perception should be
physical; the surface of the earth, another person, and so on.
Stoffregen & Bardy: On specification and the senses
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Figure 1. Some of the possible mappings between physical reality and the structure of ambient arrays. A: The no specification view as-
sumes that the mapping is many:many, so that the structure in ambient arrays is ambiguous with respect to reality. B: The modal speci-
fication view posits 1:1 mappings, but assumes that these exist within individual ambient arrays. C: The multiple specification version of
the independent specification view suggests that a given aspect of reality redundantly structures several parameters within a given am-
bient array. D: The amodal specification version of the independent specification view assumes that a given aspect of reality redundantly
structures parameters within different ambient arrays.
However, if there is no specification, then there can be no
direct access to physical referents (Oman 1982); any knowl-
edge of physical referents must be a product of internal pro-
cessing. This inferential processing, or unconscious infer-
ence, requires its own referents. For example, Lakatos
(1993, p. 143) argued that each sense relies upon its “prin-
cipal sensory dimension as the basis for interpretation.” For
this reason, within traditional views it is widely hypothe-
sized that the referents for perception are properties of sen-
sory stimulation, or sensory reference frames (e.g., Soecht-
ing & Flanders 1992; cf. Feldman & Levin 1995).
Different frames of reference are believed to exist for
each perceptual system; acoustic structure for the auditory
system, gravito-inertial force for the vestibule, anisotropic
optical structure for the visual system (luminous lines, car-
pentered environments), and patterns of pressure within
and at the surface of the body for somatosensory systems.
Because they are based on qualitatively different forms of
energy, these frames of reference are mutually exclusive;
optical structure is qualitatively unrelated to acoustic or
gravito-inertial structure, for instance. Thus, object motion
(e.g., the movement of the vocal tract during speech) would
be perceived by the visual system relative to an optical
frame of reference, while it would be perceived by the au-
ditory system relative to an acoustic frame of reference.
Similarly, walking would give rise to changes in optical stim-
ulation that differ qualitatively from changes in stimulation
of the vestibular and somatosensory systems.
3.1.3. Input conflict. When a single event influences multi-
ple ambient arrays, it will often be the case that separate ar-
rays suggest different and incompatible (i.e., mutually ex-
clusive) realities. In such cases, the patterns in different
arrays are said to conflict with one another (e.g., Bushnell
& Weinberger 1987; Harris 1965; McGurk & MacDonald
1976; Nashner et al. 1982); we refer to this as input conflict
(Stoffregen & Riccio 1991).4 Consider driving a car at con-
stant velocity. Mechanical properties of the vehicle and the
road produce low-amplitude vibration, which is transmitted
to the body and propagates upward through the body to the
head. Due to the nonrigidity of the body, there are differ-
ences in the phase and amplitude of vibration of the torso
and head. Somatosensory stimulation (i.e., patterns of pres-
sure on the torso) suggests vibration, but is ambiguous 
with respect to translation. Vestibular stimulation (patterns
of gravito-inertial force at the head) also suggests vibra-
tion (and is ambiguous with respect to translation), but the
vibration is not the same as that suggested by the soma-
tosensory system. Visual stimulation (i.e., optical flow) sug-
gests linear translation coupled with low-amplitude vibra-
tion. Vision will conflict with the other two systems because
only vision suggests translation. In addition, there will be in-
put conflict between patterns available to the somatosen-
sory and vestibular systems, since these suggest different vi-
bratory motions.
3.1.4. Antagonistic interaction. When there is input con-
flict, the organism must make a choice (usually construed
as unconscious inference) about the actual state of reality.
The choice must be internal because the structure of the
ambient arrays is assumed to be ambiguous with respect to
reality. In most theories the determination of a single per-
cept (i.e., the resolution of conflict) is believed to rely on
antagonistic interactions between the perceptual systems.
One form of antagonistic interaction is sensory suppression,
in which perceivers resolve conflict “by responding selec-
tively to input in one modality and ignoring inputs in other
modalities” (Lewkowicz 1994, p. 166). For example, when
there is conflict between vision and touch, it often is be-
lieved that vision dominates touch in determining a single
percept (e.g., Harris 1965; Marks 1978; Warren & Rossano
1991). Alternately, the antagonistic interaction may consist
of a calculation in which different weights are assigned to
inputs from each perceptual system (e.g., Oman 1982;
Parker & Poston 1984).
3.1.5. Illusory percepts. If the dominant input is not cor-
rect or if there are errors in the weighting scheme, then the
final percept will be inaccurate. For this reason, differences
in stimulation across perceptual systems can lead to per-
ceptual errors, or illusions (e.g., Dichgans & Brandt 1978;
Warren & Rossano 1991; Witkin & Asch 1948). A large por-
tion of perceptual research relies on subjective reports that
are believed to reflect erroneous or illusory percepts (e.g.,
Dichgans & Brandt 1978; Leibowitz et al. 1986; Wertheim
1994).
The no specification view leads to theories of perception
in which sensory stimulation is ambiguous with respect to
reality, so that accurate perception depends upon internal
processing to resolve the ambiguity. Given that virtually all
behavior gives rise to multimodal stimulation and that
much of this stimulation is nonredundant, a pervasive role
of this processing must be the resolution of input conflict
(Oman 1982). Proponents of the no specification view have
directly addressed many of the resulting problems, and
have proposed a variety of internal processes to deal with
them. In the remainder of this section we argue that these
problems apply equally to existing views that assume the ex-
istence of specification.
3.2. Modal specification
The ecological approach to perception and action consti-
tutes a fundamental contrast to traditional theories. Part of
the contrast exists at the level of epistemology. The ecolog-
ical approach rejects the assumption that the relation be-
tween potential sensory stimulation and physical reality is
ambiguous. Within the ecological approach it is assumed
that there is a lawful 1:1 relation, or mapping, between po-
tential sensory stimulation and reality such that properties
in ambient arrays specify the underlying physical reality
(e.g., Shaw et al. 1982). Specification would make it possi-
ble for perception to be direct, that is, for veridical infor-
mation about reality to be picked up without mediation by
unconscious inference. We noted in section 3.1 that sensory
reference frames are required in the no specification view.
When specification is assumed to exist, sensory reference
frames are unnecessary: If perception is direct, then per-
ceivables can be measured relative to physical referents.
The concept of specification has been applied in a vari-
ety of ways. The most common interpretation is what we re-
fer to as the hypothesis of modal specification. The modal
specification hypothesis asserts that specificity exists in in-
dividual energy arrays (e.g., Fowler 1986; Kugler & Turvey
1987, p. 9; see Fig. 1B). The argument is that for reasons of
natural law each ambient array bears a specificational rela-
tion to the underlying physical reality. Considerable effort
has been directed to identifying the quantifiable parame-
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ters of ambient arrays that may have the essential 1:1 rela-
tion with aspects of physical reality. Examples include
global optical flow (Gibson 1966), which is created by self-
motion through an illuminated environment, patterns in
the haptic array produced by the inertia tensor (Solomon &
Turvey 1988), which is a property of handheld objects; and
t and its time-derivatives (e.g., Lee 1980), which can be in-
fluenced by temporal properties of impending collision,
such as time-to-contact (Tc). Presentations of the modal
specification hypothesis generally have not addressed (i.e.,
have neither accepted nor rejected) the possibility that in-
formation may exist in patterns that extend across different
energy arrays (e.g., Fowler 1986; Kugler & Turvey 1987;
Lee 1980; cf. Smith 1994).
The modal specification view does not posit relations be-
tween patterns in different ambient arrays. What are the
implications of this view for situations involving simultane-
ous stimulation of multiple perceptual systems? By framing
its premises in terms of distinct ambient arrays, the modal
specification view embraces the assumption that separate
senses exist. This causes problems for intersensory rela-
tions, which can be illustrated by again considering driving
at constant velocity. The discrepancy (i.e., nonredundancy)
between stimulation of the visual, vestibular, and somato-
sensory systems would constitute ambiguity concerning
physical reality, that is, input conflict. If a given reality gives
rise to different structures in two or more senses, then at
least one of the structures must be wrong, in other words,
not specific to reality.
This problem has not been addressed in discussions of
modal specification. For example, in the literature on opti-
cal flow it is common to suppose that the optical specifica-
tion of self-motion is independent of (Warren 1995) or will
dominate (Lee & Lishman 1975) information about self-
motion that is picked up by other sensory modalities, but
there has been little discussion of the input conflict that this
implies or its consequences for the concept of specification.
3.3. Independent specification
We have seen that in the no specification view the mapping
between reality and potential sensory stimulation is as-
sumed to be many:many, while in the modal specification
view the mapping is assumed to be 1:1. The third view,
which we refer to as the independent specification hypoth-
esis (Stoffregen & Pittenger 1995), proposes that the map-
ping is 1:many. In this view, each aspect of physical reality
gives rise to multiple, independent structures or patterns in
one or more ambient arrays, yet each pattern is individually
specific to the underlying reality. In the behavioral science
literature this proposal has taken two forms, one positing
1:many mappings within a given ambient array (multiple
specification), and the other positing 1:many mappings be-
tween arrays (amodal specification). We will argue that
these two views are logically identical.
3.3.1. Multiple specification. In this view, a given aspect of
reality is believed to influence the structure of multiple as-
pects of a given ambient array (Fig. 1C). These different as-
pects constitute “multiple sources of information” about re-
ality, and it is hypothesized that perception can be achieved
with equal fidelity on the basis of any one (Cutting & Vish-
ton 1995). Optical examples include multiple specification
of Tc (Laurent et al. 1996), and multiple specification of
heading (Warren et al. 1991). The most general develop-
ment of this view has been presented by Cutting, who ar-
gued that observers “select among multiple sources of in-
formation” (Cutting 1986, p. 241), each of which “equally
specifies the physics of a situation for an object or event”
(Cutting 1991, p. 29). The result is that “all sources equally
specify the object or event perceived” (Cutting 1986, p. 248).
3.3.2. Amodal specification. James Gibson (1966; see also
Gibson 1969; 1983) argued that information can be amodal,
or available redundantly to more than one perceptual sys-
tem (as we noted earlier, James Gibson also endorsed a dif-
ferent position; this is discussed in sect. 6). Thus, the
amodal specification view posits a 1:many mapping, with
properties of reality being specified by patterns existing re-
dundantly in different ambient arrays (Fig. 1D). James Gib-
son presented this as a general assertion:
Different stimulus energies – acoustical, chemical, radiant –
can all carry the same stimulus information . . . patterns in the
flux of sound, touch, and light from the environment may be
equivalent to one another by invariant laws of nature. (Gibson
1966, p. 55; cf. Gibson 1986, p. 115)
The concept of amodal information has a strong appeal
for many ecological psychologists, who argue that it “does
away completely with the paradox of detecting cross-modal
correspondences when the patterns of energy formally have
nothing in common. If a person is detecting information
and not stimulus cues, the same information is available in
various forms” (Pick 1986, p. 235). Within the ecological ap-
proach, research addressing relations between the senses
has concentrated almost exclusively on the concept of
amodal specification (e.g., Bahrick 1988; Fitzpatrick et al.
1994; Lee 1990; Rosenblum & Saldana 1996; cf. Smith
1994).
3.3.3. Problems with independent specification. For both
independent specification views, the interpretation of driv-
ing at constant velocity appears to be similar to the inter-
pretation of the no specification and modal specification
views. The multiple specification view does not posit any
comparison between modalities, but if such a comparison
took place it would reveal a discrepancy or ambiguity con-
cerning reality in the arrays available to the visual, so-
matosensory, and vestibular systems, in other words, input
conflict (cf. Cutting & Vishton 1995, p. 98). If stimulus pa-
rameters can vary independently of one another, then at
least one of them will vary independently of the relevant re-
ality; hence, that variable (at least) does not bear a lawful
relation to reality. This is implicit in the statement that “one
can in principle vary one without varying another” (Cutting
1991, p. 29). Cutting’s assertion refers to variations that
might be caused by an experimenter. However, the concept
of specification is based on the physics of energy propaga-
tion, which applies both within as well as beyond the labo-
ratory. If such variations are possible in the laboratory, then
they must be possible in general. This problem is reflected
in empirical evaluations of the multiple specification hy-
pothesis. For example, Laurent et al. (1996) described op-
tical variables that, they argued, are independently specific
to Tc. One of these was the rate of change of expansion of
an optical contour, and another was the rate change of oc-
ular convergence required to maintain binocular fixation on
an approaching object. Laurent et al. (1996) proposed eval-
uating the relative effectiveness of these variables by using
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an experimental manipulation that altered the relation of
one optical variable to Tc while not influencing the other
variable. By its nature, this manipulation violates the defi-
nition of specification: If it is possible to alter the relation
between a stimulus variable and reality, then the stimulus
variable does not have a unique, determinate relation to
that reality. Thus, the multiple specification view appears to
imply a lack of specificity and so implies a need for infer-
ential processing to resolve conflict between inputs.
The concept of amodal specification is commonly used to
explain crossmodal influences on the perception of objects
or events that naturally structure more than one form of
ambient energy. Examples include objects that influence
the structure of the optic array and, when touched, of pres-
sure on the skin (e.g., Gibson & Walker 1984); support sur-
faces, which influence the structure of the optic and me-
chanical arrays (e.g., Fitzpatrick et al. 1994); and speech,
which structures the optic and acoustic arrays (e.g., Rosen-
blum & Saldana 1996). In such situations the concept im-
plies a comparison between information obtained via dif-
ferent perceptual systems. The postulation of such a
crossmodal comparison requires a prior assumption that
the senses work separately in such a way that their outputs
can be compared. Thus, there must be, for example, a vi-
sual perception of an event that is then compared with an
independently generated haptic perception of the same
event (e.g., Gibson & Walker 1984). Fowler and Dekle
(1991, p. 822) proposed that speech perception is based on
the “joint specification” of speech in the optic and acoustic
arrays, while Rosenblum and Saldana (1996, p. 328) dis-
cussed speech in the context of “modality neutral kinematic
patterns.”
Among proponents of amodal specification, there has
been little discussion of what happens when structures in
different ambient arrays are discrepant rather than redun-
dant. Cases where discrepancies exist, such as driving,
would appear to constitute input conflict, with its attendant
implication of the lack of specificity and need for inferen-
tial processing. When patterns in different arrays are
caused by different events (as in studies of the McGurk ef-
fect), then the patterns must also be discrepant or conflict-
ing (e.g., Rosenblum & Saldana 1996). The resolution of
this conflict has not been discussed (e.g., Fowler & Dekle
1991; Rosenblum & Saldana 1996), but it would appear to
imply an internal process. Thus, with respect to specifica-
tion, the hypothesis of amodality appears to be logically
identical to the hypothesis of multiple specification within
a modality.
The independent specification hypothesis can be true
only if each candidate stimulus parameter always varies
uniquely with the corresponding physical event. Only then
would specification be preserved, and input conflict
avoided. Given that this is not true, it is not clear whether
either form of the independent specification hypothesis can
be correct.
3.4. Summary
Each view of specification is confronted with problems that
arise from the existence of discrepancies among the pat-
terns of energy available to different perceptual systems.
Supporters of the no specification view have not provided
a justification for the assumption of separate senses, but
they have moved to address many of the issues that arise
from the concept of input conflict. There has been no sim-
ilar movement among supporters of the modal specification
and independent specification views. We have argued that
by accepting the assumption of separate senses, the modal
specification and independent specification views implic-
itly accept the existence of input conflict, which is incom-
patible with the concept of specification.
4. Physical referents for physical motion
In section 3, our analysis focused on the possibility of a law-
ful relation between ambient arrays and reality. We argued
that the assumption of separate senses leads to problems for
theories of perception that assume the existence of specifi-
cation in ambient arrays. In this section we pursue this ar-
gument at a more fundamental level. We will argue that
concepts of specification that are based on individual forms
of ambient energy are problematic at a level of physics that
is logically prior to the structuring of ambient energy. That
is, we will argue that even if there were lawful relations be-
tween some aspects of reality and the structure of individ-
ual forms of ambient energy, this would not imply that these
structures bear a 1:1 relation to reality, in general. While
our focus is on the concept of specification, our analysis has
general implications for the interpretation (by behavioral
scientists) of physical motion.
If specification exists, then it should be possible for per-
ceivables to be measured relative to physical referents (sect.
3.2). What are these physical referents?5 In this section we
discuss referents that are used by physicists. Each of the
referents that we discuss could serve as a referent for a for-
mal (physical) analysis of motion, independent of any psy-
chology.
4.1. All motion is relative
Behavior consists of motion. Perception involves motion 
of receptor systems (often including the whole body), and
action involves motion of effectors (often including the
whole body). Thus, the perception and control of behavior
is largely equivalent to the perception and control of mo-
tion. This raises questions about the physics of motion.
How do we define motion? A common concept within
the behavioral sciences is the idea of absolute motion. Be-
havioral scientists often refer to “absolute motion” (Wert-
heim 1994, p. 302) or “objective motion” (Held & Leib-
owitz 1994, p. 451). Yet in physics absolute motion is not a
meaningful concept. In general relativity, the concept of ab-
solute motion has no meaning (Becker 1954; Einstein & In-
feld 1938). Motion can be defined only relative to some ref-
erent: for example, motion relative to the earth, motion
relative to the sun, motion relative to an object (Wade &
Swanston 1991, pp. 96–97).
While these physics are well understood, their conse-
quences for analyses of behavior have not been fully ad-
dressed. We know that the earth moves relative to the sun
and has a different motion relative to the galaxy, but a pow-
erful and widespread intuition remains that at the level of
behavior the earth and its gravitational field constitute an
absolute referent for motion. For example, Wertheim
(1994, p. 302) defined absolute motion as “motion relative
to external space (i.e., 3-D ‘Newtonian’ space, as defined by
the horizontal surface of the earth and its gravitational
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field).” Similarly, Dichgans and Brandt (1978, p. 758),
equated “orientation with respect to . . . gravity” with “po-
sition of objects and the observer on the earth’s surface.” In
both cases, the concept of absolute motion assumes that
motion relative to earth gravity is equivalent to motion rel-
ative to the earth. Since the earth is a source of gravity, and
since gravity does not move relative to the earth, this as-
sumption is unquestioned. Nevertheless, it is incorrect. It
is possible to be in motion relative to the earth and station-
ary relative to earth gravity at the same time.
4.2. The earth and its gravity
Earth gravity is an accelerative force that tends to move
masses toward the earth’s center of mass. At any point on or
above the earth, gravity points toward the center of the
earth (Fig. 2). A consequence of this is that a person aligned
with gravity in Cincinnati will be at an angle relative to a
person aligned with gravity in Paris. This is true for points
arbitrarily close together: Upright people on opposite sides
of town are at a slight angle relative to one another. In ad-
dition, a person traveling along a gravitational equipotential
(an arc at constant distance from the earth’s center of mass)
will have a constant alignment relative to gravity; his in-
stantaneous alignment relative to the instantaneous (i.e., lo-
cal) direction of gravity will always be the same. If the per-
son moves along the equipotential at constant velocity,
there will be no acceleration relative to gravity, and so the
body will be gravito-inertially identical to one at rest rela-
tive to the earth (Goldstein 1980). Under these conditions,
the person is moving relative to the earth, but stationary rel-
ative to the earth’s gravitational field.
The requirement for constant velocity motion along a
gravitational equipotential is restrictive in terms of real be-
havior. For example, it excludes many forms of biological
motion or locomotion, because these are characterized by
changes in velocity. However, the requirements can be met,
sometimes with surprising ease. A person would need to be
restrained to prevent small accelerations due to nonrigid
body motion.6 Such a person could then be placed in an air-
craft during straight and level flight (i.e., flight at constant
altitude and velocity). The same effect would obtain for a
restrained person in an automobile traveling at fixed speed
along a straight, flat road, or on a sled gliding across ice. In
these cases the person would be in motion relative to the
earth, but stationary relative to gravity. These examples
show that the magnitude of velocity is irrelevant: A person
can be stationary relative to gravity whether he is traveling
at walking speed or at hundreds of kilometers per hour.
This analysis illustrates a fundamental error in any at-
tempt to equate motion relative to the earth with motion
relative to earth’s gravity. The intuitively comfortable idea
of absolute motion makes sense only if motion relative to
gravity and motion relative to the earth’s surface are identi-
cal. Given that they are not, which of these should be con-
sidered absolute, and why? This dilemma illustrates the
meaninglessness of the concept of absolute motion (Becker
1954) and shows that any psychological construct of ab-
solute motion, or of an absolute referent for motion, can
have no basis in physical reality.
4.3. Motion relative to the direction of balance
Gravity is widely considered to be a fundamental constraint
on the control of orientation and motion (e.g., Schone
1984). However, this assumption is incorrect. In general,
the orientation of physical bodies (both animate and inani-
mate) is not influenced directly by the direction of gravity.
Orientation is influenced directly by the direction of bal-
ance (Riccio & Stoffregen 1990).7 In general, an object will
remain balanced only when aligned with the direction of
balance. If a pencil standing on its eraser is aligned with the
direction of balance it will not fall over, even if the direction
of balance differs from the direction of gravity.
For animals, changes in the direction of balance are most
commonly created by their own behavior. These changes
result from inertial forces that they apply to the support sur-
face or medium in controlling orientation and locomotion.
Animals often align their bodies relative to the direction of
balance (Riccio 1995). For example, in curvlinear locomo-
tion, the direction of balance is shifted out of alignment
with gravity by the inertial forces generated by the animal
(or vehicle) in creating the turn. When runners, cyclists,
and motorcyclists lean into turns they do not fall over de-
spite the fact that their bodies are out of alignment with
gravity. This is because they remain aligned with the direc-
tion of balance as the latter rotates, just as tassels hung from
a car’s rearview mirror also “lean” during turns. The rota-
tion of the direction of balance in turns results from the in-
ertial forces that sustain the turn.
It might be argued that accelerations generated by ani-
mate behavior are of such low magnitude that they can be
ignored. However, the magnitude of acceleration gener-
ated by living things commonly exceeds magnitudes that
can be generated by most vehicles (Vogel 1988). Biologi-
cally generated accelerations are often brief, but this does
not imply that they can be (or are) ignored. Linear acceler-
ation changes the direction of balance (Riccio 1995), with
the change being proportional to the magnitude of the ac-
celeration. One common example concerns sprinters who
prepare to begin a race by setting their body at an angle,
with the torso partially supported by the hands. When the
starting gun goes off they apply maximum acceleration.
During a brief accelerative phase they can easily be ob-
served (e.g., on slow-motion film) to be tilted forward (rel-
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Figure 2. At any location on or above the earth’s surface, earth
gravity points toward the earth’s center of mass. A person aligned
with gravity in Cincinnati (DGC) is at an angle relative to a per-
son aligned with gravity in Paris (DGP). A person traveling from
Cincinnati to Paris at constant velocity (relative to the earth) along
a gravitational equipotential is moving relative to earth but is sta-
tionary relative to gravity.
ative to the ground) while running. As runners approach
top speed, they straighten up. The initial lean prepares
them to be aligned with the shift in the direction of balance
that will result from their own efforts (imagine what would
happen if they applied their full acceleration while stand-
ing erect). Horizontal acceleration decreases rapidly as they
approach top speed. The decrease in acceleration causes
the direction of balance to rotate toward the direction of
gravity; as the runners straighten up, they should “track”
this rotation.
The direction of balance has no fixed relation to the earth’s
surface, or to earth gravity. A consequence of this is that 
an animal can have one alignment or motion relative to the
earth, another relative to gravity, and a third relative to the
direction of balance. Equally important is the fact that 
the direction of balance is highly localized; it can differ for
adjacent animals (depending of what they are doing), and it
can change rapidly over time (e.g., brief changes brought
about by the transient accelerations that characterize ani-
mate locomotion). This illustrates, at the level of behavior,
the vacuity of any concept of absolute motion. It is to be
stressed, again, that these referents (earth gravity, the di-
rection of balance, and the earth’s surface) are logically and
physically distinct.
4.4. No privileged referent
The discussion in section 4.3 might seem to suggest that the
local, instantaneous direction of balance is a fundamental
or absolute referent for the control of behavior. We believe
that this is not true. The reason is that the direction of bal-
ance is not always relevant to behavior. Two examples will
make this point. First, orientation, and behavior in general,
continue to be controlled effectively when there is no di-
rection of balance (e.g., when the gravito-inertial force vec-
tor has a magnitude and direction of zero). This is true in
orbital spaceflight, where gravity has a direction and
nonzero magnitude, but the gravito-inertial force vector has
a magnitude of zero and no direction. After a period of ad-
justment, humans and other animals control their orienta-
tion and motion very capably under such conditions. A re-
lated example occurs with water immersion. Under water,
the gravito-inertial force vector has magnitude and direc-
tion, but for a person in a state of neutral buoyancy there is
no direction of balance (i.e., at neutral buoyancy the grav-
ito-inertial force vector imposes no directional constraints
on orientation or behavior). People who are at neutral
buoyancy have only a poor ability to perceive or control ori-
entation and locomotion relative to the gravito-inertial
force vector, but they have a good ability to perceive and
control orientation and locomotion relative to other refer-
ents, such as objects or surfaces (Stoffregen & Riccio 1988).
This indicates that neither the direction of balance nor the
gravito-inertial force vector is a general or exclusive refer-
ent for the control of behavior.
Sometimes behavior is not controlled relative to the di-
rection of balance even when the direction of balance is
present; we sacrifice alignment with the direction of bal-
ance to some other goal. Examples include a soccer goal-
keeper diving to catch a shot, and a baseball player diving
to catch a fly ball. In such cases, once the player has left the
ground, the ball may be the sole referent for both percep-
tion and control. Recent research on prehension suggests
that reaching and grasping are organized directly with ref-
erence to the object, rather than by defining the object’s po-
sition and motion relative to other referents (Garrett et al.
1998; Zaal et al. 1998).
4.5. Multiple, task-specific referents
The existence of logically independent referents does not
imply that only one referent is relevant to behavior at any
given time. It may be that animals control different aspects
of their behavior relative to different referents (Riccio
1995; cf. Fouque et al. 1999). A person who is in motion rel-
ative to one referent and in stasis relative to another, for ex-
ample, may simultaneously control their orientation and
motion relative to both. Consider driving at constant veloc-
ity on a flat highway. During turns, as the direction of bal-
ance changes relative to the surface of the earth, the torso
remains aligned with the direction of balance (that is, it ro-
tates as the direction of balance rotates), but the head and
eyes may maintain their orientation relative to the road
(Fig. 3). A similar effect occurs in flight. During turns, the
pilot must control the orientation (and position) of the air-
craft relative to the surface of the earth (e.g., for naviga-
tion), while at the same time aircraft orientation must be
maintained relative to the direction of balance (i.e., to main-
tain aerodynamic stability). Perception and control relative
to multiple, simultaneous referents will be adaptive in most
situations (Riccio 1995).
Our analysis reveals a general requirement for increased
care in characterizations of motion. The existence of an un-
limited number of independent physical referents means
that a description of motion is meaningful if and only if it
names the referent (or referents) relative to which the mo-
tion takes place. In turn, this means that across situations
action may be perceived and controlled relative to different
referents. The selection of referents should have a func-
tional basis (Riccio 1995); that is, it should depend on the
goals of action. One aspect of learning to perform new tasks
will be the determination of which referents are relevant.
4.6. Summary
We have reviewed the fact that in physics there is no mean-
ingful concept of absolute motion. We have shown this to
be true in the case of motion relative to the earth, which
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Figure 3. Multiple, simultaneous referents. The driver main-
tains his body in alignment with the direction of balance, while si-
multaneously maintaining his head and eyes in alignment with the
illuminated environment (the road). During straight driving (A)
the head and body are parallel, but in turns (B), when the direc-
tion of balance is not perpendicular to the road, the head and body
remain aligned with their separate referents.
differs from motion relative to the earth’s gravitational
field. The absence of a single, fundamental referent for
motion led us to consider the existence of a variety of ref-
erents, all independent and of equal reality: None can be
regarded as primary or basic to any other. Finally, this
leads to the idea that motion can be analyzed (and per-
ceived and controlled) relative to multiple simultaneous
physical referents. In the next section we will consider the
implications of these facts of physics for the concept of
specification.
5. Physics and specification
In this section we discuss some of the implications of our
analysis of physical referents for theories of perception. The
first implication applies only to theories that posit the exis-
tence of specificity between reality and the structure of am-
bient energy arrays. The second implication is more gen-
eral.
5.1. Ambiguity in single-energy arrays
Our discussion of physical referents revealed that there are
an unlimited number of possible referents, all of which are
mutually independent at the level of physics. Motion rela-
tive to any one of these is equally real. How does this relate
to the hypothesis that the structure of ambient energy 
arrays is specific to reality? The specificity hypothesis is 
not about the nature of reality, and so is not about the exis-
tence of, or relations between physical referents. Rather,
specificity is about the mapping between the physics of the 
animal-environment interaction and the energy fields that
are available to perceptual systems. Accordingly, this map-
ping is logically posterior to the existence, number, and in-
dependence of physical referents. This raises questions
about relations between physical referents and the struc-
turing of ambient arrays. Does motion relative to a given
physical referent impart unique structure to a particular
form of ambient energy? Can motion relative to a given
physical referent impart unique structure to more than one
form of energy?
While all physical referents are equally real, they do not
have equivalent relations to various forms of ambient en-
ergy. For example, a given event may entail motion relative
to the surfaces and media that generate, reflect, or prop-
agate light (the illuminated environment), yet may entail 
simultaneous stasis or motion relative to the direction of
balance (the gravito-inertial environment). Changes in po-
sition or motion relative to the illuminated environment
will not necessarily produce changes in position or motion
relative to the direction of balance, and vice versa. This
means that a given pattern of optical structure may corre-
spond to a variety of patterns of gravito-inertial structure,
and vice versa. Consider an animal moving along a gravi-
tational equipotential (see sect. 4). The animal would be 
in motion relative to the illuminated environment (produc-
ing spatiotemporal changes in optical structure) but station-
ary relative to the direction of balance (producing spatio-
temporal stasis in what we might call the gravito-inertial 
array).8 Consider also motion in an elevator, where there
are changes in gravito-inertial structure (as the elevator ac-
celerates), but stasis in optical structure. In these cases, the
gravito-inertial array does not specify real changes in posi-
tion and motion relative to the illuminated environment,
and the optic array does not specify real changes in position
and motion relative to the gravito-inertial environment.
Similarly, the structure of the gravito-inertial array is not
specific to motion relative to the surface of the earth; this is
true, also, of structure in the optic array, which can vary in-
dependent of motion relative to the earth’s surface. Com-
pare a situation in which a person flies along a gravitational
equipotential with a situation in which a person in a fixed-
base simulator is exposed to a simulation of flight along a
gravitational equipotential. Although these situations differ
dramatically in their consequences for behavior (e.g., an
aircraft crash can be fatal, but a simulator crash is harmless),
it would not be possible to differentiate them on the basis
of structure in the optic array, or in the gravito-inertial ar-
ray. This is because the structure of each array is identical
in these two situations (leaving aside temporary limitations
in the technology of optical simulation). In general, there
will not be a unique mapping of physical referents onto
forms of ambient energy; some referents structure only one
form of energy, while others structure multiple forms. This
means that there is no single form of ambient energy whose
structure is specific to position or motion relative to all
physical referents. For this reason, no single form of ambi-
ent energy (i.e., no single-energy array) can have a specifi-
cational relation to physical motion.
Our analysis brings into question the assumption that
structure in light, sound, and other forms of ambient energy
are (individually) specific to physical motion and, hence, to
reality in general. Two possible interpretations may be
drawn from this. One is that specificity does not exist, that
sensory stimulation bears an ambiguous relation to reality,
and, therefore, that any approach based on specification
cannot explain perception and action. The other possible
conclusion is that specificity exists in something other than
arrays of a single form of energy. The latter possibility is ad-
dressed in section 6.
5.2. Reinterpreting subjective reports
Our analysis of physical referents has important conse-
quences for the perception of physical motion, and for in-
terpretation (by researchers) of subjective reports of phys-
ical motion. These implications apply equally to studies that
assume or reject the existence of specification. For exam-
ple, motion (or stasis) of the self relative to the illuminated
environment is neither more nor less real than motion (or
stasis) of the self relative to the gravito-inertial environ-
ment, relative to the surface of the earth, or relative to any
other physical referent. A person who is stationary relative
to the surface of the earth (e.g., a person standing inside a
“moving room,” Lishman & Lee 1973, or seated inside a ro-
tating drum, Dichgans & Brandt 1978) can be in motion rel-
ative to the illuminated environment. The person’s motion
relative to the room or drum is real, just as his stasis rela-
tive to the earth is real.
This understanding of physical reference frames moti-
vates a substantial reinterpretation of many widely ac-
cepted concepts of perceptual error (i.e., illusion). It is
widely believed that there is erroneous or illusory percep-
tion of self-motion. To underscore the importance of the
concept of perceptual error, Dichgans and Brandt (1978, p.
755) began their chapter with these words: “The sensation
of self motion is a common visual illusion”; this interpreta-
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tion has been accepted generally (e.g., Howard 1982; Lee
& Lishman 1975; Nashner et al. 1982; Wertheim 1994). In
these cases the error may be with the experimenter’s as-
sumption of an “absolute” referent for motion, and not with
participants’ percepts (cf. van Ingen Schenau 1980).
The statements “I am moving” and “I feel like I’m mov-
ing” previously thought to be unambiguous, are now seen
to be ambiguous. Consider the case of a person at rest rel-
ative to the earth’s surface who is exposed to a display of op-
tical flow, which occurs in the cinema, in fixed-base flight
simulators, and in many laboratory experiments (e.g., Dich-
gans & Brandt 1978; Lishman & Lee 1973). In such exper-
iments participants are often asked to state whether they
feel themselves to be moving. If they say that they are mov-
ing, they are correct (this is because they are in motion, rel-
ative to the illuminated environment), but if they say they
are stationary, they are also correct (this is because they are
stationary relative to the earth). The fact that both re-
sponses can be correct illustrates the ambiguous nature of
questions such as “Do you feel that you are in motion?” A
better question, reflecting the physics of motion, would be
“Do you feel that you are in motion relative to anything, and
if so, relative to what?”
This reasoning applies as well to the control of self-
motion. Dichgans and Brandt (1978, p. 787) noted that “il-
lusions” of self-motion can affect the control of orientation
(posture): “deceptive visual motion impressions cause a dis-
placement of . . . postural vertical . . . and body sway.” In
other words, the body sway is an error based on a mistaken
percept. The error interpretation has been retained, either
explicitly or implicitly, in dynamical analyses of the percep-
tion and control of self-motion (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 1994),
and is common in neurophysiological research (Stein &
Meredith 1993). As an example, consider the experiments
of Lishman and Lee (1973), in which standing participants
were exposed to optical flow created by a moving room. In
a variety of conditions, subjects were asked to “report what
was happening when the apparatus was in motion” (p. 290).
Lishman and Lee divided these reports into those consis-
tent with “visual information,” those consistent with “me-
chanical information,” and “other” (“A report was classified
as ‘other’ when it did not wholly correspond to either the vi-
sual or mechanical kinaesthetic information” [p. 290]). A
report that “I am moving” would be classed as “visual,”
while a report that “the room is moving” would be classed
as “mechanical.” Our analysis has shown that each of these
statements is ambiguous. Reports in the “other” category
were not analyzed. However, this category would include
reports that were factually correct, such as “I am in motion
relative to the room, but stationary relative to the floor.”
Lishman and Lee assumed that motion would be perceived
relative to only a single referent. This assumption may have
lead them to exclude correct reports from their analysis,
something that occurs routinely in studies of perceived self-
motion (e.g., Dichgans & Brandt 1978; Graybiel 1952;
Wertheim 1994). This suggests that errors in the experience
of self-motion may be less common than generally is sup-
posed.9
5.3. Summary
The physics of motion, and of referents for motion, have im-
portant implications for the perception of motion and the
interpretation of subjective reports of motion. One impli-
cation is that percepts and behaviors that are not congruent
with gravity or with the earth’s surface are not necessarily
erroneous or illusory. This should motivate a substantial
reinterpretation of many existing data reports and changes
in the way in which participants are asked to report their ex-
periences of self-motion.
We have argued that the physics of motion are logically
prior to the issue of the specification of motion in ambient
energy arrays, and that motion relative to different physical
referents will structure some ambient arrays but not others.
A major implication of this is that specificity does not exist
in the structure of individual forms of ambient energy. This
is not a problem for the no specification view, but it poses a
fundamental problem for views, such as the ecological ap-
proach to perception and action, which assume that speci-
fication exists. If the principle of specification is to be sus-
tained, then it must take some form other than modal
specification or independent specification. This is ad-
dressed in the section 6.
6. Specificity in the global array
If specification cannot exist in single-energy arrays, then it
may not be possible to sustain a theory of direct perception
within the assumption of separate senses. In this section, we
offer a novel hypothesis about specification, which does not
require the assumption of separate senses. We do not at-
tempt a formal proof of our hypothesis. Rather, we argue
that it is possible and that it deserves to be tested.
6.1. The global array
The concept of ambient arrays was developed in the con-
text of single forms of energy, and there is wide acceptance
of the existence of (at least) the optic array and the acoustic
array. We now draw attention to the existence of an ambi-
ent array, which has previously received little consideration.
This array, which we call the global array, consists of spa-
tiotemporal structures that extend across multiple forms of
ambient energy. These patterns are higher-order in the
sense that they are superordinate to (and qualitatively dif-
ferent from) the patterns that exist within single-energy ar-
rays. Thus, in principle, information in the global array may
be detected without prior or concurrent sensitivity to struc-
ture in single-energy arrays (cf. Gibson 1986, p. 141). Like
other ambient arrays, the global array is not an hypothesis,
but a fact. The question is not whether it exists but, rather,
whether it contains information, and whether that infor-
mation is detected and used by animals.
The global array can be represented as an n-dimen-
sional space. The number of dimensions is the sum of di-
mensions of the different forms of energy, minus those di-
mensions that are common across all forms of energy. The
dimensions of space (i.e., position) and time are common
across all forms of energy, while other dimensions are pe-
culiar to individual forms of energy. Considering these
jointly yields a global array with several dimensions. For
purposes of illustration we reduce this to three (Fig. 4).
The structure of the global array (e.g. Fig. 4) is influ-
enced by all events, objects, and surfaces that influence the
structure of single-energy arrays. In addition, the global ar-
ray is influenced by events that do not structure single-
energy arrays; among these are motion relative to some of
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the referents discussed in section 4. Information about
these relative motions is essential for many common be-
haviors, and so animals have a strong motivation for being
sensitive to information in the global array. In the absence
of such sensitivity, animals would be forced to obtain this
information through inferential processing, that is, through
internal comparisons of the patterns in single-energy arrays
(i.e., those picked up by individual perceptual systems).
The following examples illustrate the existence of informa-
tion in patterns that extend across forms of energy. These
examples focus on patterns that extend across two or three
kinds of stimulus energy. However, each is also a structure
in the global array. The events in question may vary the
structures in several forms of energy. Our discussion in
terms of a limited number of forms of ambient energy is for
clarity of presentation only.
Consider a situation in which an automobile cruising at a
constant velocity slows to a stop (Fig. 5); for simplicity we
consider only motion relative to the illuminated environ-
ment (which influences optical structure) and relative to
the gravito-inertial force environment. Figure 5A shows the
consequences of this motion for structure in the optic array
and in the gravito-inertial array. Optical structure is am-
biguous with respect to motion relative to the gravito-iner-
tial environment: The same optical patterns could be
caused by deceleration of the body relative to the ground,
or by deceleration of an illuminated enclosure (e.g., a mov-
ing room; Lee & Lishman 1975) relative to a gravito-iner-
tially stationary observer. At the same time, gravito-inertial
structure is ambiguous with respect to the nature of the mo-
tion: The same patterns of acceleration could be caused by
deceleration to a stop, or by acceleration (in the opposite
direction) to a constant nonzero velocity. Figure 5B shows
the higher-order relation that exists in the global array be-
tween optics and gravito-inertial force. This “optical-gravi-
toinertial pattern” does not have the ambiguities of the pat-
terns in single-energy arrays; it specifies that the observer
is undergoing gravito-inertial deceleration relative to the il-
luminated environment. An animal that was sensitive to this
higher-order pattern would be able to perceive its motion
directly. An animal that was sensitive only to structure in
single-energy arrays would need to relate these structures
through internal processing.10
This example can be expanded to include patterns that
extend across three or more forms of ambient energy. 
Consider a car moving at constant velocity in congested
traffic, where some of the other cars are beyond the field of
view but may still be heard as drivers honk their horns.
Some of these other cars may be moving, while others may
have stopped. The acoustic array, taken in isolation, does
not differentiate between motion of the subject car (or
other cars) relative to the gravito-inertial force environment
and motion of cars relative to each other. Similarly, the op-
tical-gravito-inertial pattern discussed here provides no in-
formation about motion relative to any audible referents.
However, patterns that extend across optics, acoustics, and
gravito-inertial force will provide information about the si-
multaneous motion or stasis of the subject car relative to the
gravito-inertial force environment and relative to the audi-
ble and visible environments.
The original example of information in the global array was
given by James Gibson (1966), who discussed an animal rest-
ing on a support surface. When the substratum is horizontal
relative to the direction of balance, the reactive force that the
surface generates against the dorsal surface of the animal is
parallel to the direction of balance. If the animal is standing,
the ankle angle that corresponds to a state of balance will be
908. However, when the substratum is at an angle relative to
the direction of balance (e.g., on sloping ground) the reactive
force of the substratum is not parallel to the direction of bal-
ance. The angular difference between the direction of bal-
ance and the reactive force is the slope of the substratum rel-
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Figure 4. The global array, represented by a n-dimensional
space (three in this example) of energy structures
Figure 5. Evolution over time of (A) single energy arrays and (B)
the related global array during braking a vehicle to a stop. (A.U.
means arbitrary units.)
ative to the direction of balance. This difference will give rise
to nonredundant stimulation of the vestibular and so-
matosensory systems. The nonredundancy will constitute a
structure in the global array, specifying the slope of the
ground relative to the direction of balance (Gibson 1966, p.
63). Gibson (1966, pp. 271–72) noted that “the combination
is invariant and constitutes a stimulus of a higher-order.” This
means that for animals that are sensitive to the global array,
perception of ground slope can be direct.
A similar analysis applies to a support surface that moves
independent of the direction of balance. Consider stance
on a platform that can rotate around an axis parallel to the
ankle joint (e.g., Nashner et al. 1982). When the platform
is stationary relative to the direction of balance, ankle rota-
tion will have a fixed relation to head displacement, so that
somatosensory and vestibular stimulation will be redun-
dant. When the platform rotates, ankle rotation occurs in-
dependent of head displacement. This is often interpreted
as a situation in which there is conflict between structure
available to the somatosensory and vestibular systems (e.g.,
Nashner et al. 1982). An alternative interpretation is that
the discrepancy between mechanical and gravito-inertial
structures constitutes a pattern in the global array that pro-
vides information for the fact that the person is standing on
a rotating surface. Mechanical structure (available to the so-
matosensory system) taken alone is ambiguous with respect
to the difference between body sway and rotation of the
ground surface. Similarly, gravito-inertial structure (avail-
able to the vestibular system) taken alone is ambiguous with
respect to this difference. Only the superordinate relation
(that is, the structure in the global array) is uniquely related
to each situation.
One of the major challenges for our view will be the for-
malization of structure in the global array. In this target ar-
ticle, we do not attempt such a formalization. However, sev-
eral recent analyses have formalized informative patterns
that exist as higher-order relations between forms of ambi-
ent energy, and so may be examples of structure in the
global array. These formalizations are intended to illustrate
the mathematically rigorous basis of structures in the global
array; they need not be schemes for the weighting of sen-
sory inputs within the perceiver. Rather than internally ex-
ecuting the calculations on the right-hand side of each
equation, the left-hand side might be detected directly (this
is the heart of our position).
Bingham and Stassen (1994) analyzed the structuring of
ambient arrays that results when the head moves relative to
illuminated objects. The purpose of their analysis was to
identify information about the distance of illuminated ob-
jects from the observer. The optical parameter t (i.e., the
inverse of the relative rate of dilation of a contour in the op-
tic array) is influenced by the physical Tc of the head with
the distal object or surface. However, Bingham and Stassen
noted that optical flow created by oscillatory head motion
is ambiguous with respect to distance unless there is inde-
pendent information about the velocity of head motion.
Head movement structures gravito-inertial patterns that
are available to the vestibular system. This means that the
higher-order relation between head velocity and optical
flow is unambiguously related to object distance:
tpv/T 5 (1/2p)(D/A) (1)
where tpv is the value of the optical parameter t at the peak
velocity of head motion, T is the period of head oscillation,
D the distance of the target, and A the amplitude of head
movement.
Peper et al. (1994) analyzed the perception of the location
and timing of catching. In catching an object the catcher
needs information not only about when the object will ar-
rive, but also about where. Peper et al. identified a param-
eter in the global array that provides information about the
velocity at which the hand must move in order to be at the
right place at the right time to catch the object:
Vh 5 (Xb 2 Xh)/t, (2)
where Vh is the hand velocity necessary to intercept a mov-
ing object, Xb is the instantaneous sideward position of the
object, Xh is the current position of the hand, and t is the
Tc of the object with the fronto-parallel plane of the body
(assuming constant velocity object motion). Optical struc-
ture is influenced by Xb and t, while patterns of mechani-
cal pressure are influenced by Xh. Some additional formal-
izations of structures in the global array have been
presented by Stoffregen and Riccio (1988, Eqs. 4–6).
In each of these cases, animals that are sensitive to pat-
terns in the global array can detect the relevant parameters
directly, whereas animals that are sensitive only to structure
in single-energy arrays can recover the necessary informa-
tion only through internal computation. Researchers have
typically assumed that accurate perceptions of relative mo-
tion in these situations are derived from sense-specific sen-
sitivity to structures in optics, force, acoustics, and so on.
That is, researchers have assumed that the patterns in the
global array are not sensed directly, but are broken down at
receptor surfaces, and then reconstructed inside the ani-
mal. Our argument is that patterns in the global array might
be sensed directly, without reduction to structures in indi-
vidual forms of energy.
6.2. Implications of the global array
The implications of the possible existence of specificity in
the global array are numerous. In this section we discuss
several of these.
6.2.1. No specification? If there is specificity in the global
array, then the no specification view is not correct (cf. Gib-
son 1966; Shaw et al. 1982), and theories that use the no
specification view to motivate hypotheses about internal
processing of ambiguous sensory inputs lose this motiva-
tion. We have already noted (sect. 3.4) that proponents of
the no specification view have not offered a justification for
the assumption of separate senses. If none can be provided,
and if specification exists in the global array, this would sig-
nificantly undermine the general motivation for this view.
It might be argued that specification exists but is not de-
tected by animals (e.g., Proffitt & Gilden 1989). To evalu-
ate this argument it would be necessary to identify infor-
mative structures in the global array and conduct new
research to determine whether these are detected. Existing
studies of sensitivity to structures in single-energy arrays
may not be relevant.
6.2.2. Independent specification? The existence of the
global array is a problem for the independent specification
view (which comprises amodal specification and mulitple
specification; see sect. 3.3), since higher-order structures
tend to undermine the idea of the independence of lower
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order parameters. In addition, we have argued that patterns
in single-energy arrays are not specific to reality (sect. 5.1).
If specificity exists solely in the global array, then neither
version of the independent specification view can be cor-
rect.
There can be redundancy across different forms of am-
bient energy, as postulated by the amodal specification
view. In the amodal view, redundancy can be detected only
by an internal comparison of patterns detected by different
perceptual systems (sect. 3.3.3). In our view, redundancy is
a higher-order relation in the global array that can be de-
tected directly. The global array pattern that is created by
redundancy across individual forms of energy is a limiting
case of structure in the global array, but, like any other
structure in the global array, it differs qualitatively from re-
lated structures in single-energy arrays.
We noted earlier (sect. 1) that James Gibson endorsed
two positions with respect to the information available to
different perceptual systems. Our position is not compati-
ble with Gibson’s endorsement of amodal specification (see
sect. 3.3.2). However, our position is compatible with Gib-
son’s claim that information exists in higher-order patterns
that extend across different forms of ambient energy.
6.2.3. Information, energy, and sensory loss. It might be
argued that the global array does not always exist because
some forms of energy are not always present, such as in the
dark, or when there is total silence. Such an argument is
problematic because it relies on a confusion between en-
ergy and information. A lack of energy does not constitute
a lack of information. Rather, the absence of a form of en-
ergy is information (at a minimum, it is information of the
absence of energy, e.g., for the fact that it is dark). James
Gibson made this argument in the context of single-energy
arrays (e.g., Gibson 1966; for additional treatments, see,
e.g., Michaels & Carello 1981; Turvey et al. 1981). He ar-
gued that information for perception exists in patterns in
energy, not in energy per se. We believe that this argument
holds in the context of the global array. If so, then the ab-
sence of any given form of energy would not imply the ab-
sence of the global array.
This has consequences for the loss of receptor systems,
as occurs in blindness or deafness. In our view, all per-
ceivers detect patterns in the global array. Individuals who
have suffered perceptual loss have lost their sensitivity to a
particular class of these patterns, but they remain sensitive
to the remaining classes of patterns. Most people can de-
tect patterns in the global array that extend across optics,
acoustics, mechanical pressure, gravito-inertial force, and
chemical energy. By contrast, blind people can detect only
those global array patterns that extend across acoustics, me-
chanical pressure, gravito-inertial force, and chemical en-
ergy, while deaf people can detect only those patterns that
extend across optics, mechanical pressure, gravito-inertial
force, and chemical energy. Loss of sensitivity to certain
patterns in the global array should have implications for
performatory action. Consider walking. Normal walking is
guided relative to the illuminated environment, and so de-
pends upon sensitivity to patterns that extend across optics.
When these patterns are not available (due to complete
darkness or to blindness), walking is still possible but must
be controlled on the basis of other patterns. These other
patterns are available to normal animals (e.g., we can walk
in complete darkness), but do not permit optimal control,
and so are not preferred when there is a choice. We believe
this accounts for behavioral changes that are observed with
blindness, such as restricted walking. Note that a lack of
sensitivity to information that includes structure in light is
not necessarily a “sensory deficit.” Species that have no
eyes (e.g., worms and moles) cannot detect patterns in the
global array that extend across the optic array and, like
blind individuals, cannot control behavior in all of the ways
that are available to the sighted. Given the behavioral suc-
cess enjoyed by these species, it would appear to be inap-
propriate to refer to their perceptual experience as being
deficient.
6.2.4. Implications for research in neuroscience. Rather
than investigating the activity of neural units, the ecological
approach to perception and action focuses on the interac-
tion between the animal and the environment and on how
this interaction structures ambient energy arrays. However,
the hypothesis that specification exists, and that it exists
solely in the global array, could have substantial implica-
tions for research on the nervous system. One implication
is that neuroscientists might search for cells or nuclei that
respond selectively to structures in the global array. In neu-
rophysiological terms, this would mean searching for neural
units that respond to patterns of activity that extend across
different kinds of receptors, such as the retina and the
vestibule. As we noted in section 2.5, many sites in the ner-
vous system are known to be influenced by stimulation of
different sensory organs (Stein & Meredith 1993). These
sites are commonly interpreted as loci for inferential (e.g.,
associative) integration of inputs from different receptors,
but they could be reinterpreted as loci of information
picked up from the global array. Rather than forming asso-
ciations between qualitatively different forms of stimulus
energy, these sites may exhibit direct (i.e., nonassociative)
sensitivity to qualitatively unitary patterns in the global ar-
ray. With such a reinterpretation, the existing knowledge
base could be built upon in studying neural sensitivity to
structures in the global array. Research of this kind would
be greatly facilitated by prior identification of such struc-
tures, so that they could be presented and manipulated in
a controlled manner during recording of neural activity (re-
search on the global array could also be conducted in clin-
ical populations; cf. Lee et al. 1984). As an example, Equa-
tions 1 and 2 might be used to generate stimuli that could
be used in studies of the nervous system.
6.2.5. Perception of unimodal stimuli by stationary ob-
servers? We have argued that the global array is the sole
source of information sufficient for veridical perception,
and that it contains information that is essential for the per-
ception and control of motion relative to different physical
referents. How does this argument relate to the perception
of objects and events that influence the structure of indi-
vidual forms of stimulus energy? Similarly, how does it re-
late to situations in which the perceiver appears to be a sta-
tionary observer?
There are extensive literatures on the perception of ob-
jects (e.g., Henderson 1992), events (e.g., Bingham et al.
1995), the location of sound sources (e.g., Guski 1990), and
so on. In all these cases, experimenters ask observers to per-
ceive things that structure individual forms of ambient en-
ergy, such as light or sound. Observers typically are station-
ary in the sense that they are asked to remain still, giving
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reports of their perceptual experience, rather than having
physical interactions with the objects or events.
While the experimenter’s interest may focus on a single
modality, sensory stimulation is continuously multimodal.
Changes in the structure of a given array occur in the con-
text of ongoing, simultaneous patterns in other ambient ar-
rays and, consequently, in the global array. In these situa-
tions, as in any other, the global array exists and is available
to perceivers. The fact that the experimenter is concerned
only with how perception is influenced by structure in one
form of energy does not imply that observers have an
equally narrow focus. We believe that even when asked to
make perceptual judgments about so-called unimodal stim-
uli, observers are motivated to sample (and, in fact, rely
upon), information that is available in the global array. It is
almost certainly the case that observers perceive more than
the experimental stimulus. Experimenters may present “an
object or event,” and observers may comply with instruc-
tions to give reports about “an object or event.” However,
rather than perceiving “an object or event,” observers may
perceive “an object or event that I am looking at (or listen-
ing to, etc.), in this place.” That is, observers may perceive
objects and events in relation to themselves and their sur-
roundings. Information about these relations is found only
in the global array. Perceptual reports may not include
these relational facts because the experimenter has not re-
quested reports of this kind.
Relational information in the global array may be critical
for perceptual reports that are commonly assumed to re-
flect unimodal perception. This is because perceivers are
active rather than passive; the success of perception re-
quires adequate control of this act. In order to achieve and
maintain visual fixation, for example, we must stabilize the
eyes, the head, and the body. In order to explore objects or
events, we must be able to organize and control stable move-
ments of all of these. This suggests that observers are nei-
ther stationary nor passive (Gibson 1986). The actions
needed for perception require information in the global ar-
ray.
The need for action in perception has been documented
at a variety of levels. Here we concentrate on subtle rela-
tions between perception and postural motion; these mo-
tions can provide information to “stationary” observers.
Empirical research suggests that there is an intimate rela-
tion between body motion and perception in contexts that
typically are analyzed without reference to motion of the
observer.
As a first example, it is known that observational activi-
ties as simple as visual fixation of stationary objects are in-
fluenced by controllable variations in postural motion. Stof-
fregen et al. (1999a; 1999b; 2000b) instructed participants
to fixate a distant target or a nearby target while standing.
Reliable variations in parameters of postural sway were
elicited by changes in the fixation task. These differences
were observed across changes in the visual target (a blank
target versus a block of printed text), in the nature of the vi-
sual task (simple fixation versus search for target letters),
and changes in target distance (near vs. far). Variations in
posture were functionally related to constraints imposed by
the visual tasks, that is, modulations of postural sway facili-
tated visual performance.
Similarly, Kellman and Short (1987) investigated the role
of body motion in the development of perception of three-
dimensional form. Babies who were moved (oscillated
briefly in a semicircle in front of the objects that they were
fixating) could more easily differentiate form than babies
who were stationary. Motion of the babies’ bodies (relative
to the gravito-inertial force environment and relative to the
illuminated environment) altered the structure of the optic
array (e.g., through motion parallax) of somatosensory stim-
ulation and of vestibular stimulation (through variations 
in the direction of balance). Note that stimulation of the
vestibular and somatosensory systems differed because the
head is not rigidly attached to the torso (cf. Riccio 1995). In
addition, body motion altered relations between patterns 
in these forms of energy, that is, structures in the global 
array.
Finally, Mark (1987; Mark et al. 1990) has shown that re-
striction of postural sway can inhibit learning of changes in
affordances. Standing observers looked at a chair whose
seatpan was height-adjustable and made judgments about
the maximum seatpan height on which they could sit. In
some conditions, observers’ shoes were fitted with blocks
that increased their height and so their maximum sitting
height. Immediately after donning the blocks, judgments of
maximum sitting height were inaccurate, but over a series
of trials judgments gravitated toward the correct (new)
value despite the fact that observers were not permitted to
practice sitting (Mark 1987). In later experiments, Mark et
al. (1990) found that this spontaneous learning did not oc-
cur in the absence of postural sway (when observers were
required to stand with their body and head pressed against
a wall).
On the basis of these studies we conclude that even “sta-
tionary, passive” observation depends upon successful con-
trol of movements of receptor systems and often of the
whole body. We have argued that information for the con-
trol of motion relative to physical referents exists only in the
global array. Accordingly, we conclude that information in
the global array is required even for perception of objects
and events that structure only a single form of ambient en-
ergy.
6.2.6. Sensory interaction: The McGurk effect. As a final
example of the application of our theory to existing re-
search, we reconsider the McGurk effect (see sect. 3.1.1),
which is widely interpreted as reflecting general principles
of intersensory interaction (e.g., Kuhl & Meltzoff 1988;
Welch & Warren 1986). In studies of this effect, the visual
portion of a videotape shows a speaker saying one syllable,
while on the audio track a different syllable is presented.
Observers are instructed to report the syllable on the audio
track, and perceptual reports are strongly influenced by the
nominally ignored visible speaker. One of the most consis-
tent and dramatic findings is that perceptual reports fre-
quently are not consistent with either the visible or the au-
dible event. Rather, observers often report “a syllable that
has not been presented to either modality and that repre-
sents a combination of both” (Green et al. 1991, p. 524).
This presents a challenge to inference-based theories of
speech perception (Green et al. 1991; McGurk & Mac-
Donald 1976); the sustained interest in the McGurk effect
arises in part from the need to explain how it is that the fi-
nal percept differs qualitatively from the patterns in the op-
tic and acoustic arrays.
In experiments on the McGurk effect, participants that
are exposed to multimodal stimulation are asked to give
perceptual reports that are unimodal, that is, they are asked
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to report only what they hear (e.g., McGurk & MacDonald
1976). Numerous studies have documented the fact that 
reports are not consistent with structure in the acoustic ar-
ray .11 This is consistent with our general premise that per-
ceptual systems do not function independently, but work in
a cooperative manner to pick up higher-order patterns in
the global array. In fact, we would predict just such an out-
come. If speech perception is based on information in the
global array, then it must be unnatural (or at least uncom-
mon) for observers who can both see and hear the speaker
to be asked to report only what is audible; the global array
provides information about what is being said, rather than
about what is visible or what is audible. Our position is sim-
ilar to that of Fowler and Dekle (1991) in that we stress the
fact that multiple perceptual systems are stimulated simul-
taneously and that the stimulation has a single source (i.e.,
a speaker). Our position differs in that we do not assume
that observers are separately sensitive to structures in the
optic and acoustic arrays but, rather, propose that observers
are directly sensitive to patterns that extend across these ar-
rays, that is, to patterns in the global array. Because such
patterns are external to the perceiver, perception of speech
via information in the global array does not entail an inter-
nal process of integration. In research on the McGurk ef-
fect, the discrepancy between the visible and audible con-
sequences of speech is commonly interpreted as a conflict
between the two modalities, but it could also be interpreted
as creating information in the global array that specifies the
experimental manipulation, that is, the global array may
specify that what is seen and what is heard arise from two
different speech acts. This leaves the question of why ob-
servers often do not detect the manipulation. We regard
this as an issue of perception (i.e., information pickup),
rather than an issue of specification (i.e., the existence of in-
formation). This is addressed in the next section.
7. Conclusion
We have reconsidered traditional concepts of the senses.
We have argued that there is no clear basis for the assump-
tion that perception is accomplished by a set of distinct per-
ceptual systems. This led us to reconsider concepts of po-
tential sensory stimulation. We reviewed existing concepts
of specification, that is, of the possibility that relations be-
tween reality and patterns in ambient energy are unique.
We considered the hypothesis that specification does not
exist, the hypothesis that specification exists within individ-
ual forms of ambient energy, and the hypothesis that spec-
ification exists redundantly within or across forms of energy.
We argued that the assumption of separate senses creates
problems for any theory that assumes the existence of spec-
ification. We then reviewed the physics of motion in an ef-
fort to determine whether the structure within a single form
of ambient energy can have a specificational relation to
physical motion. We concluded that this is not possible; that
is, we concluded that specification cannot exist within the
assumption of separate senses. In section 6 we proposed
that specification exists. We proposed that structure exists
in the global array, that this superordinate structure carries
information that does not exist in any of the individual ar-
rays, and that it is essential for accurate perception and con-
trol of behavior with respect to the multitude of real refer-
ents.
The possibility that specificity exists solely in the global
array provides the possibility of direct perception, but only
if the senses function as a single unit. To accept this possi-
bility requires rejection of the assumption of separate
senses. A view emerges in which perception consists not of
a group of systems working in parallel (and often in con-
flict), but of a single system whose parts operate as a unit to
pick up information that is available only to the unit.
Our analysis has broad implications for research on per-
ception and action. A few of these are briefly discussed
here. In studies of perception researchers may need to take
into account the global information that is always available.
Researchers commonly present to subjects only a single
form of energy. It is assumed that the application of stimu-
lus energy to only one sense is grounds to ignore, method-
ologically and analytically, the energy available to other
senses. However, when an experimenter stimulates a single
modality, there is an influence on structure in the global ar-
ray (e.g., Figs. 4 and 5). Research is needed to determine
whether animals are directly sensitive to structure in the
global array.
Such research will require novel experimental method-
ologies and novel analyses. Can we manipulate structure in
the global array independent of structure in single-energy
arrays? One promising strategy is to use the method of pair-
wise comparisons (Fouque et al. 1999). This method con-
sists of fixing the structure in one or more single-energy ar-
rays while systematically varying the structure in the global
array (across experimental conditions) in situations that
have consequences for behavior (Fouque et al. 1999). A re-
ciprocal option is to fix parts of the structure of the global
array while varying the structure of individual forms of en-
ergy. This might be achieved if variations in different forms
of energy were appropriately coordinated. The possibility
of additional methods should also be pursued.
It is essential that experimenters understand the physics
underlying experimental work and the physical reference
frames relevant to the task. For instance, when a judgment
task involves the detection of stasis or motion, instructions
given to the subjects should be very specific with respect to
the referents that are to be used for the perception of mo-
tion. When the proper physics are employed, errors, illu-
sions, and variability should decrease. In addition, behav-
ioral measures should be primary to phenomenal measures
for those studies that investigate perception and control of
movement (Fouque et al. 1999; Riccio 1995).
Errors occur in both perception and performance, but
the existence of errors does not imply a lack of specificity.
Rather, errors may imply a need for perceptual-motor 
differentiation (learning) of those structures in the global
array that are relevant to a given behavior. Errors can be 
expected when animals are prevented from exploring task-
relevant dynamics of the animal-environment system (e.g.,
Mark et al. 1990). This may account for the common ob-
servation that observers in studies of the McGurk effect do
not detect the experimental manipulation (i.e., the fact that
the audible and visible events are different syllables). In the
learning of perceptual-motor skills, one problem is to dis-
cover and exploit different structures in the global array.
Learning a somersault, for example, appears to depend
upon the discovery and control of higher-order relations be-
tween vestibular, mechanical, and optical patterns of en-
ergy (e.g., Bardy & Laurent 1998). To our knowledge, the
literature on motor control and sport has not addressed the
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existence of the global array, the evolution of its structure
during behavior, or the process of learning to pick up struc-
tures within it that are relevant to particular behaviors. We
believe that a focus on the global array in the context of skill
learning can reveal regularities and changes that may aid
our understanding of the learning process, ultimately lead-
ing to enhanced performance. In general, the existence of
the global array poses new challenges for the study of per-
ceptual-motor learning and development. Are infants (and
novices, in general) sensitive to patterns in the global array,
and if so, how does this sensitivity develop with experience?
It might be supposed that for infants and novices, initial
sensitivity is to structure in single-energy arrays, with expe-
rience leading to the pickup of structure in the global array.
One problem with this is that it requires the assumption of
separate senses. Another is that it would require that
novices begin with sensitivity to nonspecific structures,
which is contrary to and unnecessary in ecological theory.
In this target article we have questioned some of the most
fundamental assumptions that underlie theories of percep-
tion. Our rejection of the assumption of separate senses and
our analysis of physical referents for perception and control
pose challenges for any theory of perception. Our rejection
of the hypothesis of specification in single-energy arrays
poses challenges for the ecological approach to perception
and action. Finally, our presentation of the global array of-
fers the possibility of a theory of the perception and control
of behavior that is based on the lawful specification of prop-
erties of the animal-environment system.
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NOTES
1. In this target article we distinguish between potential sen-
sory stimulation and actual sensory stimulation. The former con-
sists of patterns in ambient energy fields which exist outside the
head and can be analyzed without reference to any psychological
process. We refer to potential sensory stimulation in terms of ar-
rays of ambient energy, such as the optic array. Actual sensory
stimulation consists of portions of ambient arrays that are sampled
by perceptual systems.
2. This is distinct from ways in which scientists might analyze
a complex system. It is possible to study one hand of a violinist, but
there are no one-handed violinists.
3. It might be argued that we have separate senses because the
receptor systems have distinct evolutionary histories. However,
this argument is circular because it begins with the assumption
that there are separate systems.
4. Many researchers argue that input conflict is uncommon or
rare (e.g.. Welch & Warren 1986), but in ordinary behavior input
conflict must be the rule rather than the exception (Oman 1982;
Stoffregen & Riccio 1988; 1991). The concepts of conflict and re-
dundancy across perceptual systems are important across a broad
range of research, including social psychology (e.g., Pennebaker
& Roberts 1992) and neurophysiology (e.g., Maunsell et al. 1989;
Stein & Meredith 1993). For a discussion of the relation between
input conflict and other concepts of intersensory conflict, see Stof-
fregen and Riccio (1991).
5. Our discussion of physical referents might suggest that we
believe that these referents are perceived. We do not argue that
physical referents are perceived as such. Our argument is that be-
havior is perceived and controlled with reference to physical ref-
erents. In the ecological approach to perception and action, it is
the relation between the animal and the referent that is perceived
and controlled (that is, the affordances for behavior relative to the
referent). Perception of “behavior relative to a physical referent”
does not require prior or independent perception of the referent,
per se, just as perception of a triangle does not require prior or in-
dependent perception of the lines that make up the triangle. For
further discussion of this issue, see Gibson (1986) or Stoffregen
and Riccio (1988).
6. Even small changes in velocity, such as those caused by head
movements, can have profound effects on the perception of self-
motion. This accounts for the fact that the experience of vection
is more easily induced in restrained subjects (e.g., Dichgans &
Brandt 1978; Wertheim 1994).
7. We refer to the direction of balance rather than to the di-
rection of gravity (or, more properly, the direction of the gravito-
inertial force vector). In most situations, the direction of balance
is contraparallel to the gravito-inertial force vector. However, the
two entities differ qualitatively (the direction of balance is defined
in terms of kinematics, the gravito-inertial force vector in terms of
kinetics), and recent research has shown that both the perception
and control of body orientation are influenced more strongly by
the direction of balance than by the gravito-inertial force vector
(Riccio et al. 1992).
8. The fact that we can present optical flow in the absence of
motion relative to the earth or relative to the gravito-inertial envi-
ronment (e.g., in the cinema, in visual flight simulators, and in
“virtual environments”) shows that optical flow is not uniquely re-
lated to, and so provides no information about, motion relative to
these referents (cf. Smets 1995, pp. 199–200).
9. This raises the question of why people sway in response to
imposed optical flow in moving rooms. That is, if there is no per-
ceptual error, then why do they sway? It may be that they have
chosen to stabilize the head and eyes relative to the illuminated
environment (the room), and that they use body sway to maintain
this stabilization.
10. The optical and gravito-inertial patterns depicted in Figure
5a are not identical or redundant. In traditional approaches to 
visual-vestibular interaction, this type of nonredundancy is inter-
preted as intersensory conflict (see sect. 3.1.3). The global array
structure depicted in Figure 5b implies that the nonidentity of op-
tical and gravito-inertial structure does not need to be interpreted
as conflict (Stoffregen & Riccio 1991). Nonredundancies exist in
the stimulation of different perceptual systems, but the interpre-
tation of these in terms of intersensory conflict is not obligatory.
Conflict is an interpretation rather than a fact. If specificity exists
in the global array, then sensory conflict may not exist. Intersen-
sory conflict is widely believed to cause motion sickness, but if it
does not exist then this cannot be true. This is part of the motiva-
tion for an alternative theory of motion sickness (Riccio & Stof-
fregen 1991), for which there is empirical support (Stoffregen et
al., in press; Stoffregen & Smart 1998).
11. In studies of the McGurk effect, responses that are not
consistent with the audio track are routinely classified as errors or
illusions. No a priori basis for this classification has been offered;
for example, McGurk and MacDonald (1976, p. 746) offered no
justification for the error classification other than that it was done
“for the purpose of analysis.” As an alternative, observers’ re-
sponses could be classified into different groups without the de-
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scription of any group as being either correct or incorrect, illusory
or veridical. The common interpretation is credible only if it is as-
sumed that “correct” responses are defined solely in terms of the
soundtrack, that is, only if it is assumed that the experimenter’s in-
terpretation of the situation is shared by the observers. If, as stu-
dents of the McGurk effect allege, speech perception is inherently
cross-modal, then it could be argued that the natural definition of
“correct” would be in terms of percepts that reflect the influence
of both modalities. This, in turn, suggests that a more appropriate
method for studying speech perception would be to ask observers
to report “what you perceive” or “what was said,” rather than
“what you heard.”
Open Peer Commentary
Commentary submitted by the qualified professional readership of this
journal will be considered for publication in a later issue as Continuing




Karen E. Adolph, Ludovic M. Marin, and Frederic F. Fraisse
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003.
{adolph; martin}@psych.nyu.edu fef1@is9.nyu.edu
www.psych.nyu.edu
Abstract: Based on studies with infants, we expand on Stoffregen & Bardy’s
explanation of perceptual motor errors, given the global array. Information
pick-up from the global array is not sufficient without adequate ex-
ploratory movements and learning to support perceptually guided activity.
The central point of Stoffregen & Bardy’s (S&B’s) intriguing arti-
cle concerns the problem of specification (the information avail-
able in ambient arrays of energy). On S&B’s account, information
in the global array is essential for accurate perception and adap-
tive motor control. They claim that perceptual-motor errors result
from inadequate information pick-up. This unhappy situation oc-
curs when observers cannot differentiate the relevant structures
in the global array (lack of perceptual-motor learning) or when
task constraints prevent adequate exploration to pick-up the in-
formation (as is often the case in laboratory experiments).
Our commentary expands on the too brief explanation the au-
thors provide for perceptual-motor errors. It is important to pro-
vide a clear explanation of how such errors might occur if, as the
authors propose, information gleaned from the global array is suf-
ficient to support perceptually guided activity. Our commentary
aims to redress this deficiency. Like the authors, we draw our ex-
amples from studies of stance and locomotion. We show that re-
sults from studies of infants can inform the debate about spec-
ification. We begin with learning to differentiate the relevant
structures in the global array.
Typically, motor development appears as a sequence of postural
milestones – sitting, crawling, and walking. To maintain balance in
each posture, infants must keep their bodies within a region of
permissible postural sway (McCollum & Leen 1989; Riccio &
Stoffregen 1988). The extent of this region changes depending on
variations in the ground surface, functional changes in body char-
acteristics, changes in the location of the center of mass due to
body movements, and so on. Thus, perceptual control of balance
is paramount. Adolph and Eppler (1998; in press) proposed that
each postural milestone in development constitutes a different
perception-action system with different relevant control variables
that could presumably correspond to different structures in the
global array. For example, sitting, crawling, and walking postures
involve different regions of permissible sway for different key piv-
ots around which the body rotates. In addition, each posture in-
volves different muscle groups for executing movements and for
generating compensatory sway; different vantage points for view-
ing the ground; different patterns of optic flow; different interac-
tions between visual, somatosensory, and vestibular information;
and so on. Thus, a protracted period of learning is required for in-
fants to identify the relevant control variables for each posture in
development and to master their on-line calibration.
As predicted by this account, recent experiments showed that
infants must learn to calibrate actions to the changeable region of
permissible sway, but that learning does not transfer from sitting
to crawling (Adolph, in press) or from crawling to walking (Adolph
1997). When infants were tested at the edge of an adjustable gap
(0–90 cm) in an experienced sitting posture, they leaned forward
over safe gaps and carefully avoided leaning over risky ones. But,
when the same infants were tested on the same gaps in an unfa-
miliar crawling posture, they fell into impossibly large gaps on
multiple trials. Similarly, when infants were tested at the brink of
an adjustable slope (0–368) in an experienced crawling posture,
they crawled down safe slopes but avoided risky ones. When the
same infants were tested on the same slopes in an unfamiliar walk-
ing posture, they fell down impossibly steep slopes on multiple tri-
als. In both gaps and slopes tasks, the pattern of errors was con-
sistent with a differentiation learning process, as proposed by
S&B. Errors decreased at the most extreme increments of gap and
slope, where information for adaptive motor control was presum-
ably most clear; errors increased at the middle range of incre-
ments, where information would be most difficult to differentiate.
Apparently, experience with each new postural milestone provides
infants with the opportunity to differentiate the relevant informa-
tion in the new global array.
Now, we turn to the second source of errors mentioned by S&B:
Inadequate exploration. Information in the global array does not
come for free. As Gibson (1979) pointed out, actions are embed-
ded in a continuous perception-action loop. Exploratory move-
ments generate information that, in turn, elicits further explo-
ration. Despite dozens of experimental manipulations of visual,
vestibular, and somatosensory information (e.g., Bardy et al.
1999), surprisingly little is known about multimodal exploration in
the service of guiding stance and locomotion. Which exploratory
movements give rise to what sorts of information and what infor-
mation elicits further exploration?
We propose that exploratory behaviors generate the necessary
information for detecting upcoming threats to balance in a tem-
poral and spatial sequence (Adolph & Eppler 1998). Exploration
from a distance must occur first, yielding concurrent visual, vest-
ibular, and somatosensory information from ongoing body sway
(Mark et al. 1990; Riley et al. 1997). Information derived from di-
rect contact with a surface provides a closer simulation of the rele-
vant forces. But, exploring via direct contact must be elicited by
prior long distance cues. Thus, errors should result when long dis-
tance cues about surface properties are unreliable. We argue that
1ong distance cues for depth (slopes, cliffs, gaps, etc.) are reliable,
but long distance cues for surface friction and rigidity are unreli-
able. Slippery surfaces can be shiny or matte. Squishy surfaces can
be bumpy or smooth. Unfortunately for walkers, friction and rigid-
ity are ubiquitous properties. Our account explains why variations
in surface friction – not depth – are the leading cause of accidents
from falling in adults (Lin et al. 1995). Like stepping into quick-
sand, often walkers do not realize that a surface is slippery until
they have already stepped onto it. Similarly, infants do not respond
adaptively to information for surface friction or rigidity without di-
rect contact (Eppler et al. 2000; Gibson et al. 1987; Stoffregen et
al. 1997). Without adequate exploratory movements, the global ar-
ray is impoverished and insufficient for guiding activity.
In summary, empirical findings from studies of infants’ stance
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and locomotion are consistent with S&B’s specification hypothe-
sis about the information available in the global array. Adaptive
control of action requires adequate exploratory movements to
generate the requisite information and a protracted period of
learning to differentiate the relevant information structures. In
other words, using the global array for perception and action re-
quires exploration and learning.
Physiological convergence of sensory
signals as a prelude to perception
Kurt F. Ahrens
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Abstract: The global array may be a useful concept in studying behavior
in a complex environment, especially in the context of dynamical systems
theory. However, Stoffregen & Bardy’s arguments are weakened by the
conflation of sensation and perception, and by the lack of evidence for syn-
ergy between stimulus energy arrays; strong evidence places the conver-
gence of sensory stimuli inside the head.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) postulate that people are able to di-
rectly sample the global array (GA) of potential sensory stimuli
and thereby perceive higher order patterns that single sensory sys-
tems are unable to discern. These superordinate patterns in the
GA are claimed to specify or characterize the event being per-
ceived in an unequivocal manner while single energy arrays (e.g.,
optic or acoustic) may be ambiguous. They conclude that future
research in perception should pay special attention to the GA that
the subject experiences, as the synergetic combination of signals
in the GA may produce perceptions that single modality stimuli
cannot evoke. Furthermore, since body motions and other subtle
behaviors that enable sampling of the GA may be difficult to con-
trol in experiments, they should be recognized and incorporated
into experimental designs rather than unsuccessfully controlled
and ignored. S&B’s recommendation to broaden the scope of per-
ceptual and behavioral research is timely in light of the recent
growth of whole brain functional imaging and high resolution
MEG and EEG methods. Furthermore, their proposal to focus ef-
forts on characterization of the GA may be an appropriate adjunct
to the development of a dynamical systems theory formulation of
agent-world interactions (Beer 1995); the agent (or individual) is
a complex system, within the greater world-system, for whom the
GA constitutes the total flux of input from world to agent. Never-
theless, elements of their discourse are problematic: they appear
to conflate sensation and perception; they provide no evidence for
the synergy between energy arrays they claim is the hallmark of
the GA, nor do they provide evidence for novel sensors of higher
order patterns; and they discount the behavioral and neurophysi-
ological evidence that sensory integration occurs within the brain.
Sensation is the transduction of ambient energy (whether elec-
tromagnetic, kinetic, or chemical potential) into a spatiotempo-
ral pattern of neural activity. No meaning is conveyed by this
process (Freeman 1995); it is entirely mechanistic. However, the
result of sensory transduction is a perturbation of the state of the
nervous system, which may lead to perception of the event pro-
ducing the stimulus energy. This occurs because the sensory
evoked pattern of neural activity interacts with a perceiver that
has learned from experience and is therefore able to construct
meaning from a familiar input pattern. In dynamical systems ter-
minology, the input drives the brain-state into a basin of attrac-
tion (one that is shaped by experience and prior state). S&B as-
sert that perception is undivided. This seems very likely true 
and resonates with Freeman’s description of the unity of an 
intentional mind (Freeman 1995). The problem arises when the
authors attempt to show that the senses are not separate. If 
completely different anatomical structures that respond to com-
pletely different forms of energy are not separate senses, then
there may be no justification in differentiating any part of the hu-
man body from another. Their example of two eyes being neces-
sary for binocular depth perception is not persuasive precisely
because it is a perception, not sensory transduction. Monocular
deprivation in early development prevents the proper connec-
tions in the cerebral cortex from forming that would allow the
perception of depth due to optical disparity, despite the other-
wise normal functioning of both eyes (Blake & Hirsch 1975). Fur-
thermore, child behavioral studies show that the ability to use
binocular disparity for depth perception follows, but does not co-
incide with, the ability to control vergence of the eyes, implicat-
ing an internal experience dependent process (Yonas & Granrud
1985). While there may be only one perceiver, there are certainly
many sensors, and their relations to each other must develop with
experience, that is, they must be learned.
S&B suggest that the GA is more than the sum of its parts, but
provide no supporting evidence. It seems implausible that single
energy arrays interact in any significant physical way. Sound and
light emanating from an event are merely so much sound and
light; no new form of energy is created. One possible explanation
for their viewpoint is that different energy forms from one event,
taken together, imply that event whereas taken singly they are am-
biguous. This logic is predicated upon knowledge of the regular-
ity of the environment (natural laws), about which individuals
learn early in development and throughout life (Thelen & Smith
1994). Without a learned framework that allows the classification
of multisensory input patterns, inputs could come from one of a
hundred sources and only be so much noise. The aspect of the GA
that is different from the sum of its parts is the association of stim-
ulus patterns that the individual has built internally over a lifetime.
Therefore, without a synergetic interaction between the energy
arrays, there is no need to postulate special sense organs respon-
sive to higher order aspects of the GA; the ordinary senses are
enough.
S&B mention several examples of neurophysiological results in-
dicating convergence of sensory input. There are certainly many
more, but the limbic system is one whose importance for making
associations between disparate stimuli has been repeatedly de-
monstrated (Agglet et al. 1997; Buckner et al. 1995; Wood et al.
1999). That damage to the limbic system can produce deficits in
one’s ability to learn associations supports the idea that the im-
portant relations between elements of the GA are laid down in
neural circuitry by a physiological mechanism, but the question
remains how sensation of multiple sensory inputs triggers per-
ception of a single event. Studies of the binding problem in visual
perception have implicated correlated neuronal activity in the
perception of separate stimuli as a related group (Gray et al. 1989).
Other studies have shown widespread patterns of activity corre-
lated with the inferred meaning of stimuli (Barrie et al. 1996;
Smart et al. 1997), and in conjunction with behavioral tasks
(Bressler et al. 1993). These results are all consistent with a dy-
namical systems interpretation of brain activity, in which the mul-
tifaceted global input array nudges and cajoles the activity of this
highly interconnected system from one basin of attraction to an-
other in the elaboration of behavior.
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We are better off without perfect perception
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Abstract: Stoffregen & Bardy’s target article is based on the assumption
that our senses’ ultimate purpose is to provide us with perfect information
about the outside world. We argue that it is often more important that in-
formation be available quickly than that it be perfect. Consequently our
nervous system processes different aspects of information about our sur-
rounding as separately as possible. The separation is not between the
senses, but between separate aspects of our surrounding. This results in
inconsistencies between judgments: sometimes because different frames
of reference are used. Such inconsistencies are fundamental to the way the
information is picked up, however, and hence cannot be avoided with
clearer instructions to the subjects.
Since the Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) target article deals with hu-
man interactions with the environment, it is impossible to ignore
the physiology involved. Once one considers the physiology, it be-
comes evident that in practice there can be no “specification” of
the kind described in the target article. For instance, in color vi-
sion it is well known that various combinations of wavelengths of
light can stimulate the three kinds of cones in exactly the same
manner, so that we are unable to distinguish between them. Sim-
ilarly, various combinations of ego-motion and motion of the en-
vironment can give rise to the same global optical flow (sect. 5.1).
These are examples of what S&B would call many-to-one map-
pings. Unless all information from all the senses is considered for
every judgment, many-to-one mappings will give rise to conflict-
ing judgments. S&B examine ways to avoid such conflicts. We
question whether such conflicts have to be avoided.
Hidden behind worries about conflicting judgments is the as-
sumption that our senses’ ultimate purpose is to provide us with
perfect information about the world “outside.” To obtain such per-
fect information it makes sense to combine input from all the
senses. However, attempting to gain access to perfect information
has a price: time. For interacting with the environment, timing can
be much more important than precision. There is no point know-
ing exactly when a ball will hit you if you only gain access to this
information once it is too late to react to it.
We have shown that it takes 200 msec to react to a change in the
speed of a target that one is trying to hit (Brenner et al. 1998), but
only 110 msec to react to a change in its position (Brenner &
Smeets 1997). Since these kinds of movements take only a few
hundred milliseconds, this difference in timing is not negligible.
When hitting moving targets the direction in which subjects move
their hand does not appear to depend on the target’s velocity
(Brenner & Smeets 1996; Smeets & Brenner 1995), presumably
because the disadvantages of waiting an additional 90 msec out-
weigh the advantages of having access to reliable velocity infor-
mation.
In our opinion, the main task of our senses is to select the most
suitable information for the task at hand, and to do so fast. From the
moment the information reaches our senses separate aspects of the
information are selected and analyzed for specific tasks, or parts of
tasks. The selection starts even earlier if one considers the move-
ments we make to obtain the information. Separate independent
processing for different judgments can result in substantial con-
f1icts between them (Abrams & Landgraf 1990; Brenner et al. 1996;
Glennerster et al. 1996; Mack et al. 1985). Nevertheless, the sepa-
ration seems be so complete that we even fail to notice conflicts 
between attributes when the conflicts themselves could give us
valuable additional information (Brenner & Damme 1999; Brenner
& Landy 1999). The main reason for our judgments normally being
approximately consistent is presumably the consistency in the world
“outside,” in what S&B call the “global array.”
Abandoning the need to avoid conflicts allows the nervous sys-
tem to rely on different information for each judgment. We as-
sume that each judgment is based on the most reliable informa-
tion for that particular judgment. Thus, relative positions are
judged from retinal information alone, but egocentric localization
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Figure 1 (Brenner & Smeets). Target velocity during simulated ego-motion that matched the simulated velocity in a preceding inter-
val without simulated ego-motion. All velocities are relative to the visual surrounding. Each thick line connects the centres of the ranges
of acceptable target velocities for the seven simulated ego-velocities for one of the five subjects. The thin diagonal line represents a con-
stant velocity of 0.2 m/sec of the target relative to the observer, ignoring the visually simulated ego-motion. The thin dashed line repre-
sents a constant velocity of 0.2 m/sec of the target relative to the visual surrounding. The two panels show the same subjects’ perfor-
mance with two different instructions.
needs extra-retinal information about the orientation of our eyes
as well (Brenner & Cornelissen 2000) In this example the differ-
ence in information is associated with a difference in the referent
that is involved (see sect. 4.5). Our view implies that the referent
is fixed for any given judgment, rather than being something sub-
jects can choose as S&B suggest in section 5.
We examined subjects’ freedom in choosing a referent by ask-
ing them to compare the initial and final velocities of an ap-
proaching target (simulated with both monocular and binocular
cues on a large screen). The methods were very similar to those
used in a similar study on lateral motion (Brenner 1991) The tar-
get initially approached at 0.2 m/sec while the background was
static. During the presentation the visual background started mov-
ing in depth so that the optic flow was consistent with forward or
backward ego-motion of the subject. At the same time the target
could change its velocity. We determined how fast the target had
to move during the simulated ego-motion for it to appear to con-
tinue to move at the same speed.
The subjects were initially instructed to judge whether the tar-
gets’ velocity changed, without explaining what we meant by “the
velocity.” Subjects had no difficulty with this task, and all five sub-
jects spontaneously judged the target’s velocity relative to them-
selves, ignoring the visually simulated ego-motion (left panel in
Fig. 1). These results are consistent with previous work on lateral
motion, in which velocity judgments also appeared to be related
to oneself (Brenner 1991; Brenner & van den Berg 1996).
We then showed the subjects their data and explained to them
that we were simulating ego-motion and that we wanted them to
judge the target’s velocity relative to the surrounding. Subjects
found this much more difficult. The results are shown in the right
panel of Figure 1. It is clear from the variability that none of the
subjects was really able to do this task. Perhaps they would have
been able to do so if they had actually experienced vection, or if
the simulation was not only visual, but apparently they were not
able to select the visual surrounding as a referent.
How many systems make a global array?
Gregory A. Burton
Department of Psychology, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ 07079.
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Abstract: Stoffregen & Bardy suggest that the global array provides the
specification that is lacking when senses are considered in isolation. This
seems to beg the question of the minimum number of senses in a global
array. Individuals with sensory loss manage with fewer senses, and humans
manage with fewer than electric fish; so specification, if it exists, cannot
require all possible senses.
Stoffregen & Bardy’s (S&B’s) major theme is well worth endors-
ing, in principle. Nonetheless, I remain unconvinced that evi-
dence against the assumption of separate senses is strong enough
to demand changes in traditional perceptual experiments, or that
the utility of their global array construct can survive the problem-
atic question of the minimum number of “separate” senses that
make a global array.
Here are three interesting contentions of S&B’s. First, there is
no airtight way to logically distinguish any two classic senses more
definitively than any other two pieces of sensory equipment (like
the two ears). Second, the “separate senses” construct is illogical,
as is the prototypical experiment focusing on single senses, be-
cause distinct senses never work in isolation. Third, the concept
of perceptual specification can only be saved by adherence to the
global array construct.
S&B state the arbitrary-distinction argument most forcefully in
section 2, analyzing whether the classic senses can be distinguished
reliably by one of several means. I am afraid that I was unpersuaded
by the repeated claim that a particular distinction is invalid because
it presupposes the distinction it is supposed to demonstrate. One
could use this strategy to disqualify any distinction whatsoever.
Stronger arguments: anatomical distinctions will not work because
there are other anatomical distinctions that definitely do not indi-
cate a functional difference. Physical media and most brain centers
are not generally dedicated to only one of the classic senses. Though
these arguments seem solid, section 2 neglects some stronger jus-
tifications, like qualia-based distinctions (audition and vision are
experienced differently), deficit based distinctions (people can be
blind but not deaf), and evolutionary distinctions (electric fish have
electric sense but humans do not). Two of these last are treated in
other sections but their implications are more serious than S&B re-
alize, as I will discuss later.
To support the second point of the analysis, that senses rarely
work in isolation, S&B give examples of cooperation of the classic
senses and present an important argument in section 6.2.5 about
implicit cooperation when senses seem to work in isolation. How-
ever, evidence that sensory cooperation exists does not prove that
the senses “operate as a unit” (sect. 7), nor does this cooperation
necessarily follow from the arbitrary distinction argument. Fur-
thermore, perceptual researchers are justified in believing that
they have learned much from studies in which a particular sense
or subsense is isolated; research that discovered pheremones 
useful in pest control might serve as one particularly practical ex-
ample.
The third part of S&B’s argument, that the global array concept
is the only way to save perceptual specification, seems more like a
wish. Their implication is that a qualitative difference exists be-
tween perception through a single sensory channel (if that is even
possible) and by means of the global array. For S&B, perception
through multiple integrated sensory channels provides a tighter
and more trustworthy contact with the world than perception
through a single channel.
With such implications, one cannot help but wonder how many
systems are necessary to have a global array; one hopes the answer
is not “all of them.” Clearly, it is more than just two. The authors
use the example of airplane simulators that include visual and in-
ertial information. This environment that looks and feels like an
airplane is not one, so optic and inertial information in isolation or
even working as a set do not specify aircraft flight. Since S&B think
the global array provides specificity in the simulator, some other
system (which they do not name) must disambiguate the simula-
tor from the real thing. So in this example at least three systems
are necessary. Do all perceivables require three systems or more?
Consider perception of cold. If I need to put on a coat, I do not
think that haptic, olfactory or visual information should change my
intention. If some perceivables require multiple systems but oth-
ers can “get by” on one or two, will an animal or person actually
know in any given situation whether a particular thing was per-
ceived or whether they were “forced to obtain this information
through inferential processing” (sect. 6.1)? If I perceive some-
thing critical but cannot distinguish whether it was specified or in-
ferred, does the specification notion have any meaning at all?
Perhaps S&B would contend that specification always requires
all systems, the whole global array, even in cases that superficially
seem to require just one. A person under great stress may ignore
the cold, so perhaps my perception of cold necessarily implies that
I do not, through manifold other channels, perceive some more
urgent source of stress. Aside from leaning toward tautology, this
strategy seems contradicted by the authors’ discussion of other
distinctions in sensory resources, sensory deficits, and cross-
species differences.
In section 6.2.3, it is suggested that blind people enjoy a global
array that still includes numerous sources of information, even if
one has been lost. Furthermore, the success of eyeless creatures
is a demonstration (not to mention, I would add, poor electric-
sense deprived humanity), that the global array of any particular
individual of a particular species does not have to include any par-
ticular sense. If humans can enjoy specification without electric
sense, then logically some perceivables in the Umwelt of the elec-
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tric fish can be specified without electric sense, that is, without the
full global array. Therefore, specification is possible with some-
thing less than all available sensory systems. How many systems
does it take?
The idea that there is a countable minimum number of systems
to make a global array not only seems to violate the spirit of the
global array construct but also to demand the very kind of hard
distinctions among senses that S&B decry in the first part of their
target article. For example, if two systems were the minimum for
specification rather than inference, then the question of whether
olfaction and gustation are two senses collaborating (say, on the
perception of food) or one flavor system would have serious im-
plications.
Absolutist array specification and species
survival: An ecological perspective 
on ecological perception
Patrick A. Cabe
Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Pembroke,
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Abstract: Stoffregen & Bardy propose an absolutist transmodal array
structure model, intended to displace models of specification in all exist-
ing perceptual theories. Absolute specification of world structure in array
structures, either unimodal or transmodal, may not be provable, but might
be falsifiable. Absolute specification, moreover, may not be a necessary
postulate in an ecological approach to understanding perception-action.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) boldly propose an absolutist model of di-
rect perception via transmodal structure in a “global array.” That au-
dacious venture underscores several critical issues for perception.
S&B discredit all existing perceptual theories, because each al-
lows input conflict (input ambiguity) and therefore implies cogni-
tive (indirect) processes. The syllogism is: If array structures (AS)
conflict, then perceivers must choose between alternative world
structure (WS) interpretations; choice implies cognitive process-
ing; therefore, input conflict implies cognitive processing. The
main focus is intersensory conflict, but any AS ambiguity yields the
same conclusion. Because all existing perceptual theories entail
such ambiguities, they all entail cognitive processes. The target ar-
ticle is silent about why cognitive processing is a fatal flaw, how-
ever.
But perception is inherently a matter of choice, of differentia-
tion of information most relevant for the organism (Gibson 1969).
Organisms that cannot choose cannot be said to perceive. One
might grant that WS maps more completely to transmodal AS
without conceding that the transmodal array mapping is absolute;
the transmodal array, too, may map ambiguously to reality. With-
out physical-mathematical analysis to confirm absolute WS-AS
mapping, the same criticism that S&B level against existing the-
ory may – by the same syllogism – force us to reject their trans-
modal model.
Although the target article’s central theme is specification, what
that term connotes is not completely clear. S&B offer an absolutist
definition: “Only if each stimulus parameter always [their em-
phasis] varies uniquely with the corresponding event . . . would
specification be preserved and input conflict avoided.” Theories
they reject, however, assert non-absolutist specification. Is speci-
fication absolute or non-absolute; that is, can WS-AS mapping be
more or less specific? If so, to what degree can species tolerate
non-unique WS-AS mappings? Possibly the absolutist position is
not absolutely required.
Perceptual theories all propose two mappings. The first is from
WS (objects, surfaces, and events) to patterned energy flows (op-
tic, acoustic, mechanical, and chemical AS). If that mapping is
unique (at least 1:1 and probably mathematically “onto”; see Sol-
omon et al. 1989), then it is absolute, and absolutely informative
about WS. The second mapping is from AS to perception-action
(PA); its primary endpoint is control of adaptive (survival-promot-
ing) behavior. As S&B suggest, behavioral control is sometimes
imperfectly adaptive. Every perceptual theory must somehow ac-
count for PA error.
The probability of adaptive control of behavior depends on the
collective probability of WS-AS mapping sufficiently specific to af-
ford adaptive control, of sensitivity to AS affording adaptive be-
havior, and of adequate performatory capability. Individual sur-
vival probabilities depend on the probability of adaptive control of
individual behavior. Species survival requires only that enough in-
dividuals survive to reproduce, not that every individual survive.
Some PA error is tolerable.
In essence, opposing theories parse PA error in different ways.
Absolutists assert that the probability associated with WS-AS map-
ping is perfect; they deny any possibility that PA error arises from
imperfect (non-absolute) WS-AS mapping. Alternatively, the WS-
AS mapping itself might be imperfect, non-absolute: Multiple
WSs may occasion the same AS; the same WS might yield multi-
ple different ASs; or the WS-AS connection may be only partially
reliable. Thus, some portion of PA error could result from non-
unique WS-AS mapping.
Species survival ultimately requires only that WS map into AS
sufficiently well to afford adaptive control of behavior. That map-
ping need not be absolute, so long as it is good enough to support
individual survival well enough to promote survival at the species
level (where it counts most ecologically). Ecological considera-
tions, then, do not necessarily rule out non-absolute WS-AS map-
ping. Evolution is opportunistic: Whatever works to support
species survival tends to be preserved across generations. In prin-
ciple, if non-absolute WS-AS mapping can serve this survival end,
organisms may actually have evolved to use non-absolute map-
ping.
The ecological perception community faces an enormous chal-
lenge here. The nature of WS-AS mapping – unimodal or trans-
modal, absolute or non-absolute – cannot be simply a matter of
faith or fiat; it must rest squarely on solid physical-mathematical
analysis. Absolute mapping demands a completeness proof that
has never been offered, and may not even be possible because it
would require showing one infinite (WS) set to be commensurate
with another infinite (AS) set. Yet the absolutist position appears
open in principle to disconfirmation (i.e., by showing that some as-
pect of WS does not map to any AS).
Even disconfirmation is problematic, however, because AS it-
self is only loosely defined. The trend in the literature seems to be
to demonstrate only post hoc the positive existence and utility of
some AS for perception. Gibson (1979) claimed that “inex-
haustible” (p. 243) mathematically describable AS invariants exist.
Such descriptions are as yet relatively sparse and not easily pre-
dictable a priori on any principled basis (Cutting 1993). Appro-
priate heuristics to guide array invariant searches remain to be de-
veloped (cf. Mace 1977; Neisser 1977), both for the current
unimodal perspectives that S&B reject and surely for the more
complicated transmodal view they defend.
Theories succeed when they state clearly under what circum-
stances they do and do not work. Lacking clarity on the key issue of
specification, those boundaries cannot be drawn for ecological per-
ception. The ecological approach, with its reliance on “higher order”
(how high?) AS variables seems relatively immune to falsification.
The unimodal direct perceptual theory S&B dismiss has been
partially successful, but remains a perplexing undertaking. The
transmodal model advanced in the target article exacerbates that
perplexity. At its present stage of development, S&B’s proposal
seems as open as other perceptual theories to many of the same
criticisms that these authors outline. The major benefit of this tar-
get article may be simply to sharpen the focus on key issues that
remain unresolved in perceptual theory.
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The patterns of energy used for action 
are task-dependent
Yann Coelloa and Yves Rossettib
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Abstract: Is there any ecological purpose in assuming that perception for
action exists only through a global array of energy? Unlike Stoffregen &
Bardy, who assume that behavior consists of movements, we would ar-
gue that behavior consists of a stable coupling between perception and ac-
tion achieved through experience in an adaptive context. Determining 
target position in an aiming manual task and temporal control of impact
movement illustrate that patterns of energy used for action are task-
dependent.
Beyond unusual postures and personal rendering, what charac-
terizes a skilled pianist playing a new score is the fact that his gaze
is alternately oriented toward the vertical music stand and the hor-
izontal piano keyboard where the hands are performing. A care-
ful observation emphasizes that the arms fall under visual control
mainly when a significant lateral displacement of one hand is re-
quired to reach distant keys. What does this tell us about the way
sensory signals are used for action? Obviously movements of short
amplitude (say, one octave in the case of a piano keyboard) can be
controlled through a coupling between visual (a set of music
notes), and kinesthetic or somesthetic (changes in configuration
or in position of hands) signals processed with respect to a non-
visual referent. Conversely, movement of significant amplitude
cannot be accurately controlled on the basis of similar informa-
tion. Vision of body segments is needed for accurate distant reach-
ing, the goal of movement being achieved by estimating the hand
to target visual gap including, presumably, a visual physical refer-
ent.
Beyond a prosaic illustration, the relevant question suggested
by the pianist is how the spatio-temporal constraints of the task
impose the selection of a specific source of information (or phys-
ical referent) which serves as the basis for smooth and accurate
movement execution. According to Stroffegen & Bardy (S&B)
(sect. 1), perception consists of picking up information that exists
in irreducible patterns across different forms of energy. Physical
aspects of the world are specified in energy patterns reaching the
sensory systems, but direct perception of behaviorally relevant 
aspects of reality involves macroscopic patterns (variables) that 
extend across different forms of ambient energy. Some experi-
mental data seem to favor this perspective, for example, the cross-
modal perception of the location of a visible and noisy stimulus
(e.g., in speech perception as suggested by the McGurk effect).
However, perception and action cannot be dissociated, even in the
case of speech perception (see Desjardin et al. 1997). This raises
the question of whether there is any ecological purpose in assum-
ing that perception for action exists only through the global array
of energy.
The task for a perceptual psychologist is to uncover the infor-
mation that specifies what we perceive (Gibson 2000). For the
ecological psychologist, people perceive affordances, that is, prop-
erties of objects that have a value in terms of behavior (Gibson
1979; Sanders 1997; Stoffregen 2000). Hence, from an ontologi-
cal viewpoint, an object affords a class of actions that have an adap-
tive function for the perceiver. However, taking this assumption
for granted, three issues remain to be addressed: (1) What are the
properties of the actor-environment interaction that would con-
tribute to the emergence of affordances? (2) What makes an af-
fordance effective at a particular time? and (3) How do afford-
ances constrain action in such a way that behavior emanates from
a continuous coupling between perception and action? With re-
gard to the first two points, it seems obvious that a theory of per-
ception or stimulus discrimination that would include action pa-
rameters is lacking, although some attempts to link behavioral
changes with Skinner’s principle of operant conditioning have
been made in the past (e.g., Ingvalsden & Whiting 1997). Unlike
S&B (sect. 4. 1), who assume that behavior consists of motions, we
would argue that behavior consists of stable coupling between
perception and action achieved through experience in an adaptive
context.
With regard to the last point, it is apparent that adaptive be-
havior involves discerning a source of information (or invariant,
Gibson 1979) that is relevant according to the goal and the spatio-
temporal constraints of the task. Thus, an ecological psychologist
would be interested in finding out not only what information is
perceived, but also how information and action are inherently re-
lated. As emphasized by Grush (2000), “egocentric space exists in
virtue of the mastery of a battery of sensorimotor skills” (p. 64).
This is obviously in line with Gibson’s idea that “the world is spec-
ified in the structure of light that reaches us, but it is entirely up
to us to perceive it” (1979, p. 63).
Behavior consists of actions, and may be initiated without any
prior motion. With regard to the global array hypothesis, S&B
(sect. 6.1) suggest that perception is influenced by events that do
not structure single-energy arrays. However a stationary person
desiring to grasp an object in a static visual environment needs to
determine the relative position of that object with respect to a
point of observation, or a hand-starting position. An aiming man-
ual movement requires the perception of physical properties that
allow a distant object to be located egocentrically, with no need to
move the head back and forth to generate optic flow (Bingham &
Pagano, 1998). Furthermore, directing one hand towards a distant
object usually requires continuous adjustment of hand displace-
ment as distance is, in general, misperceived when vision condi-
tions are limited (Coello & Grealy 1997; Coello & Magnet 2000;
Foley & Held 1972; Goodale et al. 1986), or when the task is very
stringent in terms of spatio-temporal accuracy (Pisella et al. 2000;
Proteau 1992). In visuo-manual tasks, no energy patterns except
the visual array would fulfil such constraints since the spatial tar-
get is inevitably specified in the visual ambient array (reaching
movements in darkness towards a sonorous target are usually
broadly inaccurate, Berthier et al. 1996). Two examples illustrate
this, one relating to action initiation and the other to continuous
action guiding.
From a given point of view, multiple energy arrays may con-
tribute to the perception of a distant target. Though considerable
effort has been expended on demonstrating the participation of
extraretinal signal in distance perception (e.g., state of vergence,
Treisilian et al. 1999), studies have recently shown that enriching
the visual environment reduces perceptual underestimation of
distance as observed otherwise (Coello & Grealy 1997; Coello &
Magne 2000), even in monocular vision (Coello et al. 2000b).
However, the most striking effect was that enriching the visual ar-
ray had a positive effect on action accuracy only when elements
structuring the visual scene spread out in the action space (Coello
& Magne 2000). This was interpreted as denoting a dynamic as-
pect of space perception underlying the functional use of retinal
input in the relative coding of target distance. In the context of a
reaching movement, space perception accordingly seems to re-
quire probing the optical array to determine target distance, which
cannot be accurately achieved otherwise (Treisilian et al. 1999).
Again, in line with Gibson’s ideas: “the reality underlying the di-
mension of space is the adjacent order of objects or surface parts”
(1979, p. 101). On the other side of the hand-to-target action, the
encoding of hand position does benefit from various sensory in-
puts, with respective contributions strongly dependent on the ex-
perimental conditions. Vision may provide a stronger (e.g., passive
observation) or weaker input (e.g., prior to initiate an action) than
proprioception (Rossetti et al. 1995), and, in the dark, the propri-
oceptive contribution can be strongly altered by the cognitive
knowledge about experimental variables (Imanaka & Abernethy
2000).
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Experimental data seem to support the further notion that initi-
ating an action also includes the capacity to prospectively tune the
perceptual system to a specific source of information, so as to al-
low a continuous and accurate guiding of the motor act. A particu-
lar example of such perception-action coupling concerns the con-
trol of impact movement. Some activities, such as golf-putting,
require a fine tuning of effector (putter) velocity at impact in order
to make the object (ball) travel the expected path. In general, a con-
trolled approach of distant objects in anticipation-coincidence
tasks is considered to depend upon estimating the time remaining
before contact with the destination point. A first-order approxima-
tion of time to contact can be achieved by extracting from the op-
tic flow the inverse of the relative rate of expansion of the contour
of the approaching object (Lee 1976), or the relative rate of con-
striction of the gap separating effector and target in the case of an
aiming movement directed towards a stationary object (Lee 1997).
Applying this theory to impact movement (time to gap-closure,
Craig et al. 2000) leads one to admit that absolute movement time
is known prior to action onset, which needs further examination.
Another way to understand the control of impact movement is to
consider that the optical control variable is contingent on the task
constraints. Analyzing temporal control of golf-putting has shown
that the acceleration of arms during the downswing is indeed con-
tinuously coupled with the relative rate of change of the visual gap
between the starting and actual position of the putter, with weak
involvement of ball position (the time from departure control
strategy, Coello et al. 2000a). This distinct way of using visual in-
formation for controlled approach or impact with a stationary ob-
ject indicates that achieving adaptive behavior involves a continu-
ous coupling between action and a specific, task-dependent
source of information. This seems consistent with other observa-
tions relating to skill learning. For instance, in gymnastics, despite
the high velocity reached, performing a somersault was found to
rely primarily on visual information. As stated by Bardy and Lau-
rent (1998), “because the body is in free fall during the jump, the
vestibular and the somato-sensory systems are unable to furnish
information about (changing) body orientation relative to the
ground, and thus vision must play a crucial role” (p. 975). Their
study suggested indeed that experts’ somersaults are continuously
regulated with respect to a prospective visual variable (the first or-
der time to contact relating to the ground surface).
Coming back to the prosaic illustration brought forward in the
introduction, one may conclude that for a pianist changes in hand
posture are specified from visual chords as perceived on the score.
However, achieving an accurate rendering would depend on the
ability to identify the source of information that would enable the
pianist to reach the correct keys smoothly and accurately with re-
spect to the spatio-temporal contraints prescribed by the music
precepts.
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Alan Costall,a Giulia Parovel,b and Michele Sinicob
aDepartment of Psychology, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth P01 2DY,
United Kingdom; bDepartment of General Psychology, University of Padua,
Padua 35100, Italy. Alan.costall@port.ac.uk
{parovel; sinico}@psy.unipd.it 
www.port.ac.uk/department/psychology/staff/alan.html
Abstract: Stoffregen & Bardy argue that unimodal invariants do not exist,
and that only “amodal” invariants are possible. But they confuse two sep-
arate issues. Amodal invariants, we argue, do indeed exist to specify fea-
tures of the environment, but not even an amodal invariant, in isolation,
could specify their “presence” or “reality.”
If the textbooks are to be believed, “perception” is largely re-
stricted to vision. Even the important message of James Gibson’s
The senses considered as perceptual systems, that the senses
should be conceived “as interrelated rather than mutually exclu-
sive” (Gibson 1966, p. 47), was eclipsed by his final and more
widely cited text, An ecological approach to visual perception
(Gibson 1979), a work that came dangerously close to celebrating
the self-sufficiency of vision. So we welcome S&B’s examination
of the interrelatedness of the senses. Our commentary begins with
a plea for terminological consistency in the light of past usage
(S&B are not the first people since Aristotle, Locke, and Berkeley
to discuss this issue), and then a plea for common sense. As we see
it, their article conflates two distinct, if partially overlapping, ar-
guments – one that takes things just a bit too far, and the other
hardly far enough.
Terminology. Long ago, Michotte and Metelli wrote about
amodal perception or completion to characterize the experience
of the continued existence of an object optically occluded by an-
other, such as the concealment of an object by another object, or
its disappearance behind a screen. They coined the term “amodal”
because, as they argued, although we do not experience the con-
cealed object as having gone “out of existence,” it is nevertheless
“out of sight” (Kanizsa & Gerbino 1982; Metelli 1940; Thines et
al. 1991). In addition, there is the case of what we might call trans-
modal perception, where a quality proper to one sensory modal-
ity is experienced by means of another: seeing the coolness of the
shade of a tree, or the softness of an object. Then there is what von
Hornbostel (1925) and Werner (1934) called supramodal percep-
tion, where the same quality appears to be equally available to a
whole range of different sensory modalities. Finally, in our very
brief and preliminary analysis, there is intermodal perception, the
simultaneous stimulation of the different senses (for this and re-
lated issues, see Marks 1978).
As S&B make clear, their article is not primarily concerned with
perception but with the relation between ambient energy array
and the environment. And they are concerned with intermodal ar-
rays. Now, since Michotte and Metelli already have a just claim to
the term “amodal,” what specific term might we apply to S&B’s
proposed invariants? Since their argument is ambiguous, we will
offer two alternatives: multimodal or panmodal invariants.
Specification, representation, and reality. Given their commit-
ment to holistic thinking, it is not suprising that the Gestalt psy-
chologists questioned the possibility that any isolated energy pat-
tern could be specific to its source:
. . . just as ambiguous words become more specifically defined when
they are placed in sentences that give them a contextual setting, the am-
biguity of mediation events is reduced when the stimuli or manifesta-
tions referring to the distal stimulus are embedded in the total situation.
(Heider 1958, p. 35 et seq.)
Although von Ehrenfel’s (1980) classic statement of the Gestalt
principle acknowledged the existence of intermodal Gestalten,
much of the subsequent Gestaltist literature remained curiously
limited to discussions of unimodal Gestalten, usually visual Gestal-
ten. S&B therefore could be seen as pursuing the holistic logic 
of Gestaltism in their denial that any unimodal pattern of energy
could constitute information in Gibson’s sense. However, as we
see it, they conflate two distinct arguments. The first argument is
that no unimodal structure could be specific to any environmen-
tal property or event, an argument they base on a convincing but
very limited example, that of proprioception: as they convincingly
establish, neither optical nor mechanical stimulation would be 
sufficient in this particular case. Rather, multimodal stimulation
(optical-vestibular) is necessary. But they also invoke a second and
quite different argument: that no energy pattern disconnected
from all possible additional energy patterns could specify the pres-
ence or reality of an environmental property or event, as in their
example of an approaching boulder. And this calls for a panmodal
array of a limitless kind.
We are not convinced that S&B have established their general
claim that unimodal structures cannot ever be specific to environ-
mental properties and events. A pheromone may be completely
specific to the female silk-moth, or a fingerprint to a particular
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person. It is true that these structures do not, in themselves, spec-
ify the presence of a silk-moth or a person (the whole point of us-
ing fingerprints in forensic inquiry is that the culprit is no longer
at the scene of the crime). Nevertheless, these structures are not
cues in the traditional sense: they are not probabilistically related
to their reference. On the other hand, the specification of pres-
ence calls for more than even the amodal (multimodal or pan-
modal?) invariants identified by S&B. As James Gibson put it, the
fact that one is dealing with a real situation is specified by the very
inexhaustibility of the information available (Gibson 1979, p. 256).
As we see it, the distinction between the specification of an en-
vironmental property and of its presence can help us deal with two
otherwise awkward problems. The first is that the demonstration,
in the laboratory, of the “functional validity” of an invariant – even
an amodal invariant – would seem to destroy what it seeks to af-
firm, the specific relation to the actual environmental event. But,
as Gibson emphasized, “The experimenter . . . is not trying to sim-
ulate reality. [One] could not create the illusion of looking around
and walking through the countryside in any case, for [one] would
have to create the countryside” (Gibson 1979, p. 305; emphasis
added).
The second problem is this. Despite their argument against the
very possibility of unimodal invariants, in the Web version of their
article S&B not only chose to include photographs of themselves,
but photographs that look remarkably like them – and (as far as
we know) nobody else. Which is not to say that we think they are
there on the page. Plenty about them is, of course, missing from
their images, and plenty about their images informs us that it is
their images rather than themselves that are there (Polanyi 1970;
Thines et al. 1991, pp. 117 et seq.).
With either separate or integrated arrays 
of senses, perception may not be direct
Anatol G. Feldmana and Francis G. Lestienneb
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Abstract: The information required for perception may be available in the
energy arrays that stimulate sensory organs but in a form not directly suit-
able for the planning and execution of the organism’s actions in the envi-
ronment. The requisite form of information is obtained, with no loss of ad-
equate perception, by representation of sensory stimuli in frames of
reference determined by internal control signals producing actions. This
process seems evolutionarily advantageous but makes perception essen-
tially non-direct, regardless of the degree of intra- or inter-modal sensory
integration.
To plan and control movements of an artificial arm, robotic engi-
neers use “sensors” that directly, and usually separately, measure
kinematic variables (the position, velocity, and acceleration of arm
segments). As if on purpose, the nervous system avoids direct
measurement of kinematic variables. For example, muscle spin-
dle receptors are sensitive to changes in muscle length and, as
such, they play a major role in the perception of position of body
segments (Matthews 1981). However, in spindle afferents, the po-
sitional signals are mixed with those related to the rate of change
in muscle length. Moreover, afferent output is influenced by in-
dependent efferent signals from gamma-motoneurons, making
the relationship between the activity of spindle afferents and po-
sition ambiguous, even in static conditions (Fig. 1A).
For example, during tonic isometric contractions, the activity of
muscle spindle afferents increases with increasing torque under
the influence of gamma-efferents (Valbo 1974) although arm po-
sition remains unchanged. On the other hand, during slow isotonic
movements actively produced by subjects, spindle afferents may
fire at the same frequency despite the changes in the arm position
(Hulliger et al. 1982). Despite the ambiguity of the relationship
between the spindle output and the position of arm segments, the
arm is correctly perceived as being motionless in isometric condi-
tions although the activity of spindle afferent changes. In isotonic
conditions, the arm is perceived as moving although the spindle
activity remains the same.
How is this remarkable ability achieved? Stoffregen & Bardy
(S&B) could suggest that adequate position perception (kinesthe-
sia) results from some integration (a “global array”) of spindle sig-
nals with those of other sensory systems. This would be consistent
with the evidence that perception of position is based on signals
from muscle, joint, and skin afferents (Gandevia & Burke 1992)
and that these signals are integrated at the level of neurons of as-
cending tracts (Arshavsky et al. 1985; Lundberg 1975; McCrea
1992). However, it has been shown that neurons integrating these
afferent signals also receive independent signals from central pat-
tern generators (e.g., Arshavsky et al. 1985). Due to these inde-
pendent signals, the ambiguity of the relationship between the
arm position and sensory output is likely not reduced but rather
induced by the nervous system at any level of sensory integration,
contrary to the basic idea of the target article.
An answer to the question of how, in principle, adequate posi-
tion sense can be achieved despite the ambiguity has been given
in the framework of the lambda-model for motor control (Feld-
man & Levin 1995). According to the model, the central nervous
system organizes spatial frames of reference for the sensorimotor
apparatus and produces active movements by shifting the frames
in terms of spatial coordinates. The hypothesis has been sup-
ported in several recent studies (Gribble et al. 1998; Feldman et
al. 1998; Lestienne et al. 2000). The spatial frames of reference
used for actions can also be used in perception (Feldman & Latash
1982; Feldman & Levin 1995). In particular, kinesthetic percep-
tion is likely based not on sensory signals per se but on these sig-
nals represented in a frame of reference determined by central
control signals underlying the motor output. For example, gamma-
motoneurons not only influence the sensory output of spindle af-
ferents but also the muscle motor output, via spindle afferent
feedback to motoneurons.
To perceive position, some neural systems presumably measure
spindle afferent activity relative to its background level (“efferent
copy”) specified by gamma motoneurons (Fig. 1B). During iso-
metric contractions, the efferent and afferent activity increases in
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Figure 1 (Feldman & Lestienne). Tonic activity ( f ) of spindle
afferents is related to muscle length, x. (A) The effect of gamma-
efferent influences on the output signal of spindle afferents is
measured by the shift of the solid line (arrow). As a result, the
same afferent activity may be associated with different muscle
lengths (e.g., for the points on a vertical line) and the same mus-
cle length with different afferent outputs (for the points on a hor-
izontal line). The ambiguity disappears (B) if the muscle length is
measured based on the changes in the afferent activity ( f ) relative
to that ( fr) elicited by gamma influences at a referent muscle
length (xr) for which f2fr 5 0.
parallel so that the relative changes in the spindle activity are
about zero, thus signalling that the arm is motionless. On the other
hand, during isotonic movements, the decrease in the spindle af-
ferent activity normally resulting from muscle shortening is likely
compensated by the increasing activity of gamma efferents so that
the spindle activity may remain unchanged despite the changes in
the arm position. However, due to changes in the referent signals
coming from gamma motoneurons, the arm is perceived as mov-
ing. Afferent signals from tendon organs, joint and skin receptors,
also measured relative to motor control signals, could contribute
to kinesthesia in consonance with muscle spindle afferents (Feld-
man & Latash 1982).
The hypothesis that position sense involves action-based refer-
ents was also used to explain kinesthetic illusions arising during
muscle vibration (Feldman & Latash 1982) as well as the phantom
limb phenomenon in which a limb continues to be perceived even
after it has been amputated (Feldman & Levin 1995; Melzack
1989). The hypothesis that perception is based on sensory signals
represented in an action-based frame of reference seems applic-
able to other senses. For example, in all cases of postural control
described in the target article, the requirement of mechanical bal-
ance only constrains the set of possible body configurations. Sub-
jects can still choose a desired posture from this set in a way con-
sistent with task demands. Based on experimental data (Feldman
et al. 1998; Lestienne et al. 2000), it has been suggested that taken
together, action-generating control signals can determine a refer-
ent body configuration (“referent body image”) so that external
forces, including gravity, deflect the system from this configura-
tion until balance between the muscle and external forces is re-
gained at some actual body configuration.
The same referent configuration could be used in the percep-
tion of the actual postural configuration to decide whether or not
the latter meets task demands. The ability to specify appropriate
referent body configurations may be a basic mechanism underly-
ing action and perception, which is preserved even in extreme
conditions, such as weightlessness when subjects retain the basic
set of body configurations characteristic of terrestrial conditions,
despite substantial changes in the tonic activity of muscles (Les-
tienne & Gurfinkel 1988).
Action-based referent signals also seem necessary for visual
processing. For example, while walking in a room or tilting the
head, we do not perceive that the room is moving despite the mo-
tion of the projection of the visual scene on the retina. This im-
plies that the visual constancy is actively supported by referencing
the visual stimuli to control signals producing motor actions, a
process reminiscent of the sense of a constant position during iso-
metric contractions. The suggestion that visual and motor systems
are interdependent is well supported by experimental observa-
tions of different sensorimotor illusions in humans (Lackner &
Dizio 1988; Lestienne et al. 1977) and by neurophysiological stud-
ies in animals (Deliagina & Fagerstedt 2000).
In conclusion, neither individual nor global array of sensory
stimuli is directly suitable for the planning and execution of ac-
tions of the organism in the environment. Since actions are most
essential for the survival of organisms, an action-based represen-
tation of sensory stimuli has been naturally selected, which makes
perception essentially non-direct, regardless of the degree of in-
tra or inter-modal sensory integration.
The global array: Not new 
to infant researchers
Ross A. Flom and Lorraine E. Bahrick
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Abstract: We find Stoffregen & Bardy’s argument that the senses are
united and that specificity exists within the global array compelling. How-
ever, this view is not entirely new and research on the development and
the origins of perception in infancy, inspired by Gibson’s ecological per-
spective, also supports their claims. The inclusion of this developmental
research will strengthen and challenge some of Stoffregen & Bardy’s
views.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) tackle several of the more thorny issues
in the study of perception. In particular, they examine whether the
senses operate independently or collectively as a unitary system in
the pick-up of information. They also examine the nature of in-
formation available for perception and how information can di-
rectly specify an organism’s opportunities for action. S&B present
a compelling and richly elaborated argument, inspired largely by
Gibson’s theory and contemporary dynamical systems perspec-
tives, for the claim that perception is based on the detection of
higher-order relations that exist across different forms of energy
in a global (spatiotemporal) array. S&B also argue that this view is
new and is incompatible with any view of perception that proposes
that the senses work separately, or entails a process of internal
comparison across the senses to detect intersensory redundancies.
We are in agreement with S&B on many points. For instance
we agree with their assertion that information available in the
global array is the fundamental basis for perception and action and
that it is not impoverished; rather information specifying the po-
tential for action can be directly perceived. We also agree that
there is no clear basis for the assumption that perception is ac-
complished by separate senses. Finally, we agree with their asser-
tion that perception is never truly unimodal, given that one always
perceives the environment in relation to the self. However, we be-
lieve that S&B have not fully captured the contribution of current
developmental research with respect to amodal specification and
infants’ perception of the global array. Their claim that most views
of amodal perception entail a process of internal comparison is not
completely accurate. Finally, S&B have omitted a convincing ac-
count of how modality-specific properties and differences across
the senses are perceived within their perspective.
Concerning S&B’s discussion of amodal specification and the
global array, we point out that their view of amodal specification
is not new. As highlighted by E. J. Gibson:
More accurately, amodal specification refers to the fact that informa-
tion is not specific to one sensory modality. I mean the term to suggest
that there is information in stimulation, which is not tied to specific sen-
sations but is rather invariant over them. An amodal property is not an
intermodal relationship strictly speaking. I mean by it a higher order re-
lational stimulation which is not specific to a modality. Intensive di-
mensions might be an example. (Gibson 1969, p. 219)
These assumptions have shaped much of the infant work con-
ducted from the ecological perspective (e.g., Bahrick 1988; 1992;
1994; Bahrick & Lickliter 2000; Bahrick & Pickens 1994; Eppler
1995; Rochat 1995; Schmuckler 1995; Walker-Andrews 1988;
1997). These developmental researchers have similarly described
the global array as a spatio-temporal array, and have also empha-
sized that amodal specification is abstract, higher order, and en-
tails detection of relational information with a unified perceptual
system. These conceptualizations of amodal specification do not
involve a process of internal comparison in order to detect redun-
dancies across the senses (e.g., see Bahrick & Lickliter 2000). Fur-
ther, the “intensity hypothesis” (see Turkewitz et al. 1983) also em-
bodies S&B’s view of amodal specification and describes early
infancy as a period when all stimulation is experienced along an
undifferentiated dimension of intensity.
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Given that the study of infants provides a view of the organism
in a more basic state, a greater emphasis on infant research, espe-
cially that conducted to discover the origins and general principles
of perception, would be appropriate for S&B’s discussion of the
bases of perception. For example, infant research has generated
the following insights regarding the nature of perceptual devel-
opment, relevant to and consistent with S&B’s views regarding
amodal specification: First, infants are adept perceivers of amodal
relations, including temporal synchrony, tempo of action, rhythm,
intensity, and spatial location (see Bahrick & Pickens 1994). In
fact, temporal synchrony may be the most “global” amodal rela-
tion, as it is inherently relational and cannot be perceived in any
single modality alone. Second, infants detect intersensory rela-
tions in order of increasing specificity. That is, global, amodal re-
lations (e.g., synchrony) are detected developmentally prior to
nested amodal relations (e.g., temporal information specifying ob-
ject composition, tempo, or rhythm), and amodal relations are de-
tected developmentally prior to arbitrary, modality-specific rela-
tions (e.g., the red object makes a squeaky sound; the word pen
goes with the thin object; Bahrick, 1992; 1994; in press). In fact,
there is general agreement that infants detect temporal synchrony
early on, if not at birth (Bahrick, in press; Lewkowicz 2000; Slater
et al. 1999). Third, the detection of arbitrary, modality-specific re-
lations is guided and constrained by detection of amodal relations.
Thus infants learn arbitrary, modality-specific relations in the
presence, but not in the absence of amodal relations such as tem-
poral synchrony uniting the visual and acoustic stimulation
(Gogate & Bahrick 1998; Hernandez-Reif & Bahrick, in press;
Slater et al. 1999). Fourth, intersensory redundancy facilitates
perceptual differentiation and leads to more effective processing
than the same information presented unimodally (Bahrick & Lick-
liter 2000). Thus, the answer to S&B’s question as to whether in-
fants are sensitive to information in the global array, is a clear
“yes,” and there is already much evidence on this topic. We are ea-
ger to find out how S&B integrate the general principles of de-
velopment outlined above into their discussion of perception.
Finally, we are in agreement that observers must also detect dif-
ferences in stimulation that emanate from different energy
sources. Detection of amodal invariants requires detecting what is
constant across different kinds of stimulation. In fact, redundancy
of this sort is a powerful garner of infant attention and infants de-
tect amodal properties (e.g., synchrony, rhythm, tempo) develop-
mentally prior to other properties. Further, according to the in-
tersensory redundancy hypothesis (Bahrick & Lickliter 2000),
infants are better able to discriminate an amodal property when it
is presented bimodally than unimodaly. Bahrick and Lickliter
(2000) demonstrated that 5-month-olds detected a rhythm when
it was presented visually and acoustically (a hammer banging in
synchrony with its impact sounds), but not when it was presented
either visually or acoustically alone. This intersensory facilitation
entails detection of the convergence of stimulation (rhythm)
across different modalities (a higher order temporal relation) and
therefore also implies an appreciation of the differences in stimu-
lation across modalities. Pick up of differences, too, must be ac-
complished with a unified perceptual system. In fact, we would
suggest that the greater the differences in stimulation, the more
the redundancies across these differences stand out as higher or-
der invariants. One need not conclude that we have separate
senses in order to register the differences in stimulation emanat-
ing from different energy sources. Our perceptual system is flexi-
ble, unified across the senses, and attention to these different di-
mensions is a matter of attentional selectivity.
Briefly, S&B have done a wonderful job of making explicit and
questioning the basic assumptions underlying current research
and theory in perception. This article serves as a call to other re-
searchers to examine these issues, make explicit the assumptions
underlying their research programs, and evaluate their internal
consistency.
Goal directed meaning connects 
perception and specification
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Abstract: We believe that the task goal in voluntary movements provides
meaning to existing information sources in the environment and deter-
mines, in a dynamic way, the use and relative importance of these differ-
ent sources. This task-centered meaning bridges the apparent controversy
between what information is available in principle (i.e., specification), and
what information is perceived.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) analyze three hypotheses about rela-
tions between ambient arrays and physical reality, arguing that
that it is not possible, in principle, for there to be a unique rela-
tion between physical motion and the structure of individual en-
ergy arrays. S&B argue that physical motion relative to different
referents is specified only in the global array. This perspective
poses a challenge to traditional, inference-based theories of per-
ception and cognition, as well as work within the ecological ap-
proach to perception and action.
While this target article elucidates the differences between
specification (i.e., the existence of information), and perception
(i.e., information pick-up), and the implications for theories of
perception, we would argue that what is missing is the acknowl-
edgment of the meaningfulness of information, namely the pri-
macy of the task-centered goal in these voluntary movements.
S&B state,
sometimes behavior is not controlled relative to the direction of balance
even when the direction of balance is present; we sacrifice alignment
with the direction of balance to some other goal. Examples include a
soccer goal-keeper diving to catch a shot, and a baseball player diving
to catch a fly ball. In such cases, once the player has left the ground, the
ball may be the sole referent for both perception and control.
What we would argue is that even before leaving the ground the
ball is the most meaningful referent because the goal of the task
is to catch the ball!
We believe that the task goal determines the dynamic use of dif-
ferent sources of information and the saliency of each informa-
tional source during the completion of a task. Recent experiments
from our laboratory have shown how the introduction of different
types of local sensory information (e.g., haptic or auditory) can
both locally and globally stabilize a subject’s coordination during
conditions where it would normally become unstable (Fink et al.
2000; Jirsa et al. 2000; Kelso et al. 2000). In addition, it has also
been shown that the same information (e.g., relative phase) can be
important for disparate tasks, such as movement pattern recogni-
tion and production (Haken et al. 1990). Furthermore, when a bi-
ological system functionally stabilizes a system that is inherently
unstable (i.e., an inverted pendulum), the visually specified time-
to-balance drives the corrective actions necessary to avoid a cata-
strophic fall (Foo et al. 2000). However, during non-critical mo-
tions of the pole, the same time-to-balance information does not
appear to be important.
One extension of this view that the goal determines the mean-
ingfulness of the available information is that learning is a process
by which the organism discovers just what information is impor-
tant to the successful completion of the task. From the authors’
own example, “learning a somersault, for example, appears to de-
pend upon the discovery and control of higher-order relations 
between vestibular, mechanical, and optical patterns of energy
(Bardy & Laurent 1998).” This process of discovering the relevant
perception/action relationships may also be seen in motor devel-
opment (e.g., prehension in infants, see Thelen 1990)
In short, the linkage between specification and perception is
driven by meaningful (i.e., task specific) informational variables
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and their dynamics, the origins of which likely lie in the co-evolved
relationship between the organism and its environment. What
could be more meaningful and specific to the goal directed func-
tioning of a system than information that specifies the coordina-
tion among its parts? We are not only creatures of perception and
action; we are goal-directed creatures. As Sherrington (1906) re-
marked, a dog not only walks; it walks to greet its master.
Specification, information, and the loss 
of receptor systems
Barry Hughes
Department of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.
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Abstract: Claims made in the target article that information-that-speci-
fies is contained in relations among structured energy arrays, considered
as wholes, may well be true, but claims that information-that-specifies is
only contained in irreducible relations among structured energy arrays,
considered as wholes, fail to persuade, at least in the case of the blind.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) find almost all existing theoretical ac-
counts of perception wanting, including both constructivism and
direct realism, and their claims are bound to be controversial in a
new way. I expect that their arguments will be unacceptable to
constructivists for most of the same, noncontroversial reasons that
direct realism has always been unacceptable (see Ullman 1980).
More controversial are the claims by S&B that the constructivists’
insistence on the ambiguity of stimulation at the level of both in-
dividual sensory modalities and Gibson’s (1966; 1979) higher-level
perceptual systems were correct after all. The specificity that Gib-
son argued for and sought experimentally, they argue, lies only in
the higher-order structures that extend across perceptual systems.
S&B’s claims appear to constitute a simultaneous advocacy of an
anti-reductionist holism (the information in the global array is not
only more than but is “qualitatively different from” that in any sin-
gle energy array) and an anti-psychological reductionism: that
(only) the physics of (only) ambient global arrays explains speci-
ficity and information for perception completely and without
residue.
Their arguments for the existence of precise information in the
spatiotemporal structure of multiple sensory arrays (taken as a col-
lective) may be more specific than that contained in such arrays
considered additively, or within any single sensory array, and that
such information ought to be explicitly studied, are entirely rea-
sonable. For the analogous reason that it is not possible to account
for less variance by adding another factor in multiple regression,
the collective information in n energy arrays will never be less than
that contained in n21 energy arrays. However, whether it is qual-
itatively different information that is contained in the so-called
global array and whether there is information-that-specifies only
in such global arrays, however, are more contentious issues. In the
target article, specificity appears to be identified with information,
such that only a perfect correspondence of the structure of the
global array with reality constitutes information (“The question is
not whether [the global array] exists but, rather whether it con-
tains information”). While I cannot agree with this, my focus here
will be on a somewhat different issue.
S&B write as if there is only a single global array, one indepen-
dent of people or perceptual systems. I am puzzled by this. In sec-
tion 6.2.3, S&B explicitly address the nature of stimulation and in-
formation in those with complete loss of “receptor systems.” The
notion of the global array’s status as the sole specifier of informa-
tion, as S&B acknowledge, may be questioned because there are
situations where the global array is not complete, as in the case of
complete darkness. They respond that the lack of energy need not
constitute a lack of information; in fact, “the absence of a form of
energy is information” (emphasis in original). How does one un-
derstand the situation confronting a congenitally blind person, for
whom there has never been this variety of stimulation? It seems
perverse to suggest this person detects the absence of the optic ar-
ray; he never had access to it, and hence even having the knowl-
edge that he lacks vision would not constitute information. Instead
he has access to a global array that has one dimension fewer than
that available to his sighted sister. Can this array (maximally global
for him, but less global than that of his sister) specify reality?
If the compressed global array cannot specify reality (as seems
to be suggested by S&B’s reference to “restricted walking” in the
blind) one would expect that it would not contain crucial infor-
mation carried by the optical structures and that, as a result, his
performance would be less timely and/or accurate. Since mobil-
ity in the blind is indeed often tentative, slow and restricted, it may
be assumed that this is indeed the situation that arises. But it
hardly seems guaranteed in advance. If the information available
to the blind person can specify reality, then S&B ‘s insistence that
only the global array is specific cannot be sustained because two
quite different global arrays (with n21 and n dimensions) would
both specify the same reality and one would have to conclude that
the extra dimension contributes neither additional nor qualita-
tively different information. Is it conceivable that both brother
and sister could perceive certain features (or Gibsonian affor-
dances) of the world with equivalent accuracy, in situations (such
as locomotion) that ordinarily depend upon “sensitivity” to pat-
terns that extend across optics? If there were sufficient informa-
tion in the blind person’s n21 dimensions to match the perfor-
mance of the sighted person’s n dimensions, this would seem to
imply the complete global array was no more specific than an in-
complete one. Either the contents of the optic array contain no
measurably greater amount of information (on its own or when in-
corporated into an existing global array) than are contained in the
other arrays, or the (n21)-dimensional global array of the blind is
expanded without increasing its dimensionality.
Stoffregen has done as much as anyone to specify the informa-
tional basis for some remarkable echolocational abilities of hu-
mans (Stoffregen & Pittenger 1995), including the discrimination
of the presence and shape of small object shapes based on self-
generated sounds that are heard directly and as echoes returning
from structured layouts, often within a time frame so that the
echoes are available before the original sound has been completed
(e.g., Kellogg 1962; Rice 1967). Recently, I have found evidence
that naive persons deprived of optical structures can make imme-
diate use of broadband continuous echoes to make decisions about
the passability of gaps between walls when they retain active con-
trol of the direction in which the (head-mounted) cone of emitted
ultrasound is being directed and are free to explore the layout by
any head movements that they choose (Hughes 2000; cf. Warren
& Whang 1987). Plainly, the echoes heard are not the only infor-
mation available during such activities; the haptic, inertial, and
mechanical arrays are not obliterated. But what becomes of the
global array with the introduction of a new acoustic structure and
the removal of optical ones? Does such modal substitution bear at
all on the notions of information and specificity? I think so. In-
stances of functionally equivalent perceptual descriptions being
secured by different perceptual systems, suggest various hy-
potheses, including that of amodal specification (Epstein 1985).
Such manipulations may not be specific in the sense in which S&B
prefer it, but it nonetheless remains theoretically relevant and rich
in practical implications for populations such as the blind.
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Brain science: A more direct way 
of understanding our senses
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Abstract: Stoffregen & Bardy suggest that the senses are not separable.
However, they have a philosophical approach rather than using direct ev-
idence that the nervous system analyzes sensory information in a highly
flexible manner.
The target article tackles the popular question of how we perceive
information; concluding that the existence of separate sensory sys-
tems is in doubt. As evidence, Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) primar-
ily use analogies from physics and examples of convergence and
interactions of different senses, but they largely ignore the exten-
sive and relevant data on human physiology, sensory systems, and
brain processes in analyzing sensory information.
In this commentary I present some empirical evidence con-
cerning the representations of sensory systems in the brain and
their cross modal changes. Scientists have been enthusiastic about
cross-modal brain plasticity since the 1970s but it has been stud-
ied perhaps even more intensively during recent years. By now
there is ample evidence that a brain area which normally processes
information primarily from one sensory modality can become re-
sponsive to other modalities. For example, in early-onset deafness
caused by damage to the peripheral nervous system, brain areas
that normally process auditory input become responsive to visual
input (Neville et al. 1983; Rebillard et al. 1977). Similarly, in early-
onset blindess, areas that normally analyze visual information are
taken over by auditory and somatosensory functions (see, for ex-
ample, Cohen et al. 1997; Kujala et al. 1995a; 1995b; 1997; Rau-
sohecker & Korte 1993; Sadato et al. 1996). However, not just any
function spreads to brain areas deprived of their normal input. For
example, the occipital cortex of the blind seems to be activated by
attended but not by unattended auditory or somatosensory stim-
uli (Kujala et al. 1995a; 1995b; 2000; Liotti et al. 1998).
These cross-modal activation patterns have a functional role in
perception. If the neural functioning of the occipital cortex of an
early blind individual is temporarily disrupted, simultaneous
Braille reading is hampered (Cohen et al. 1997). This shows that
traditionally “visua1” areas of the brain in individuals who have al-
ways been totally blind actually process tactile information. Cross-
modal reorganization of brain functions may take place even after
childhood: Visual brain areas are activated by tactile (Buechel et
al. 1998) and auditory (Kujala et al. 1997) tasks in blind subjects
who had had normal vision until puberty or adulthood. Whether
this activity corresponds functionally to actual perception or in-
formation processing remains to be clarified.
The neural substrate for these cross-modal changes might be
neurons driven by sensory stimulation other than what is mainly
received by a primary sensory brain area. Murata et al. (1965)
found that, in the cat visual cortex, 47% of neurons respond to tac-
tile stimulation and 38% to auditory stimulation. The human oc-
cipital cortex, which is traditionally thought to primarily analyze
features of visual input, has an important role in tactile orientation
analysis (Zangaladze et al. 1999): The disruption of occipital func-
tion in human subjects interfered with tactile discrimination of
grating orientation, but not with tactile discrimination of grating
texture or the detection of electrical stimuli applied to the finger-
pad.
The flexibility of the nervous system in sensory processing has
also been demonstrated by lesions to different brain areas and 
by various manipulations of the pathways that mediate sensory 
information. For example, if retinal projections are redirected to
the auditory thalamus in neonatal ferrets, these projections not
only activate parts of primary auditory cortex via thalamo-cortical
connections but also form a retinotopic map (Roe et al. 1990; Sur
et al. 1988; see also Frost & Metin 1985 for redirected retinal 
projections to the somatosensory cortex). These visually driven au-
ditory-cortex neurons have typical properties of neurons in the vi-
sual cortex, such as orientation and direction selectivity. Moreover,
these visual-auditory connections function in a meaningful man-
ner (von Melchner et al. 2000). The ferrets could discriminate
gratings presented to the part of the retina from which the pro-
jections had been redirected to the primary auditory cortex. Al-
though visual acuity was lower than normal for the input in the
part of retina that was projected to the auditory cortex, the find-
ing is nonetheless critical to the issue discussed in the target arti-
cle: it indicates that the initial analysis of visual information can
take place in the primary auditory cortex.
These findings on sensory representations and their plasticity in
the cortex support S&B’s main idea that sensory systems are not
as separate as previously thought. However, the claim that “there
is no clear basis for the assumption that perception is accom-
plished by a set of distinct perceptual systems” is far too strong.
Although there are interactions and synesthesia between the
senses, and even though the brain can be very adaptive in how it
processes sensory information, the senses are also in many re-
spects distinct. For example, some sensory functions appear to be
represented in the modality-specific areas of the brain in a rigid
manner. Zangaladze et al. (1999), for example, found that the vi-
sual cortex is involved in analyzing orientations received tactually
but it does not seem to be processing somatosensory texture analy-
sis.
The research on sensory representation in the brain clearly pro-
vides some support for S&B’s doubt about the traditional view of
separate senses, but S&B seem to take it too far. The flexibility in
the processing of sensory input between the modalities is clearly
greater than has been thought previously. However, this does not
warrant totally abandoning the notion of separate senses, particu-
larly in light of evidence of limits in cross-modal representations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by the Academy of Finland
Expanding the theory: Nonverbal
determination of referents in a joystick task
Katherine A. Leighty, Sarah E. Cummins-Sebree, 
and Dorothy M. Fragaszy
Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602-3013.
{kleighty; doree}@arches.uga.edu sarahec@egon.psy.uga.edu
www.teach.psy.uga.edu/dept/programsj/biopsych/biopsych.html
Abstract: The arguments of Stoffregen & Bardy for studying perception
based on the global array are intriguing. This theory can be examined in
nonhuman species using nonverbal tasks. We examine how monkeys mas-
ter a skill that incorporates a two-dimensional/three-dimensional interface.
We feel this provides excellent support for Stoffregen & Bardy’s theory.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S & B) present situational examples that dem-
onstrate previous theories’ shortcomings in dealing with percep-
tual illusions, specifically that of motion perception (sect. 6.1), and
they propose a new perspective that utilizes specification in the
global array. We believe that S&B’s ideas on the use of the global
array in motion perception, specifically situations involving visual,
kinesthetic, and vestibular stimulation, are useful in addressing
skill acquisition in humans and nonhuman animals. We present
findings from our laboratory that support their theory that indi-
viduals work to detect the unique global array while mastering mo-
tor skills.
We study how capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) acquire skill in
a task incorporating visual, kinesthetic, proprioceptive, and ves-
tibular stimulation. Our capuchins (8 adult males) have mastered
using a joystick to move a cursor in a controlled manner on a com-
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puter monitor. The system provides a unique learning situation in
that while their movements are made in three dimensions, the
monkeys gain visual knowledge of results in two dimensions. To a
capuchin, working in two-dimensional space is a novel experience.
In addition to providing artificial relations between visual feed-
back and manual action, this testing system enables us to study
mastery of a skill using different kinesthetic feedback than is avail-
able when action occurs directly upon the target object. The joy-
stick and cursor are spatially separated and not physically con-
nected. Thus, unlike striking a ball with a bat, there is no direct
kinesthetic feedback about the effect of moving the joystick (i.e.,
no vibration of the joystick from contacting the cursor). This situ-
ation affords an interesting experimental context in which to study
how perceivers learn about the two-dimensional/three-dimen-
sional interface in “virtual” displays.
S&B suggest that description of motion perception is meaning-
ful only if it is made in terms of referents (sect. 4.5). In the exam-
ples presented, identification of these referents is elicited using
questions asked of the participants (sect. 5.2). However, percep-
tion in skill acquisition can be investigated in nonhuman animals
as well. To evaluate perceptual processes in nonverbal individuals,
other ways of examining perception must be found. We have used
visual tracking of the cursor and an unexpected phenomenon we
call “body-tilting” to examine perceptual contributions to learning
a perceptuomotor skill in capuchin monkeys. Both of these vari-
ables change in a patterned way with increasing mastery of the joy-
stick. We confine our comments here to the body-tilting phe-
nomenon.
We noticed that monkeys skilled at using the joystick demon-
strated a pronounced tilt of the torso, shoulders, and head in the
direction of joystick movement and resultant displacement of 
the cursor when they moved the cursor to the left or the right on
the computer monitor (Filion & Fragaszy 1997). To determine
whether visual stimulation due to the cursor displacement or
movement-associated stimulation related to manipulating the joy-
stick was the relevant referent in this task, we assigned four naive
capuchins to different learning situations. Two subjects learned to
use the joystick in the normal condition in which manipulation of
the joystick results in isomorphic movement of the cursor (e.g., a
push to the left moves the cursor to the left). The other two ani-
mals experienced an inverted relationship in which movement of
the joystick and cursor displacement was 1808 degrees opposed.
We found that animals in both the isomorphic and inverted
groups tilted in the direction of the cursor displacement, whether
or not it was the same direction as joystick movement (Leighty &
Fragaszy 2000). Individuals in the inverted group were tilting in
the direction opposite of their arm movement. After achieving
mastery in the inverted condition, these subjects experienced a re-
versal in the joystick/cursor relationship. They continued to tilt in
the direction of cursor displacement under these new conditions.
This suggests that the relevant referent in mastering this skill is vi-
sual (i.e., the direction of cursor displacement) and not the kines-
thetic properties of moving the joystick.
Why would these animals tilt when using a joystick? As Stoffre-
gen & Bardy note, a naive individual must identify and utilize dif-
ferent structures in the global array to acquire new perceptual-
motor skills (sect. 7). It may be that tilting alters the structure of
the global array in such a way that the animal is better able to de-
tect the relationships embodied in this perceptually novel situa-
tion (sect. 6.2.5). It is interesting to highlight the instances of this
form of behavior outside of the laboratory in humans. One can see
tilting being performed that seems to have no direct impact on the
outcome of the prior goal-directed action. For example, when
bowling or golfing, individuals often tilt in the direction of desired
outcome after releasing or striking the ball. One also sees tilting
in children (and adults) playing video games while using a button
controller or joystick. It may be postulated that this form of be-
havior is merely a superstitious act (according to operant defini-
tions) that ultimately serves little function in performance. We be-
lieve, however, that these behaviors increase one’s ability to detect
relevant patterns of the global array, and thus they are incorpo-
rated into exploratory activity early in the learning process. In our
view, and in accord with S&B’s theory, improved detection of the
global array contributes to the identification and use of referents
in performance of required actions.
S&B note the paucity of research in the area of development of
athletic and other motor skills in relation to the global array (sect.
7). We believe that systematic investigations in humans and non-
humans, such as we have conducted with capuchins using non-
verbal indices of perceptual processes, can help understand skill
development. Similar work will be essential in evaluating S&B’s
theory of the specification of the global array. Comparative and
non-language-based testing of this theory will generate wider ac-
ceptance within perceptual psychology, along with better inter-
facing with other fields (e.g., sports and developmental psychol-
ogy, behavioral ecology).
Although this theory works well with tasks utilizing visual, kines-
thetic, and vestibular stimulation (e.g., joystick tasks), and also with
visual and auditory stimulation (e.g., McGurk effect, sect. 6.2.6),
we are curious to see how S&B and other investigators would ap-
ply the assertion that the senses work as a single system (sect. 7)
to gustatory and olfactory stimulation. Expanding the theory to 
incorporate all forms of stimulation would strengthen S&B’s ar-
guments.
Situating situated multimodal perception: 
The relevance of global arrays 
to development
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Abstract: Stoffregen & Bardy reject the likelihood that infants are sensi-
tive to the global array, implying that intersensory integration is not possi-
ble in early development. We argue that infants are sensitive to unimodal
arrays and are able to integrate them through the active participation of
their nervous system and that the observed developmental changes are
due to experience and brain development.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) propose a bold new view that is a di-
rect descendant of Gibson’s ecological psychology. Based on the
underlying assumption that perception is thoroughly multimodal,
they propose that perception and action are linked by a percep-
tual system that is responsive to global, modality-independent ar-
rays. The global arrays are detected directly and thus integration
of modality-specific information by internal (i.e., neuronal) pro-
cesses is unnecessary. In this way, they reject Gibson’s notion that
perception and action are guided by distinct, single-modality ar-
rays. Here we address some of the questions that the concept of
global array raises for those interested in the development of per-
ception.
Based on their objection to the notion of separate senses, S&B
explicitly reject the possibility that infants and novices are initially
sensitive to unimodal arrays and, thus, by implication endorse the
idea that infants can perceive global arrays. S&B also reject the
possibility that experience might enable the pickup of global ar-
rays, and thus leave the developmentalist with the only obvious
option – the pick-up of global arrays either appears magically or
is there from birth and, therefore, is innate. The problem with ei-
ther view is that it does not explain the processes underlying the
development of perception. In addition, the overwhelming evi-
dence is that perception does change over development. How,
then, can we explain such changes, particularly with regard to in-
tersensory functions? First, the different sensory systems have
their functional onset at different times during early development
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and follow different developmental courses (Gottlieb 1971). As a
result, the various sensory and perceptual abilities that would be
essential for the detection of global arrays each emerge at differ-
ent times. For example, basic perceptual competencies such as
spatial and temporal acuity, depth perception, object perception,
sound localization, texture perception, and shape perception, to
name a few, each develop at different times and at different rates
(Keliman & Arterberry 1998). Moreover, motor abilities, which in
S&B’s view are critical to the detection of global arrays, lag con-
siderably behind. Thus, whereas by six months of age a number of
basic sensory/perceptual abilities are already fairly well devel-
oped, crawling does not emerge until around eight months and
walking not until even later.
Given that (1) self-generated perception-action coupling is es-
sential to the perception of global arrays, (2) different perceptual
capacities develop asynchronously in the first months of life, and
(3) perceptual and motor development is dissociated, serious
doubts about pre-motor infants’ ability to perceive global arrays
can be raised. Therefore, what is needed to substantiate S&B’s hy-
pothesis in human development is either a demonstration that ba-
bies can, in fact, perceive global arrays, or a suggestion as to how
they would develop this capability other than from integrating
modality-specific information. Moreover, if infants do not respond
to global arrays (and thus must somehow learn to do so), the ques-
tion is what exactly do they perceive?
Interesting to note, evidence shows that infants can perceive
various types of intersensory relations (Lewkowicz & Lickliter
1994). If this evidence does not signify detection of global arrays
then what does it signify? Our view is that infants are, in fact, sen-
sitive to unimodal arrays and that they can integrate them based
on equivalent and redundant features through the active partici-
pation of the nervous system. The various developmental changes
observed in intersensory abilities are, in turn, likely to be due to
experience, as well as brain growth, development, and reorgani-
zation (Lewkowicz 2000; von Melchner et al. 2000; Wallace &
Stein 1997). S&B would likely reject the specifics of our view by
stating, as they do, that it is not consistent with the ecological ap-
proach; unfortunately, they offer no alternatives. For those inter-
ested in development, however, the principal challenge is to de-
termine how a dynamic system that is constantly organizing and
reorganizing (Gottlieb 1991; Thelen & Smith 1994) is capable of
perceiving intersensory relations despite the fact that it may not
be able to perceive global arrays.
Our view is that the nervous system (i.e., internal processes)
plays an essential and critical role in the development of intersen-
sory perception. Indeed, one could argue that this is completely
consistent with ecological thinking. Specifically, if we extend the
evolutionary argument that Gibson used to motivate his ecological
psychology (and one that S&B would likely not find objectionable)
that organisms evolved to respond directly to perceptual structure
then it is equally likely that nervous systems also evolved to do so.
Given that no behavior is possible without the brain, why ascribe
all behavioral control to external input and reject internal pro-
cesses? How can one speak of organism-environment mutuality,
and not acknowledge the organism’s internal machinery and its at-
tendant internal processes? Recent neurophysiological findings
show that, at least in the case of spatial multimodal cues, the ner-
vous system does not automatically pick up the relations across
modalities but, instead, actively synthesizes them. Stein and his col-
leagues (Stein 1998) have shown that the deep layers of the mam-
malian superior colliculus contain multimodal cells. These cells ex-
hibit a marked enhancement in activity when near-threshold
auditory and visual stimuli are presented. In other words, there is
a strong dissociation between the information in the global array,
the corresponding neuronal activity, and behavioral responsive-
ness. Moreover, these cells are not present at birth but appear later
in development and when they do they still do not exhibit mature
functional properties. While we do not know how these cells de-
velop in human infants, the absence of multimodal responses in the
developing colliculus of the cat casts serious doubt on the assump-
tion that the perception of global arrays is innate. Even more trou-
bling for the ecological direct perception view is the finding that
when the association cortex is inactivated the collicular cells cease
to perform intersensory integration. This, in turn, results in a fail-
ure to produce appropriate behavioral responses. In other words,
perception is also in the head, not just “out there”!
Amodal specifying information: 
Where is occlusion?
William M. Mace
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Abstract: James Gibson’s theory of information, as specific to (but not
necessarily “like”) its sources, is especially indebted to the study of occlu-
sion for its core examples. In occlusion, one is “amodally” aware of hidden
surfaces. Is this still too related to one modality to count as a good case for
Stoffregen & Bardy?
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) argue that researchers should examine
information defined across energy fields but not defined within
any one. I do not think that it is clear how to flesh out their sketch
with relevant data and more detailed theory. To make their posi-
tion clear, the authors will need to review a much larger body of
data, some of which surely exists and much that will have to be
generated. I take it that a major goal of their target article is to
stimulate work on both of these. It seems clear that their paradigm
case is the specification of ground slope that they mention in sec-
tion 6.1, drawn from Gibson 1966, pp. 62–63. I hope that S&B’s
response will recommend a variety of avenues of research but one
set that I think would be especially helpful concerns occlusion.
Occlusion emerges as a topic in the term “amodal.” The position
that S&B attribute to James Gibson with the label “amodal” is a po-
sition Gibson did endorse in 1966, but he did not call it “amodal.”
Moreover, he recognized the problems the authors warn about. “If
stimulus information is equivalent across sense modalities, as I ar-
gue, then a new problem arises of the consistency and discrepancy
of information, either within a perceptual system or between per-
ceptual systems (cross-modal, supra-intermodal, amodal, the ‘co-
operation’ of the senses, ‘unity’ of the senses, etc. (Gibson 1966).”
Eleanor Gibson, as cited by S&B, used “amodal” in the authors’
sense, but James Gibson did not. Taken by itself, this is a minor
point, but considering it leads naturally to core concepts of eco-
logical psychology, specification, and information. These words
are used frequently in the target article, but without elaboration
(allowing S&B to stick closely to their main points). Because
“specification” and “information” are common enough words in
English, there is little in the target article that would mark them
as carefully chosen theoretical terms, yet what they indicate are
precisely the qualities of the ecological position that make the au-
thors’ argument plausible. Therefore I think it is worthwhile un-
derscoring their meaning for James Gibson.
The usage of the word “amodal” that James Gibson cited was
from Michotte et al. (1964). In what some have called the “rabbit
hole effect,” which forms half of the well-known “tunnel effect,”
Michotte showed that changes of shape of a circle caused by pro-
gressively removing segments, when shown as an animated film or
its equivalent, did not look like something changing shape at all,
but rather looked like a constant shaped circular form being hid-
den. Michotte referred to the awareness of the hidden parts as
amodal because there was no visual sensation coming from them,
what Gibson (1966, p. 205) liked to call a “sensationless percep-
tion.” This usage of “amodal” is common in the work of Kanizsa
and Gerbino (1982) and the framing of the issue is similar to that
coming from the Grossberg group under the heading “filling in”
(Pessoa et al. 1998).
Gibson argued that what was crucial here was the specifying
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power of the optical change itself. He maintained that the optical
changes caused by something’s going out of sight were different
from the changes caused by something’s going out of existence. He
reasoned that if going out of sight (with no change in existence)
and going out of existence are optically distinct transitions (for
starters, the first is reversible, the second is not), and an animal
can see that distinction, then there is a basis for perceiving the
continued existence of what is temporarily out of sight (Gibson et
al. 1969). There is a real sense in which one can be said to be per-
ceiving the hidden, and for Gibson that is based on the detection
of information (the specific type of change).
Studying the details of something going out of sight is, of course,
the all important (for Gibson) topic of occlusion. The optical con-
ditions for occlusion are specific to going out of sight as compared
to going out of existence. Both are more specific than referring to
them as equal cases of “disappearance” of texture. Gibson counted
the optical changes specific to each as information, that is, the
changes would be informative about some state of the environment
(its permanence or impermanence) relative to an observer/actor.
What is important to emphasize here is that the language of speci-
ficity was adopted as a contrast to terms that would presuppose
some kind of similarity or resemblance. It was not a paradox for
Gibson to assert that something (occluded surfaces) could be per-
ceived without being “present to the senses (Gibson 1986, p. 189).”
He delighted in formulations like “the perception of persistence is
not based on the persistence of the percept.”
No doubt, S&B understand these points full well. However, be-
cause so much that is central to Gibson’s ideas about information
as specifying its sources is packed into the study of occlusion and
its kind of “amodality,” I would welcome their making an explicit
connection between their ideas and occlusion. I would add that
occlusion need not be studied only visually. One can imagine that
the sound heard suddenly by someone in the street from a door or
window opening on a noisy party would not sound like the begin-
ning of the party, but a “window” on to the sound of an ongoing
party. The sense of the party’s existence would be “amodal” in the
Michotte sense. How would that compare with turning a radio on
and off? In touch, one rarely touches all the connected surfaces at
once, but can discover what is connected to what. Is occlusion, ei-
ther from vision or this more generic sense, related to informative
cases in the Stoffregen & Bardy scheme? Is there multimodal oc-
clusion? Or is this “amodality” beside the point?
Toward a strategy for demonstrating 
the perceptual independence of the global
array from individual sensory arrays
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Abstract: This commentary discusses a strategy by which investigators can
examine whether observers perceive properties of the global array inde-
pendently of properties in individual sensory arrays. Research showing
that perception of complex relationships appears to be independent of the
perception of individual components is considered. Ashby and Townsend’s
(1986) methods for identifying perceptual independence are important
tools for studying the global array.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) argue that prospective actors detect
properties of the global array independently of properties in indi-
vidual sensory arrays. One challenge is to develop research strate-
gies and tools that could demonstrate whether prospective actors
are able to detect this information directly, that is, without having
to compute global properties from the detection of independent
properties contained in each source of energy. I am skeptical
about the possibility of proving that a computational approach will
not work because one could resort to a different set of computa-
tional procedures (Mark 1987). However, research can identify
constraints on the nature of such computations so as to render im-
plausible approaches based on cognitive computations.
One strategy is to develop tasks in which the resulting behavior
or perception appears to be grounded in the detection complex
relationships among components of single arrays, so that the com-
plex relationship is detected independently of one or more of its
elementary components. Todd’s (1981) study of visual information
about moving objects showed that observers of a depiction of a
moving object were able to detect information about time to 
arrival or where a free falling object would contact the ground.
Todd’s analysis of the relationships available in these depictions in-
dicated that observers were detecting a relationship among vari-
ables that included the object’s acceleration. Yet Todd demon-
strated that observers were relatively poor in judging whether an
object was accelerating or decelerating.
Apparently, Todd’s observers were detecting the complex rela-
tionship independent of their perception of individual compo-
nents. Whereas Todd’s analysis was restricted to the visual array,
Mark’s (1987) examination of the perceived maximum surface
height on which an observer could either climb on bipedally or sit
on may well have involved relationships in the global array. When
observers’ capabilities were manipulated by having them wear 10-
cm high blocks on their feet, judgments of their action capabili-
ties initially overestimated their stair climbing capabilities and un-
derestimated their maximum sitting capabilities. However, when
given the opportunity to engage in exploratory movements (Mark
et al. 1990), observers were able to discover their new capabilities
in the absence of any opportunity to practice the relevant goal-
directed action. Throughout the experiment, Mark (1987) also
asked observers to estimate the height of the blocks on which they
were standing. Participants consistently overestimated the actual
height of the blocks by an amount greater than the error in their
judgments of their sitting or stair climbing capabilities.
This finding places a severe constraint on any computational
procedure for determining a prospective actor’s sitting or stair
climbing capabilities – a viable algorithm cannot involve per-
ceived block height in recalibrating the actor’s capabilities. Alter-
nately, prospective actors may be detecting affordances (complex
relationships between the environment and the prospective actor
that have implications for action) directly. The analyses devised by
Ashby and Townsend (1986) for distinguishing perceptual inde-
pendence of individual perceptions go to the heart of this matter.
Amazeen (1999) has used this tool effectively to demonstrate that
haptically perceived heaviness is independent of haptically per-
ceived size. The experimental goal, then, for implementing S&B’s
approach, is to devise experiments that show complex relation-
ships in the global array are perceived independently of proper-
ties of individual arrays.
Functional separation of the senses is a
requirement of perception/action research
Kipp McMichael and Geoffrey Bingham
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Abstract: Stoffregen & Bardy’s arguments against separation of the senses
fail to consider the functional differences between the kinds of informa-
tion potentially available in the structured energy arrays that correspond
to the traditional senses. Since most perception/action research pursues a
strategy of information perturbation presupposing differential contribu-
tions from the various ambient arrays, the global array hypothesis can only
be extended and tested by analyses that consider the functional aspects
along which the senses can, in fact, be separated.
Stoffregen & Bardy’s (S&B’s) argument concerning the global ar-
ray is intriguing hut potentially disturbing because it entails a re-
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jection of the traditional separation of the senses. A bold claim in
its own right, this rejection ultimately calls into question the real-
ity of separable ambient energy arrays and consequently denies
that specification can exist within such separate arrays. We argue,
however, that analysis of the informative character of the various
modalities is essential to understand the informative stability of
the hypothesized global array under conditions that perturb the
functioning of the various senses. S&B present the global array as
a logically necessary conclusion from their rejection of separation
of the senses. However, the global array hypothesis can stand in-
dependent of this rejection and must do so if it is to stand at all.
If we accept that specification is only possible within the global
array then perception/action must then rely exclusively on the
global array. The authors, however, did not describe many partic-
ulars of specification in the global array. We note that there must
be multiple ways for the global array to be configured or for in-
formation to get into the global array from the various modalities.
This follows, for instance, from the successful visually guided lo-
comotion of John Hale (Cole 1995), who lacked proprioceptive in-
formation below the neck or from the capable activity exhibited
by blind and deaf individuals like Helen Keller. In these cases, a
functionally adequate global array must be realizable via a subset
of the normally functional sensory organs. Clearly, however, not
just any subset of the sensory organs will do. Were we to combine
the sensory deficits of both Hale and Keller in the same unfortu-
nate perceiver, it is unclear how the olfactory, taste, and vestibu-
lar systems could acquire information about distal layout or limb
position.
S&B have neglected to include an account of differential effects
of specific sensory deficits on the structure of the global array pre-
sumably because they reject the notion of separable senses. Nev-
ertheless, testable predictions concerning the effects of specific
sensory attenuation or absence on the structure of the global ar-
ray would constitute an important empirical aspect of the author’s
hypothesis, particularly because temporary loss of certain modal-
ities is a regular aspect of our natural ecology. Ultimately, we must
inquire how the global array evolves over time and changes when,
for example, we turn off the lights before bed. Do we lose alto-
gether the specification of evolving limb posture and body posi-
tion in the surrounding layout when one or more modalities are
attenuated? If specification persists, then how are we to under-
stand it without independent analysis of the contributions of the
modality (that is, the sense) that has been temporarily lost?
S&B are critical of efforts to delineate separate sensory systems
using any anatomical or neurophysiological basis – but a lack of
differentiation between anatomically defined senses is not the
same as a lack of differentiation between sensory systems. Gibson
(1966) focused on the role of perception in behavior such as main-
taining orientation with respect to the surroundings. His func-
tional, rather than anatomical, approach to an analysis of the
senses did yield systems that spanned the traditional anatomically
defined senses. Nevertheless, Gibson described vision and audi-
tion as among these perceptual systems and in his analysis, vision
could be used to achieve different goals in different tasks, for ex-
ample to look at pictures or to guide locomotion. Thus, for Gib-
son, the notion of separate senses was not simply an obsolete Aris-
totelian relic but a reality of the functional requirements of
perceptual behavior.
To understand how vision can be applied to such disparate tasks
requires analysis of the kinds of information available via the struc-
tured arrays corresponding to the traditional senses. The optic ar-
ray cannot, by itself, provide information about absolute spatial
scale because it consists of only angular and temporal patterns.
Nevertheless, as described by Gibson, optical structure alone does
provide information about the ordinal structure of surrounding
layout and the observer’s spatio-temporal relation to it – enough
information to allow the control of steering, for instance, in re-
mote teleoperation. Obviously the human perception/action sys-
tem did not evolve to guide remote locomotion via a video display,
but the ability of humans to succeed at this task under such 
sensory-deficient conditions indicates that sufficient specification
does exist in the optic array alone.
S&B reject analysis of sources of information specific to the in-
dividual senses, but such analysis is required for any perturbation
study of perception/action. This is extremely significant because,
as discussed by Bingham and Pagano (1998), most investigations
study perception via perturbation methods wherein the informa-
tion in particular sensory arrays is removed or attenuated. Bing-
ham and Pagano suggested that investigations should proceed by
observing the changes in performance when information is re-
moved as compared to an unperturbed performance standard.
This requires an analysis of the information provided via particu-
lar senses to predict perturbation effects.
The need to evaluate the effect of perturbation is important be-
cause the apparatus used to control and manipulate information
is itself perturbing aside from the intended experimental manip-
ulation. Virtual reality (VR), for instance, has excited much inter-
est because it allows optical information to be controlled via com-
puter graphics while retaining an active observer. But VR requires
a user to look at a computer graphics display which entails per-
turbing visual accommodation and vergence. These perturbation
effects must be evaluated if VR is to be used to study perception/
action. In our own VR research, we have referred to results from
previous studies in which either accommodation or vergence had
been isolated and manipulated to test their role in distance per-
ception. We used these results to predict the potential effect of the
VR displays on performance in reaching tasks. We found that VR
produced the predicted effects (Bingham 2000a; Bingham et al.,
submitted). This research required analysis and study of the visual
system both independent of and as part of a system for the coor-
dination and control of reaching.
Because we must ultimately probe the nature of perception/ac-
tion systems by means of perturbations like these, functional
analysis of the senses is essential. Because Stoffregen & Bardy
failed to address the role of such perturbations in the study of per-
ception/action, it is difficult to access the theoretical or explana-
tory potential of the global array and its requisite unity of the
senses. Discussion of methodology is essential to the enterprise.
A different way to combine direct perception
with intersensory interaction
Thomas Mergnera and Wolfgang Beckerb
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Abstract: There is a discrepancy between Stoffregen & Bardy’s concept
with experimental work on human self-motion perception. We suggest an
alternative: (1) higher brain centers are informed by a given sensory cue
in a direct and rapid way (direct perception), and (2) this information is
then used to prime and shape a more complex mechanism that usually in-
volves several cues and processing steps (inferential).
We welcome the Stoffregen & Bardy’s (S&B’s) attempt to broaden
the basis for ecological psychology or, more specifically, the direct
perception concept. As sensory physiologists dealing with infer-
ential explanations of human perception of self-motion, we are re-
peatedly confronted with the limitations of our “bottom-up” ap-
proach and therefore take notice with great interest of the
“top-down” views offered by psychologists. We think that the is-
sue of directly perceiving a Gestalt-like “global stimulus array”
versus an intersensory interaction in terms of sensor fusion
(Mergner & Rosemeier 1998) may revive and deepen the inter-
disciplinary discussion. We agree with the authors that perception
mostly builds upon more than one sensory cue; however, based on
experimental evidence concerning perceptual control of dynamic
behavior in space, we feel that multisensory processing mainly
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takes place in the inferential elaboration of perception, whereas
direct mechanisms (not necessarily multisensory ones) mostly
would have priming functions. In particular, we shall argue that:
(1) an “inferential” concept of perception can largely be in line
with the ecological view, that (2) there may be a coexistens of a di-
rect and an inferential information pick-up in one and the same
perception, and (3) that the former actually may prime or shape
the latter.
Concepts of ecological psychology as part of an inferential
theory. Referring to the example of the “global array” resolving
the ambiguity of an isolated consideration of the optokinetic sig-
nal (sect. 6.1), we note that a simple neural network with one
vestibular and one optokinetic neuron in the input layer, and one
“self” and one “pattern” neuron in the output layer could, in prin-
ciple, determine whether the observer or the pattern was stopped.
Inasmuch as the activities of the two input neurons are viewed as
a unique pattern propagating through the network, one may talk
of a global, direct perception. However, one can as well interpret
the network as an inferential processor which, using appropriate
input-to-output coupling weights, derives the correct answer from
two different afferents; yet, in spite of this inferential approach we
would still classify the answer as a holistic Gestalt perception. This
is to say that there is often no sharp division between the concepts
of direct and inferential perception.
From our own work on the role of visual-vestibular interac-
tion for human self-motion perception (Mergner et al. 2000b) –
experiments in which observers and their visual surround were 
rotated independently of each other using various combinations –
we conclude that a rule-based ecological view is largely compati-
ble with the inferential approach of biocybernetical models. In
fact, the 1atter reflect the evolutionary experience that the visual
world as a whole is fixed in space and, hence, self-motion percep-
tion is foremost dependent on the visual cue. The vestibular cue
would be, for one thing, a “technical embellishment” that takes
over when the dynamical limits of the visual system are being ex-
ceeded (at frequencies >0.8 Hz). A different rule is invoked in sit-
uations where large parts of our visual fields are covered by co-
herently moving stimuli (a situation which usually occurs only
transiently). Self-motion perception then must rely on the vestibu-
lar cue in order to avoid or to minimize visual self-motion illusions
(vection, e.g., circular vection, CV. Contrary to S&B, we stick to
the notion of an “illusion” because, from an ecological point of
view, “true” motion is primarily a way to get from one point on the 
earth to another). Finally, because low frequency horizontal self-
rotations only give rise to optokinetic signals (the vestibular sys-
tem in this plane has high-pass characteristics), a third rule spec-
ifies that low frequency optokinetic signals are to be interpreted
as indicating self-motion (with the risk of creating an illusion).
These rules can be seen as features of the “global array” that de-
termines the Gestalt of the resulting perception.
Interesting to note, with sinusoidal rotations of 0.4 Hz (at this
frequency both the visual and the vestibular cues provide reliable
motion information), perceived self-motion perception was ob-
served to rather faithfully reflect the actual body rotation, inde-
pendent of the rotation of the optokinetic stimulus (OKS). This
observation apparently contradicts the first rule and would seem
to indicate that subjects relied solely on the vestibular cue for their
self-motion perception. However, the analysis of a model which
successfully simulated this and other observations (Mergner 
et al. 2000b) suggests that during rotation in a stationary visual en-
vironment, self-motion perception is determined by a visual con-
tribution; this contribution would originate from a “direct path-
way” representing “head-to-visual reference” motion. The role of
vestibular signal in this scheme is to define the kinematic state of
the visual reference (after fusion with a processed version of the
visual cue). According to this view one tends to perceive self-
motion primarily with respect to a visual reference frame. This
frame, in turn, is experienced as moving if its movements with re-
spect to the gravito-inertial reference frame exceed a vestibularty
defined threshold (example: movement experienced inside an il-
luminated funicular cabin, which is swaying in darkness). Like-
wise, during vestibular-somatosensory interaction self-motion can
be viewed as being primarily based on somatosensory afferents
and being referenced to the body support, while the vestibular in-
formation would be used to monitor and evaluate the kinematic
state of the support (Mergner et al. 1997).
Direct and inferential perception may coexist. Investigations
into the conditions favoring the occurrence of CV lead us to be-
lieve that direct and inferential perceptions can coexist and actu-
ally may collaborate. Point of departure was the observation that
CV is facilitated in conditions with a brightly illuminated OKS, as
compared to an OKS that is so dimly illuminated that the visual
field shrinks to the point where the observer can no longer see his
orbital rim boundaries (Mergner et al. 2000a). These observations
led us to investigate CV in conditions with an artificial orbital rim
that could be rotated independently of the eyes (which fixated a
stationary or moving target) and of the OKS (stationary of mov-
ing). The stimuli were applied at very low frequency (0.05 Hz)
where, in case of a real self-rotation, vestibular afferents would no
longer contribute much to its perception. The results of these ex-
periments led to a describing model which, among other facts, ex-
plains why background motions across the retina do not elicit a CV
if they are caused by eye movements. The model postulates two
independent internal notions of head motion relative to OKS. One
would be based on the visual afferents signaling the relative mo-
tion of the orbital rims (and hence of the head) with respect to the
OKS. The second would be a visual signal obtained by the sum-
mation of OKS retinal slip with an eye movement related effer-
ence copy (assuming a stationary head). Noticeably, each of these
two cues alone is able to evoke CV; however, under normal cir-
cumstances (i.e., in the presence of a structured background)
where they tend to arise in combination, they neutralize each other.
The purely visually derived signal can be viewed as providing a di-
rect perception, while the coordinate transformation giving rise to
the second signal is an example of inferential processing. Thus, di-
rect and inferential cues appear to coexist and to cooperate.
Could direct perception prime and shape inferential percep-
tion? We hold that the direct perception concept refers mainly to
everyday situations in which individuals interact with their envi-
ronment and receive a wealth of mostly congruent sensory infor-
mation. If one conceives of the brain as a learning neuronal net-
work (ignoring its anatomical and developmental “prewiring”),
one would assume that it is overtrained with regard to everyday
situations and may have learned to handle these mostly on the ba-
sis of direct perception. Yet, also in these situations, inferential
perception still may be required to adequately direct motor out-
put to the various joints of the body. Indeed, inferential models
such as our model of vestibulo-somatosensory interaction (Merg-
ner et al. 1997) specify the kinematic state of each part of the body
(head, torso, hips, etc.). By directing an observer’s attention to
these states, these notions become conscious perceptions and can
be probed experimentally. Using appropriate transformation laws,
they can be processed to elaborate a behaviorally adequate motor
innervation. In contrast, a logical extension of the “global array”
view to motor reactions would seem to require the combination of
an already huge sensory parameter space with a similarly large
space encompassing all possible configurations of the observer’s
own states, a notion that is difficult to accept, even in view of the
immense information storage capabilities of the brain. However,
we nonetheless see a role here for direct perception (not neces-
sarily for a global one, though): The operations required for in-
ferential processing and for the transformation into motor output
are likely to be quite complex because they have to take into
account the rules of spherical kinematics (unlike in most labora-
tory experiments, natural motions of the body and its parts are not
restricted to coplanar rotations). We speculate, therefore, that in
standard situations direct perception could provide higher brain
centers with a first and rapid information on external events,
which would help these centers to rapidly select the correct cal-
culation path for the detailed inferential analysis of the given sit-
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uation; in other words, a combination of direct and inferential pro-
cesses might yield an optimal trade-off between speed and relia-
bility. However, in complex and rare situations (e.g., observer and
visual background or body support moving simultaneously and in-
dependently of each other), direct perception is unlikely to pro-
vide us with an adequate “first guess” of the ongoing external
events so that, for the sake of reliability, the brain would have to
rely foremost on its inferential capabilities.
There may be a relation between the hypothesized priming
function of direct perception and the role of cognition in percep-
tual processes. Cognition can, within wide limits, modulate and
predetermine the perceptual interpretation of a given set of sen-
sory signals. For example, observers who expect a constant veloc-
ity rotation frequently will perceive such a rotation even if they 
are passively turned in darkness although their only source of in-
formation, the vestibular system, will indicate an exponentially 
decaying velocity. Likewise, the priming function of direct per-
ception may be one of setting the stage for an inferential inter-
pretation in agreement with the initial impression conveyed by the
direct perception. Conceivably this occurs by the intermediate of
a cognitive level where first the sensory Gestalt of the current sit-
uation is recognized. Stoffregen & Bardy do not address the role
of cognition for perception, continuing a tradition of classical sen-
sory physiology which virtually ignored cognition. In our view,
cognition is inextricably interwoven with perception, and instead
of trying to eliminate its role by artificial experimental paradigms,
it can be used to elucidate the mechanisms underlying inferential
processing (see Mergner et al. 2000b).
Energy, information, detection, and action
Claire F. Michaels and Raoul R. D. Oudejans
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Abstracts: Before one can talk about global arrays and multimodal de-
tection, one must be clear about the concept of information: How is it dif-
ferent from energy and how is it detected? And can it come to specify a
needed movement? We consider these issues in our commentary.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S & B) present the concept of a global array
– invariants that span more than one individual energy type (and
its associated sensory system). What distinguishes such invariants
from the usual variables studied by ecological psychologists is that
they comprise variants at the level of the energy type or sensory
system; variants are, by definition, not specific to their sources. We
agree with S&B that such invariants exist and that it is a worth-
while enterprise to consider their possible role in perceiving and
in acting. We disagree with many of the rest of their claims – par-
ticularly, the impossibility of specification in a single-energy array,
their underestimation of Gibson’s (1966) claim that the senses be
considered as perceptual systems, and their inattention to the
problem of what is specified, especially regarding action. In our
commentary we make two points; one concerns the relations be-
tween energy, information, and detection and the second claims
that sometimes actions, rather than environmental facts, are spec-
ified by information.
Point 1: Energy is not information and information is not
picked up by receptors. Electromagnetic radiation is structured by
refraction, diffraction, and reflection. The patterns so created can
specify some of the properties of the media and surfaces. If these
are specific (ecologically, rather than mathematically or logically;
see the commentary of Runeson et al. in this issue), living things
might evolve, develop, or build devices that can pick them up. It
is not light, however, that is detected, but information.
In the course of trying to track down the optical variable(s) that
fielders use to guide their locomotion to catch balls hit in the sagit-
tal plane, we asked people to attempt to run and catch luminous
balls in the pitch dark and to do so monocularly (Oudejans et al.
1999). We found that people were successful. Given that to-be-
caught balls are followed with pursuit eye movements (Oudejans
et al. 1999, Expt. 1), one would expect that the image of the ball
to be more or less stationary on the retina. The retina could not,
therefore, be registering optical variables necessary to guide
movement (e.g., Chapman’s, 1968, optical acceleration). We con-
cluded that ultimately this unmistakably optical information was
registered by non-retinal mechanisms. That is, the eye and head
movements created by tracking transformed an optical pattern
into eye or eye-and-head rotations, which would be picked up by
“vestibular and proprioceptive” mechanisms. Thus, while light is
necessarily detected by rods and cones, the information in light is
not necessarily detected by a retina. This counters S&B’s implicit
assumption that once information is described that the nature of
its detection is obvious.
Point 2: What is specified? By entering into the debate of
whether “physical reality” is or is not specified, S&B ignore the in-
timacy of information and action. A discussion of “specificity”
quickly gets spooky in the absence of a serious consideration of
what is specified. We do not believe that S&B’s answer, physical
reality, is sufficient. A key idea of the ecological approach is that
affordances can be specified by information and more generally
that information can provide a basis for controlling movement.
Recently we have argued that variables of stimulation can be
specific to action without their being specific to some environ-
mental fact or characteristic. This means that one should not al-
ways expect a 1:1 relation between an information source and a
property of the environment. We present two examples. First, in our
study of the timing of elbow extensions in the punching of falling
balls (Michaels et al., in press), we found that the onset and rate
of elbow flexion were controlled by optical expansion – the rate of
change of optical size of a ball as it approaches. Expansion rate,
however, does not specify properties of the approach of the ball;
it varies with ball size, approach velocity, and distance. Neverthe-
less, it appears that, over the course of practice in the task, ex-
pansion rate comes to specify when and how fast to flex the elbow.
As a second example, we recently demonstrated (Oudejans et al.
2000) that errors in judging offside in soccer appear to be the re-
sult of assistant referees’ using an optical variable that does not
specify who is closer to the goal (attacker or defender). The off-
side judgment is based on the optical angle between defender and
attacker. This angle would specify who is closer to the defender’s
goal line only if the line judge were always on the offside line.
Oudejans et al. (2000) showed, however, that the line judge is fre-
quently off that line when judging offside. As a result, the line
judge sometimes puts the flag up even though the attacker is not
offside, or keeps the flag down even though the attacker is offside
(depending on the side at which the attacker passes the defender).
As in the ball-punching case, flagging appears to be lawfully re-
lated to an optical variable that does not specify the environmen-
tal facts. Instead, the arrow of specificity points toward the un-
folding movement. One should look both ways, therefore, before
declaring that arrays are non-specifying.
The settings in which animals act have characteristics that are
important for actions and may be useful in their control. There is
a sea of structure and changing structure available that is poten-
tial information. Some of these structures and transformations
must “get into muscles,” to borrow Turvey’s phrase. For potential
information to be actual, a variety of media must be transparent
to it; these can include energy distributions, chemical distribu-
tions, skin deformations, and neural firing patterns, to name a few.
To make sweeping arguments about inherent limitations of single
types of energy, single organs, and which organs are detecting
what energy diverts attention from action and information and re-
vives the energy-based distinctions that Gibson had purged in
1966, or so we thought.
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Abstract: I discuss Stoffregen & Bardy’s theory from the perspective of
the complementary aspect of input conflict, namely, input coherence – the
unity of perception. In a classical approach this leads to the famous “bind-
ing problem.” The conceptual framework the authors construct leaves no
space for a binding problem to arise. A remaining problem of perceptual
conflict, arising in cases of inversion of the visual field can be handled by
the theory the authors propose.
Sensory conflict plays an important role in the target article. In this
commentary, I will look at the paper with a complementary theme
in mind: sensory coherence, or the unity of perceptual conscious-
ness.
According to the classical view, perceptual input information is
not only ambiguous, therefore requiring inference, but it is also
fragmented. Fragmentation applies at a variety of levels. First, the
input information is shattered to pieces as it is spread out over thou-
sands or even millions of receptor cells. At a higher level, fragmen-
tation occurs because of the separateness of the senses: separate
modules in the various modalities deal with the shattered pieces of
input to build modality-specific higher-level representations. These
higher level representations are supposed at least partially to solve
both the ambiguity problem and the fragmentation problem. Am-
biguity has been solved because knowledge not present (such as
Marr’s rigidity constraint, 1982, pp. 209–10) in the stimulus itself
has been brought to bear upon it. Fragmentation is partially undone
because from the receptor mosaic emerge sense-specific represen-
tations, perhaps in a “canonical” format. Yet fragmentation remains
a problem. Now how do all these outputs from these separate mod-
ules get glued together? The situation is aggravated by the fact that
it is widely assumed that there is intermediate level fragmentation
within the modules: within the visual module there are submodules
for color, form, movement, and so on (Zeki 1993). So the traditional
view creates for itself the famous “binding problem”: How do all
these separate representations get together so as to lead to the uni-
fied perceptual consciousness we normally enjoy? The favourite so-
lution within the tradition is well-known: it is neural synchronisa-
tion that is doing the job (Crick & Koch 1990).
Whatever the merits of the synchronisation idea, it is still un-
able to deal with still higher levels of fragmentation. What, for ex-
ample, binds lower level sensory representations (as outputs from
perceptual modules) to their conceptual representations? Even
after the color of the bucket, its shape and its cold feel have been
bound, it still needs to be bound to how I conceive it: as the bucket
I used to scare the attacking dog on aunt Margaret’s farm, for ex-
ample. And there is yet a further level of fragmentation; how does
the passively received input representation, even when fully
bound with each other and with conceptual representations, be-
comes something I can act upon? How is the perception-action di-
vide crossed? Does it need to be bound with plans, or with goal-
representations? Clearly, we’re on the verge of a combinatorial
explosion, or worse, conceptual impossibility (cf. Shanon 1993).
One of the many nice aspects of this paper is that it shows con-
clusively that these problems of fragmentation and binding, as the
side coin of problems of input conflict, arise not only within the
traditional view, but also within all forms of Gibsonian theories
that assume separate senses. With hindsight, one sees that it could
not be otherwise: fragmentation at separate senses (accepted by
many Gibsonians) is just a higher-level version of fragmentation at
sensory receptors (criticised by all Gibsonians). It is only with
S&B’s proposal of unifying the senses ab initio, that the concep-
tual space closes so as not even to leave room for the problem of
perceptual unity to emerge.
From the various remarks in the target article concerning the
dependence on the goals of action as the functional basis of the in-
teraction with the global array (e.g., end of sect. 4.5, also sect.
6.2.5), one sees how the theory also contains the ingredients to
cross the last gap created by fragmentation: the gap between per-
ception and action. A consequence of this is that the distinction
S&B make between perception and action can only be heuristic.
Just as they characterise their view as one in which perception is
not seen as the parallel action of a group of systems, but as the uni-
tary action of a system with parts, they, it seems to me, would have
to apply this to action and perception and see these as aspects of
one global thing: the organism in its interaction with the environ-
ment (as I think they would certainly be willing to do).
More interesting, bridging the perception/action gap in this
way allows for a real form of fragmentation: erroneous or dis-
united perception when either the organism’s perceptual situation
is problematic when viewing conditions are suboptimal or the per-
ceptual apparatus is damaged (cf. sect. 6.2.3) or when its action
possibilities are suboptimal. An interesting situation occurs when
both are suboptimal, as in the well known case of people wearing
goggles that invert the retinal image.
It has been well documented that once behavioral adaptation to
the goggles occurs, and once people learn to act in the “normal”
way again, their perception returns to normal. However, percep-
tual adaptation does not occur in an “all at once,” but in a frag-
mented way. Perceptual adaptation seems to depend on which be-
havioral capacities have adapted, and they do not all adapt at the
same pace (for discussion, see Hurley 1998, p. 347–48, and O’Re-
gan & Noë, in press). What this suggests is that just like percep-
tual unity, perceptual fragmentation is not an internal affair.
Rather it is a matter of behavioral “disunity.” At last, we have a real
case of fragmentation, but one that perfectly fits within the frame-
work Stoffregen & Bardy sketch.
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Abstract: The authors attempt to prove that single energy arrays cannot
specify reality. We offer contrary evidence that motion structures the
acoustic array to specify fundamental attributes of the source. Against di-
rect detection in general, we cite evidence that humans weight acoustic in-
puts differentially when making perceptual judgments of auditory motion.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) attempt to prove the inadequacy of per-
ceiving reality via single energy arrays through the following syllo-
gism: perception in general is largely the perception of motion; mo-
tion is relative and often indicated divergently among energy
arrays; hence, reliable perception of the environment is not possi-
ble via single arrays. We agree that motion is vital to successful per-
ception. But in addition, dynamics can impose sufficient con-
straints that allow even single sensory arrays to specify other distal
properties relevant to an animal’s behavior beyond motion per se.
For example, analytical demonstrations exist showing that audi-
tory motion can structure the dynamic acoustic array to specify fun-
damental attributes of the sound source, such as its position, ve-
locity, and time-to-contact (TTC) (Jenison 1997). These higher
order variables are inversely determined from the forward equa-
tions describing the physical mapping of intensity, frequency, and
interaural time delay (ITD) from source to observer. Such inverse
solutions are evidence that single energy arrays can specify reality
provided that sufficient input dimensions within the modality exist.
We believe there is a more general inquiry into S&B’s hypoth-
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esis concerning the adequacy of individual arrays for percep-
tion. Namely, how many sources of sensory input does it take to
specify a distal property? In our view, this is a simple question of 
algebra. Specification of a higher order property implies the 
existence of an inverse solution from the proximal inputs to the
distal variable. If there are not enough “knowns” (input) to “un-
knowns” (distal variable), then the property may not be identifi-
able. Hence, increasing the number of inputs should generally 
increase specification. This is the root of the S&B’s argument 
for the necessity of multimodal (“global”) information. Again, we
would generalize this position by saying what is needed to specify
the world is simply enough proper input information, indepen-
dent of whether that information is conveyed within (“multiple
specification”) or across modalities (“amodal specification”). By
“proper” we mean that there is a lawful physical relationship be-
tween the distal property and the input.
While this approach explicates the physical journey from envi-
ronment to receptor, we also believe in a corresponding journey
from receptor to percept. The achievement of perception is
“harder” than just saying a variable has or has not been detected,
as most ecological theorists seem satisfied to claim (Marr 1982).
Typical in such arguments, there is no description by the authors
of how higher order information is in fact directly detected by the
animal (e.g., are there transducers for global variables [Fodor &
Pylyshyn 1981])? Rather than appealing to direct detection, we
formally question: (1) how are input sources or physical dimen-
sions combined when detecting properties specified by multiple
inputs? and (2) how may perception be achieved through a form
of statistical estimation, given the stochastic nature of neural
transduction and transmission?
To investigate these questions, we have simulated the estima-
tion of higher order auditory variables (e.g., auditory TTC) using
two models of input fusion. The first employs a Kalman filter
which can successfully estimate higher order terms using as input
the noise-corrupted observed intensity, frequency and ITD of a
simulated moving sound source (Jenison 1996). In theory, one
could extend the Kalman filter to integrate information from dif-
ferent modalities, obviating any debate over a qualitative versus
quantitative difference between uni- and multimodal input. What
is required are representations of the forward equations mapping
distal states to physical input dimensions across modalities. These
equations allow the filter to dynamically adapt the fusion of input
information in order to improve its estimate of source states.
It may be the case that the Kalman algorithm does not strictly
represent neurophysiological mechanisms. However, it has been
proven equivalent to a form of dynamic Bayesian estimation
(Meinhold & Singpurwalla 1983), a process which we believe bet-
ter describes how neural systems may extract information from
sensory input. As a model embodying fewer assumptions, we have
also trained a recurrent neural network to estimate TTC from the
same acoustic dimensions (Neelon & Jenison 2000). Performance
of both models degrades as a function of reducing either the num-
ber of inputs or their signal-to-noise ratio (e.g., increase sensor
noise or virtual distance of the source). This again illustrates that
perceptual estimation is likely to be a continuous (though non-
linear) function of the quantity and fidelity of lower order inputs.
Ecological theorists may remain unconvinced that real ob-
servers combine sensory inputs to perceive higher order informa-
tion. There is evidence, however, that human subjects differ-
entially weight acoustic inputs when making judgments about
moving sources. First, we have tested listeners in tasks requiring
them to discriminate between the intrinsic frequency and TTC of
two moving sound sources (Neelon & Jenison 1997; 2000). Sub-
jects show a pattern of results similar to that of model simulations
as sensory input is degraded. Further evidence is provided by
Lutfi & Wang (1999), who indirectly measured the weights human
observers place on the acoustic inputs of level, frequency and ITD
when discriminating between moving sources. They correlated
listener response with experimentally controlled input variation to
estimate how much influence each input had on performance.
They discovered that as task and source parameters changed, so
did the weighting schemes.
To conclude, we agree in principle with S&B’s arguments that
multiple, dynamic inputs should provide better specification of
the external world than single or static inputs. However, they of-
fer no evidence that global energy arrays are necessary for identi-
fying every environmental property; on the contrary, we cite analy-
ses which show the sufficiency of the dynamic acoustic array to
specify several attributes of moving sound sources. The degree to
which the world is inversely determined by sensory inputs (i.e.,
perception) is a product of the lawful relationship of energy prop-
agation between them and the statistical reliability of the neural
representations of that input.
Input-driven behavior: One extreme of the
multisensory perceptual continuum
Kelvin S. Oie and John J. Jeka
Program in Neuroscience and Cognitive Science and the Department of




Abstract: The propositions that the senses are separate and that the
global array may be sufficient for adequate perception are questioned.
There is evidence that certain tasks may be primarily “input-driven,” but
these are a special case along the behavioral continuum. Many tasks in-
volve sensory information that is ambiguous, and other sources of infor-
mation may be required for adequate perception.
Despite the long scientific tradition of separating perception into
separate sensory systems, it has long been recognized that differ-
ent sensory systems interact in ways that remain poorly under-
stood. Our present understanding of multisensory interactions sits
at the level of phenomena such as the McGurk effect, rather than
with organizational principles of how senses interact.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) address the problem of multisensory
interaction from the perspective that separate senses do not exist.
Unfortunately, their arguments against separate senses are not
compelling. S&B reject an anatomical basis for separate senses due
to interactions of structures only within a sense (two eyes/two ears
that work together), not between. There is little doubt that anatom-
ical substructures have developed to be sensitive to particular
forms of energy. With eyes closed, how well could one determine
the intensity of a light source directed at the pinnae? Moreover, the
fact that animals with different receptors interpret the same form
of energy in different ways does not argue against separate senses,
but against the unique meaning of a stimulus to a perceiver.
More problematic is the question of whether structured energy
fields provide “sufficient/insufficient” information for accurate
perception. The problem may be in the proposition itself. The
ecological view suggests that information for behavior is specified
uniquely in the ambient array, individual or global, and any non-
1:1 mapping negates specification. But, why is specification an ei-
ther/or concept? Why not view the specification of behaviorally
relevant information along a continuum? Under certain task con-
ditions, the stimulus array dominates the response, which one
might call “input-driven” behavior or perception. Time-to-contact
(t) (Lee 1981) is a classical example of such input-driven percep-
tion. Change the parameters of the task conditions, however, and
the same sensory information may now be ambiguous, requiring
other processes and sources of information to be recruited for ad-
equate perception (e.g., memory). This view is more in line with
current thinking about cognition, which stresses the dynamic na-
ture of processing inputs from multiple sources (cf. Beer 2000).
In the search for specification, S&B appeal to the concept of the
global array; essentially a higher-dimensional version of the ambi-
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ent sensory array originally introduced by Gibson (1979). Their
formulation is vague and the arbitrary three-dimensional plots in-
tended as abstract representations of the global array are not par-
ticularly informative. Examples of higher-dimensional variables
are provided, however, that lend credence to the existence of the
global array. S&B misstep, as discussed above, when the global ar-
ray is viewed as eliminating the need for internal processing.
There may be situations in which the global array resolves ambi-
guities provided by single-sensory information. It does not follow
that internal processes are no longer necessary. Again, the solution
may be task specific, with “input-driven” responses representing
one end of a multidimensional continuum. This view is consistent
with the engineering literature, which considers multisensory in-
tegration as a subproblem of “data fusion,” in which any number
of inputs, not just sensory, are combined to form a percept of an
environment object or event (Hall & Llinas 1997).
There is no argument here that structured energy arrays exist
and that they may specify behaviorally relevant information under
certain task conditions, in the ecological sense. The question is
whether such behavior represents all perceptual processing or
merely one extreme of the perceptual continuum. Responses to
other task conditions may “weight” internal processes such as
memory/experience/instruction more heavily to form an ade-
quate percept. Recent studies support the existence of internal
models in sensorimotor integration (Kawato 1999) and multisen-
sory integration (Merfeld et al. 1999). There is growing support
that the extraction of information is a process of estimation, which
may be based upon the statistical properties of multiple sources of
input over time (e.g., Oie et al. 2000; van der Kooij 1999).
A more precise formulation of the global array than that offered
by the target article raises interesting questions of how to distin-
guish processes of direct perception from processes considered
more internal. For example, autonomous robots that process sen-
sory information from multiple sources for obstacle avoidance dy-
namically display what is deemed cognitive behavior in the form
of decision-making (Schöner et al. 1995). The general scheme in-
volves fusing two sensory sources that are spatially nearby to erect
a repellor, which the robot travels around, or to erect two separate
repellors when sensory sources are spatially distant, which the ro-
bot may travel between. The decision to go around or between two
obstacles arises from the fusion of sensory sources that vary para-
metrically. That this behavioral solution may be construed as a
classically internal process, decision-making, without any obvious
internal representation indicates that dynamic aspects of multi-
sensory processing may redefine what is considered internal.
Our view is that Stoffregen & Bardy’s stance may contribute to
understanding the problem of multisensory perception if it is con-
ceived as a special solution at one extreme of the perceptual con-
tinuum. The dichotomous nature of the direct perception/inter-
nal processing discussion may follow the evolution of the nature/
nurture debate. It is not a question of one or the other, but of how
each are blended to solve the task at hand.
Is the brain specified?
Jean Pailhous, Elodie Varraine, and Mireille Bonnard
Mouvement et Perception, Université de la Méditerranée, CNRS, Faculté des
Sciences du Sport, 13288 Marseille, Cedex 9, France.
{pailhous; varreine; bonnard}@laps.univ-mrs.fr www.laps.univ-mrs.fr
Abstract: How to conceive the place of the brain in the specification of
the animal environment relation? Reality is a continuum between exter-
nal physical energies and brain energy. The global array concept linked to
the physical world and its physical energies could be transposed to the
brain as a physical object and a dynamical system.
We are largely in agreement with Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B), par-
ticularly with the epistemological and theoretical point of view
about the nonexistence of separate senses. Their article clarifies
the functional role of sensory information. Today, the separate-
senses view still remains in researchers’ heads especially because
of the computer analogy and semantic segregation of object prop-
erties characteristic in humans. Many studies dealing with the
dominance of one sensory channel during a sensory conflict can
still be found in the literature. But the results of these studies are
highly contradictory. Indeed, the dominance of one sensory chan-
nel depends on age, learning (Misceo et al. 1999), task or form of
cognitive type. It would be interesting to reinterpret these differ-
ences in sensitivity to one form of sensory information amodally.
Our contribution, but also our objection, deals with the place of
the brain in the specification of the animal-environment (A-E) re-
lation. According to S&B the A-E relation is specified by infor-
mation picked-up in the global array, but “before the stimulation
of sensory receptors.” The global array concept linked to the phys-
ical world and to its physical energies can be transposed to the
brain as both a physical object and a dynamical system. The phys-
ically different external energies (air vibration for audition, light
for vision) activate different sensory cortices with energy ex-
changes of a similar nature (chemoelectrical current is the com-
mon energy propagated along the axon and though the synapses).
Moreover, neurons are structurally interconnected and work in
parallel. By distinguishing a physical exterior and a biological in-
terior, the brain is excluded from the physical world. However, ex-
periments have shown that during ontogeny, brain structure is
specified through the A-E interaction, that is, by epigenetic fac-
tors. The studies of Von Melchner et al. (2000) and Sharma et al.
(2000) in ferrets and the studies of Kujala et al. (2000) in humans
asked the following question: Are neural connections genetically
pre-cabled? In this case, each cortical sensory area would be acti-
vated only by one specific physical energy. Or, in the opposite way,
is the cerebral architecture specified by the activation of the sen-
sory pathways? The studies in ferrets have demonstrated that
when a modality-specific brain area such as the primary auditory
cortex is totally deprived of its normal sensory input (the stimu-
lating effect of air vibration is suppressed), it becomes responsive
to stimulation from other modalities such as the visual input. Thus,
the rewired auditory cortex has the same characteristics as the vi-
sual cortex. Sharma et al. (2000) showed that in ferrets in which
retinal projections are routed into auditory pathways, visually re-
sponsive neurons in the rewired primary auditory cortex are also
organized into pinwheels, as observed in V1. In humans, some
studies have shown that in the blind the occipital cortex are acti-
vated by sound changes (see Kujala et al. 2000, for a review). The
neurophysiology of plasticity (i.e., the structural and functional
modifications of the nervous system by the properties of its 
activation) informs us about the amodal functioning of the brain.
The specification of an auditory area by visual input (or the re-
verse) shows that a given part of the brain is not genetically pre-
destined to process a given type of information.
Just as a change in one environmental property modifies the
global pattern of external energy, a change in one environmental
property modifies the neural connections between different sen-
sory cortices (primary or associative). There are contamination
phenomena in all the sensory cortices when one input is modified
(Pailhous et al. 1990; Schöner et al. 1998). Our opinion is that this
unique combination of neural activation, specified univocally by
the properties of physical reality, modifies amodal perception. So,
the processing of the global array is not localized in associative 
areas as thought by the authors, but rather achieved through a
unique spatio-tcmporal activation pattern of the brain: perception
is more univocal than direct. The mysterious concept of direct
perception is involved in this context. Speaking about a neuro-
physiology of direct perception makes sense only if the univocal
characteristic of network activation is taken into account. Then,
we are in agreement with the authors that the A-E relation is glob-
ally specified by the physical world. But our opinion is that the
physical world includes the brain and more generally the whole
organism (in another commentary, we would say that we cannot
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understand the functioning of the nervous system isolated from its
more immediate environment – the rest of the body – we cannot
do neuroscience without doing physiology!). The perception of re-
ality is not mediated by the brain because the brain is included in
reality. It is clear that “direct perception” does not signify “with-
out working of the nervous system.” Reality is a continuum be-
tween external physical energics and physical (because chemo-
electrical) brain energy. By excluding the brain and its energy from
the physical world in order not to separate the senses, inanimate
matter is separated from the living matter. If biology is separated
from physics, there is no longer continuity between brain and en-
vironment, just coupling. Though we are totally in agreement with
S&B on the non-separation of senses and on the concept of global
array, their demonstration would nevertheless, be easier if it inte-
grated the brain. Indeed, there are neither channels nor boxes in
the brain, only networks, massively interconnected and working in
parallel. Even when the stimulation is unimodal, its treatment is
always global, as rightly underscored by the authors.
With regard to this continuity between the physical world and
the brain (which does not exclude its singularities), how is it pos-
sible to have a discontinuity between environment and behavior
at a macroscopic level? We will not be surprised that this discon-
tinuity is marked by the laws of adaptation: “the behavior of an an-
imal is adapted to its environment.” And why is the behavior
adapted ? Because the species which are not adapted to the envi-
ronment do not survive (Darwin 1958). The perception-action
coupling is the result of an adaptive change of our central nervous
system to environmental properties. In separating the nervous sys-
tem and its adaptive properties out of the physical world, the per-
ception-action coupling is masked. That is the reason the neuro-
physiology of plasticity has to have its place in the ecological
approach.
Cortical specification makes sense
Sarah L. Pallas
Department of Biology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303.
spallas@gsu.edu http://www.gsu.edu/~bioslp
Abstract: Overwhelming evidence points to the existence of separate sen-
sory channels in the nervous system. The power of this type of parallel or-
ganization is that information is first processed in neurons specialized to
code it most efficiently. However, sensory pathways are convergent and di-
vergent at each level as well, as is necessary to interpret multimodal and
conflicting information.
The prospect of commenting on a review that extends from the
theory of relativity to cognitive psychology is somewhat daunting
to a non-psychologist, non-physicist, and thus I will attempt to
provide a perspective from a sensory neurophysiologist’s and neu-
roanatomist’s point of view, filtered through our work on brain de-
velopment and evolution. From that perspective, it seems Stoff-
regen & Bardy (S&B) do not rigorously incorporate existing
knowledge about the anatomy and physiology of both unimodal
and multimodal sensory pathways into their theory. However,
their target article is certainly thought-provoking, and many of
their ideas and examples are of considerable value in clarifying
possible future approaches to the questions they delineate.
S&B’s conceptualization of an animal being “directly sensitive”
to the “global array” could be interpreted in several ways. It is dif-
ficult to see how a parameter such as the hand velocity necessary
to intercept a moving object could be “detected directly” since
multiple information sources are necessary to calculate it. If their
argument is that information does not access the brain through
unimodal channels to be later combined in multimodal areas, the
evidence does not support them.
If, on the other hand, their argument is that multimodal areas
are of critical importance to an animal’s ability to understand its
world, that most environmental stimuli have a multimodal com-
ponent, and that animals have neurons that are sensitive to multi-
modal stimuli, then this is not only an obvious point but has a great
deal of experimental support, and does not require proposing at
this point. Gibson and others, including Charles Darwin, sug-
gested long ago that sensory systems are shaped by evolution to
decipher those signals that are of greatest importance to the or-
ganism (Gibson 1979), and such signals often contain energy
across different modalities.
Or perhaps by “directly sensitive” they mean that there are
modules or arrays that are constructed developmentally and/or
evolutionarily that are inherently capable of interpreting aspects
of the global array relevant to survival. The authors are right in that
it is probably the case that such modules have not been properly
searched for in many cases, given that most physiologists restrict
themselves to one sense. But this notion of “combination-sensitive”
neurons is a very old one (e.g., Lettvin et al. 1959) and has been
applied to multimodal inputs by numerous investigators (e.g.,
Stein & Wallace 1996).
Work by sensory physiologists over the past few decades has
made it clear that the brain contains a series of tuned input chan-
nels (sensory organs) that are sensitive to a particular range or type
of energy with minimal overlap, and that these classes are segre-
gated by modality in the early stages of processing. Indeed, this
parallel organization is essential for optimum processing efficiency,
as different neurons and pathways are specialized for processing
certain aspects of a stimulus. Examples of this are the channels
coding form and motion in the mammalian visual pathway (Liv-
ingstone & Hubel 1988), the time and intensity channels of the
auditory pathway (Feldman & Knudsen 1997), or the amplitude
and phase channels in the electrosensory pathway (Kawasaki &
Guo 1998). In these cases, the neurons and synapses in each path-
way are designed optimally for the task at hand. Another crucial
advantage of parallel organization is that the separate lines can be
brought together in multiple different ways; if they were joined at
the outset this combination and recombination process would not
be possible. In that sense, arguing that perception is not organized
via different channels, while perhaps heuristically useful, seems
out of tune (pun intended) with the evidence. Researchers have
not “assumed that the patterns in the global array are not sensed
directly,” rather there is excellent evidence that sensory informa-
tion is decomposed at the receptor surface and then recombined
in an internal, multimodal representation of the environment,
with attention to the position of the eyes, head and body through
reafference or efference copy.
How does an animal define one sensation as auditory and an-
other as visual, rather than as combined auditory/visual stimuli?
The evidence suggests that the assignment is historical; visual cor-
tex becomes visual during its development in large part because it
is usually hooked up to the photoreceptors. If one hooks up visual
cortex to auditory receptors, or vice versa, the perceptual assign-
ment of the tissue is transformed (Gao & Pallas 1999; Heil et al.
1991; Pallas, in press, for review; Pallas et al. 1999; von Melchner
et a1. 2000). Anima1s with early visual inputs to the auditory path-
way, when asked to categorize a wide variety of visual and auditory
stimuli, will define visual stimulation of the auditory pathway as
visual (von Melchner et al. 2000) In other words, auditory cortex
can be taught to process and perceive visual stimuli through ex-
perience.
The biggest drawback of S&B’s theory is that the authors do not
report or propose any concrete experiments to test their theory or
to refute the well-established current view. Their argument, that
multinodal patterns of information are sensed directly and that
senses function as a single unit, is of limited value if not backed up
by experimental evidence. Hopefully it will at least serve as an im-
petus to greater care in experimental design by the various disci-
plines engaged in the study of perception.
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Direct perception of global invariants 
is not a fruitful notion
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Abstract: The epistemological premises and scientific viability of Stoffre-
gen & Bardy’s ecological perspective are evaluated by analyzing the con-
cept of direct perception of global invariants vis-à-vis (1) behavioral evi-
dence that perception is based on the integration of modal sources of
information and (2) neurophysiological aspects of the integration of sen-
sory signals.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) aim at internal consistency within the
theoretical framework of ecological psychology. Starting from the
epistemological premises of (unique) specification and direct per-
ception, it is concluded that the senses cannot be separated. This
radical conclusion calls for an evaluation of the premises and via-
bility of S&B’s ecological perspective. In doing so, we concentrate
on considerations and behavioral findings regarding illusions, in-
formational conflicts, flexibility, and learning, as well as neuro-
physiological aspects of the integration of sensory signals.
Illusions and informational conflicts. It follows from S&B’s
analysis that an event is only fully specified in the global array.
However, this is not to say that modal arrays do not specify any-
thing. Optic flow, for instance, specifies relative motion with re-
gard to the visual environment. Experiments involving informa-
tional incongruencies, resulting in illusory or real self-motion,
indicate that such modal sources of information are used and that
their relative importance may differ. This is underscored by
graded degrees of illusion that scale with presentational aspects of
the manipulated information. For instance, the visually-induced
illusion of self-tilt increases with the field of view (Allison et al.
1999). It is unclear how such a graded effect can be understood in
terms of the direct perception of a global invariant. Moreover, the
correspondence between postural sway patterns and modality-
specific information (generated by, e.g., an oscillating visual scene
[Dijkstra et al. 1994] or touch bar [Jeka et al. 1997]) seems more
readily understandable on the basis of modality-specific informa-
tion sources rather than nondecomposable global invariants.
Only if perception is based on multiple sources of information
can the occurrence of informational conflicts be explained. A con-
vincing demonstration of such a conflict involves the observation
that a deafferented patient could easily draw a five-point star while
watching her hand in a mirror, whereas this was rather difficult for
normal control subjects. As the relation between movement di-
rection and visual scene (mirror image) was manipulated in both
groups, the most logical explanation is that the control subjects ex-
perienced a conflict between visual and proprioceptive informa-
tion, whereas the patient did not because propriocepsis was un-
available (Lajoie et al. 1992).
Flexibility and learning. The qualitative differences between
global arrays of different dimensions imply that global invariants
used in an array with dimensions X and Y are of limited use in an
XYZ-array. As such, the system is incapable of flexible adaptation
to situations that involve global arrays of different dimensions: A
global invariant is specific for a particular array and does not trans-
fer to other (e.g., higher or lower dimensional) arrays. A system
combining multiple (modal) sources of information would be
more flexible in this regard.
Similar considerations pertain to the attunement to global in-
variants during perceptual-motor learning. How can extensive
practice involving full vision result in the ability to juggle with eyes
closed? After all, practice in a particular global array does not al-
low for simultaneous attunement to an invariant in a qualitatively
different (lower dimensional) array that is not actually present.
Likewise, shifts in dependence on particular modalities during a
learning process (Fleishman & Rich 1963) are difficult to under-
stand within S&B’s framework, whereas this phenomenon is read-
ily explained from the perspective of multiple modal sources of in-
formation.
Integration of sensory signals. If perception is based on mul-
tiple modal sources of information, the process of integration may
be viewed as the result of computations and weightings performed
by some intelligent homunculus. However, recent findings re-
garding MST (medial superior temporal) cells in monkeys may il-
lustrate a less spooky mechanism of integration of relevant “infor-
mation.” Many of these neurons respond to both optic flow and
vestibular information (with some cells showing enhanced activity
when the two are congruent and others when they are incongru-
ent), while other neurons are sensitive to only one of the two
modalities (Bremmer et al. 1999; Duffy 1998). Thus, MST cells
play a role in the detection of relative motion and self-motion.
Whether such sensitivity to modality-transcending information is
to be interpreted as integration over different modalities or as di-
rect perception is a theoretical rather than empirical question.
Conclusion. S&B attempted to carry the epistemological
premises of ecological psychology (specification and direct per-
ception) to their logical extremes. However, many observations
and considerations cast doubts on the fruitfulness of the proposed
direct pick up of global invariants. Although one option is to aban-
don the concept of specification altogether (e.g., nonspecifying
quantities that correlate highly with relevant properties may be
used instead, cf. Michaels & De Vries 1998), an epistemology
based on modality-specific specification may still provide an ade-
quate framework for examining how animals know (their relation
to) the environment. Because the ecological approach rests heav-
ily on its epistemological premises, the question whether such a
view qualifies as “ecological” depends on whether integration of
modal sources of information is considered as “direct perception.”
Whatever one’s predilection in this regard, the road proposed by
S&B does not seem to be the one to follow.
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How important is specificity?
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Abstract: There is good neuropsychological evidence for an amodal, re-
lational basis for perception and action. Using this idea, it may be possible
to define more accurately what is meant by specificity, in the Gibsonian
sense of the term. However, for complex organisms, and most especially
for creative, open-ended perceivers and actors such as human beings,
specification may not be relevant.
Approaches to perception and action might be said to have direct
and indirect poles. The direct approach claims that the informa-
tion available to active perceivers, or at least some portion of it, 
is both necessary and sufficient to enable action towards the real
world, without error or distortion. Indirect or constructive ap-
proaches hold that sensory information is necessary, but not suffi-
cient. Memory, inference, and other cognitive operations must oc-
cur before we can make sense of sensation and hence use it to
guide our actions.
The former pole we might identify with the ethos of physics,
with its search for law-like generalisations. The latter pole we
might identify with psychology, an altogether more pluralistic dis-
cipline, within which law-like generalisations are merely a part of
a far more heterogeneous and negotiable body of findings.
While at different points in their article the authors deal with
both these poles, the underlying concern seems to be strongly with
the former, physics-like project. For example, in the introduction
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they note that investigating how sensory arrays might specify the
properties of reality is a problem for physicists, not psychologists.
They nonetheless pursue this issue and conclude that the arrays
of ambient energy reaching any particular sensory system are ac-
tually ambiguous with respect to the dynamics of the physical
world from which they come. The arrays cannot, they claim, un-
ambiguously specify real-world properties.
Prima facie, this seems like a significant challenge to the direct
approach as it presently stands. That approach, based on the work
of James Gibson, has always rested on the assumption that the dy-
namic structure of an ambient array is rich enough to be the basis
for adaptive, accurate action. If it can be shown that it is not, then
this seriously weakens the whole approach.
But Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) do not give up on specification.
In fact, they offer a new conceptual basis for it and one which, be-
ing broader, may actually be more stable and general. The novel
aspect of their proposal is that specification does indeed exist, but
within a global, that is, multi-sensory array of higher-order rela-
tions between arrays of energy picked up by the different senses.
This proposal has a great deal to commend it. The notion that
specification was tied to a particular sensory system seems unlikely
a priori. Animals, after all, use their senses together, not sepa-
rately, and seldom rely on a single sense to coordinate complex
patterns of activity. Moreover, there is a great deal of evidence that
points the other way. That there is cross-talk between sensory
pathways is well known, but what recent neuropsychological find-
ings indicate is that sometimes there may also be cross talk be-
tween the sensory and motor pathways (e.g., Rizzolatti & Arbib
1998). Recent moves towards a more embodied, enactive view of
perception and action likewise support the idea that we should
treat the sensory-motor pathways as mutually constraining or
defining (Hurley 1998).
However, S&B are still pursuing a conventional ecological line,
namely, to demonstrate specificity as a challenge to inferential
theories. The task of ecological psychology is to show that specifi-
cation exists and rests in discoverable, law-like relations. But since
these relations are now treated in a rather more complex way than
before, the challenge is perhaps not as strong or distinctive as it
was. The notion of “higher-order” relations is a significant step
away from the simplicity and clarity of the original Gibsonian pro-
gramme.
Perhaps a more radical challenge, to both direct and indirect
approaches, would be to contest the notion of specification itself.
This is not to reject it. Clearly, under some circumstances and for
some perceivers, especially simpler ones, specification is impor-
tant. For example, organisms like reptiles, who, while active and
skillful are nonetheless bound to rather fixed patterns of action
within relatively limited niches, probably rely on specific patterns
of energy which are not too difficult to discover. Such organisms,
in Popper’s terms, are in closed rather than open ecological and
evolutionary niches. What they need to know in order to do what
they need to do may indeed be quite specific and hence specifi-
able.
But for organisms living in more open niches, and especially for
creative perceivers like human beings, specification may be irrel-
evant. Their actions are more adventitious and unpredictable;
they perceive and act under uncertainty. Here, precise specifica-
tion may not be a realistic objective for psychological research.
Complex organisms, especially human beings, are not like that.
The world is imperfectly known and actions are seldom perfectly
adapted to circumstances. More often they are provisional, ex-
ploratory, and, being subject to inaccuracy, are continually recali-
brated.
The proposal that there exists a higher-order, multi-modal, re-
lational basis for perception and action is an exciting one. The
challenge, or opportunity, is to use this idea to investigate the flex-
ibility, not the fixity, of higher-order perception and action. Thc
sensory systems of higher organisms are tolerant. That is, they are
able to operate under uncertainty and intermittent interruption.
Indeed, under most circumstances, specification may only exist
momentarily. In which case, a multi-modal array of relations might
have the role of maintaining the spatio-temporal consistency of ac-
tion.
It seems a rather limited use of this powerful idea, merely to
pursue an old agenda of formally accounting for specification.
Sensory systems, and the amodal patterns of neural activity to
which they contribute, are tuned by on-going activity. For all that
S&B acknowledge the importance of action, the emphasis re-
mains, in true Gibsonian style, on perception, on what is there to
be perceived. They note Berkeley’s scepticism about how the dif-
ferent types of sensory experience could ever cohere into unified
percepts. In response, they propose higher order relations.
But Berkeley is more easily defeated. Perception and action are
unified by an effort after meaning. Sensory systems exist and are
used in order to discern objects and situations fit for action. For
simpler organisms, this may well be achieved primarily on the ba-
sis of a specific, and hence specifiable, set of relations between the
world and the information reaching the senses. For more complex
ones, and most especially for human beings, the open, creative,
and adventitious nature of their actions makes specification, at
whatever level, a secondary matter. It is not a central aspect of per-
ception and hence need not have such a primary role in psycho-
logical inquiry.
Three consequences of believing that
information lies in global arrays and that
perceptual systems use this information
John B. Pittenger
Department of Psychology, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Little Rock,
AR 72204. jbpittenger@ualr.edu
Abstract: Stoffregen & Bardy provide grounds to suppose that specifica-
tion requires global arrays and that this information is used by perceptual
systems. Three conclusions follow from this supposition; (1) global speci-
fication will be taken seriously only if additional examples are discovered;
(2) research into single-sense information must take global information
into account, and (3) ecological psychologists must account for perceptions
based upon non-specific information.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) make many claims about information
in what they call “global arrays.” Rather than attempt to evaluate
all those claims, I will assume that the authors are at least partly
right and examine the consequences of that assumption. Specifi-
cally, I will suppose that the following “limited global hypothesis”
is true: (1) some aspects of the environment are completely spec-
ified only by information in a global array, and (2) when such
global array information is available, it is detected and used by per-
ceptual systems on some, but perhaps not all, occasions.
Even if the limited hypothesis becomes widely accepted, I will
be very surprised if many perceptual researchers go on to make
major changes in their theoretical or empirical work. Two classes
of demonstrations must be developed before global arrays will
have a broad impact on research practice. First, more analyses of
information are needed, ones which clearly document the exis-
tence of information that is available in the global array but not in
any “single sense” array. Second, researchers must be convinced
that perceivers make use of global information. In other words, we
need empirical demonstrations showing that perceptual perfor-
mance based on global information is measurably different (faster,
more accurate, less variable) than that based on single-sense in-
formation. Until a reasonable number of both types of demon-
strations are available, global information can be treated as a rare
special case rather than as a central fact about perception. In sum-
mary, while S&B provide a first glimpse of what may eventually
constitute a major challenge to perceptual theory and research, a
good deal of work remains to be done to make that challenge fully
credible.
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My second group of comments concerns the appropriate con-
duct of research. The ultimate goal of most perceptual researchers
is, or at least should be, to provide an account for perception as it
occurs in everyday life. Researchers who both have this goal and
accept the limited global array hypothesis must include consider-
ation of global array information in their work. First, it would be
risky to limit analyses of information to single-sense arrays: If the
information needed to perceive the environment is sometimes
available only in a global array, then the researcher cannot know
in advance whether or not the information relevant to the aspect
of the environment he or she is studying lies in a local or a global
array. Second, when global array information is known to be avail-
able for the phenomenon under study, it is surely important to
know whether or not that information is used by perceivers. While
the researcher might well demonstrate that local information does
influence perception, we would still not know whether or not
global information is utilized in everyday perception.1 In sum-
mary, the target article presents a challenge to all perceptual re-
searchers: We can no longer be certain that our research into per-
ception based on single-sense information will contribute to the
understanding of perception as it occurs in everyday life.
Finally, the target article has important implications for follow-
ers, including myself, of the ecological approach to psychology.
Ecologists believe that it is rarely useful to study perception using
displays from which the researcher has removed some of the in-
formation available in naturally-occurring arrays. The logic behind
this belief is straightforward: Since perception in everyday life is
based upon the detection of information which specifies the envi-
ronment, studies using arrays which do not specify the environ-
ment will not tell us how the perceptual system operates in every-
day life. Ecologists believe that the results of research in which the
experimenter has, by artifice, removed information from arrays
(e.g., by requiring monocular viewing, preventing head motion,
showing displays for fractions of a second, etc.) have no clear in-
terpretation. However, if the limited hypothesis is correct, then
ecological psychologists will need to pay more attention to per-
ception in circumstances where the environment is not uniquely
specified.
It seems to me clear that circumstances arise both naturally and
frequently which force perceivers to interact with the environ-
ment with less-than-optimal information available. Moreover,
such interactions often achieve the perceiver’s goals. Note, for ex-
ample, how effectively the blind walk and how much the sighted
can do in the dark, when they are looking in the “wrong direction,”
and so on. Similarly, the deaf function well in everyday life, as do
the hearing when noise masks informative sounds. A systematic
account of perceptually-guided actions which are frequent, suc-
cessful, and occur in natural situations must be included in any
theory of perception.
The target article rightly criticizes researchers for assuming, on
ill-examined grounds, that an adequate theory of perception can
be based on information carried only in single types of energy and
detected only by the traditional senses. The question of whether
or not global information actually exists and is used by perceptual
systems matters very much to both theory and research. The tar-
get article does not answer this question. It does, however, show
us that we need to stop assuming that the answer is self-evident
and start doing the difficult work that will provide the facts which
will lead to the answer.
NOTE
1. It is worth noting that we do not know very much about the accuracy
of perception in everyday life. Most of our research concerns the effect of
some stimulus variable on perception: that variable is manipulated in var-
ious ways and the perceptual consequences tracked. We rarely establish
the accuracy of perception in everyday life (i.e., when full information is
available and the perceiver’s actions are unconstrained) and then ask how
much of the variance in everyday perception can be accounted for by our
pet stimulus variable.
Movement dynamics and the environment 
to be perceived
Gary E. Riccio,a Richard E. A. van Emmerik,b
and Brian T. Petersb
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Abstract: In perception science, an alternative to focusing on individual
sensory systems is to describe the environment to be perceived. We focus
on the emergent dynamics of human-environment interactions as an im-
portant category of the environment to be perceived. We argue that in-
formation about such dynamics is available in subtle patterns of movement
variability that, of necessity, stimulate multiple sensory systems.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) argue that specification exists only in
patterns that extend across different forms of ambient energy.
They emphasize that this is a fundamental problem for the vast
majority of experiments that seek to arbitrate between theories of
direct and indirect perception by manipulating “single-energy ar-
rays.” Their arguments suggest further that such experiments are,
at best, misleading with respect to the behavior of real animals in
real environments.
We are in basic agreement with S&B about the centrality of the
“global array” in understanding animate behavior. Our research,
however, is not concerned with comparisons between theories of
direct and indirect perception. Instead, direct perception is a first
principle of ecological psychology that guides our research on the
interdependence of perception and movement. Direct perception
motivates an interest in mappings between the world and the stim-
ulation of an animal’s sensory systems. We are interested in how
such mappings allow one to observe and, thus, to control one’s
movement in an environment. At the same time, we examine how
movement instantiates such mappings and how a tacit under-
standing of our own movement dynamics reveals momentary task-
specific domains over which 1:1 mappings exist (Riccio 1995; Ric-
cio & McDonald 1998b).
Our approach to understanding perception in the context of
real interactions between an individual and an environment is
based on Gibson (1979/1986). Although this last work of James
Gibson focused on visual perception, we believe it provides the
best blueprint for studying specificity in the “global array.” The
reason is that Gibson made a clear scientific distinction between
“the environment to be perceived” and “information in stimula-
tion,” and he gave logical precedence to the former. Put simply, a
scientist must understand what can and should be perceived be-
fore questions about specificity can be addressed (Riccio 1993;
1995; Riccio & McDonald 1998b). This starting point would not
necessarily lead to mappings between the environment to be per-
ceived and patterns of stimulation (i.e., information in stimula-
tion) of a single sensory modality. In fact, as S&B point out, we
cannot determine how this could ever be the case when human
movement is involved (Riccio 1995; Riccio & McDonald 1988a).
Furthermore, we are sympathetic to their argument that it may be
impossible or meaningless to study perception only in the absence
of movement. The scientific study of perception must be broader
than what it has been throughout most of twentieth century.
Most of our work on human posture and movement has focused
on the environment to be perceived. A fundamental assumption
of such “ecological physics” is that the environment cannot be de-
scribed independently of the animal and the animal cannot be de-
scribed independently of the environment (Gibson 1979/1986;
Riccio 1993; 1995; Riccio & McDonald 1998b; Riccio & Stoffre-
gen 1991; Stoffregen & Riccio 1980; 1991). Any biomechanical
model of posture or movement, for example, makes specific as-
sumptions about the surroundings of the body (e.g., the surface of
support) even if they are not explicitly included as parameters of
the model. Descriptions of the human body and its surroundings
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can be unified with respect to conventional mechanical properties
or dynamical constraints that are due to momentary couplings be-
tween perception and movement (Riccio 1995; Riccio & McDon-
ald 1998b). We have been working to characterize such emergent
dynamics, which impose constraints on human posture and move-
ment (Riccio 1993; Riccio & McDonald 1998a).
Our working hypothesis is that the dynamics of the animal-
environment interaction can be perceived and that this capacity is
essential to human adaptability. This requires that information
about such dynamics is available in the stimulation of sensory sys-
tems. We have argued that pick-up of dynamical information is fa-
cilitated by obtaining stimulation through the exploratory activity
of perceptual systems (Riccio 1993; Riccio & McDonald 1998a).
Perceptual systems include sensory systems and all the movement
systems of the body that act essentially as accessory structures for
sensory systems (Gibson 1979/1986) . We have provided evidence
that the dynamics of animal-environment interactions are revealed
in subtle, albeit ubiquitous, patterns of movement variability that,
of necessity, stimulate multiple sensory systems (Riccio 1993; Ric-
cio & McDonald 1998a). An important implication of our findings
is that perception and movement will be compromised by condi-
tions that suppress or obscure the informative patterns of move-
ment variability. We have argued that body restraint is one method
of suppressing such patterns (Riccio et al. 1992; Stoffregen & Ric-
cio 1988; 1991). We also have argued that pathological movement
may result from obscured patterns of movement variability (i.e.,
impaired observability), rather than from impaired musculoskele-
tal dynamics per se (Riccio & Stoffregen 1991).
Our research on movement coordination problems in Parkin-
son’s disease has focused on the consequences of reduced vari-
ability for movement coordination and perception. The classic
Parkinsonian symptoms are tremor, rigidity, and slowness or ab-
sence of movement. Functional implications are that individuals
with Parkinson’s disease experience increased instability during
postural and movement tasks, an associated higher incidence of
falls, and reduced ability to make transition to another movement
pattern. A common assumption in many studies on movement dis-
orders is that increased variability (e.g., stride length or stride fre-
quency) is associated with instability during locomotion. However,
based on theoretical considerations and empirical work from a dy-
namical systems perspective (e.g., Diedrich & Warren 1990;
Haken et al. 1985; van Emmerik et al. 1999), variability in coordi-
nation dynamics has been shown to be essential in pattern change.
In addition relatively high frequency variability can play a role in
exploratory behavior (Riccio 1993; Riccio & McDonald 1998a). In
addition, noise added to a weak signal can improve detectability
in muscle spindle or cutaneous receptors (“aperiodic stochastic
resonance”; Collins et al. 1996).
In our work on gait in Parkinson’s disease we have shown a sys-
tematic reduction in variability of relative phase between pelvic
and thoracic rotations compared to age-matched control subjects.
This reduced variability is associated with a reduced capacity or
inability to change movement patterns (van Emmerik et al. 1999).
The relative phase variability is considered a functional measure
of rigidity in Parkinson’s disease. In a similar fashion, the classical
4–6 Hz tremor in Parkinson’s disease has been shown to affect the
coordination dynamics during gait and manual movements (van
Emmerik & Wagenaar 1996).
The inability to change coordination dynamics in the trunk is
linked to reduced variability in couplings and has expected conse-
quences for gait stability in patients with Parkinson’s disease. It is
our contention, however, that the observed reduction in variabil-
ity of segment couplings as well as the steady 4–6 Hz tremor not
only have consequences for stability, but also affect the patient’s
capacity to detect relevant dynamics for the task at hand. In this
regard, we claim that the observed symptoms of rigidity and
tremor in Parkinson’s disease patients have consequences for the
pick up or availability of information by perceptual systems. We
are currently investigating the consequences of head, neck, and
trunk rigidity in these patients for the availability of information
in stimulation. Recent work from our laboratory suggests that the
coordination and timing of the eyes, head, and trunk when shift-
ing gaze is influenced by gait cycle dynamics (Peters et al. 2000).
The proposition here is that increased rigidity or decreased vari-
ability in segmental couplings could limit the degrees of freedom
in this eye-head-trunk coupling and possibly obscure movement
dynamics that are important for perception.
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Abstract: Stoffregen & Bardy’s primary motivation for rejecting current
views on specification in favor of the global array is that current forms of
specification in single-energy arrays allow the ambiguous or inadequate
specification of reality. I show that this motivation is not justified, and that
the global array concept still falls prey to inadequate specification.
In certain situations that Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) describe, 
single-energy stimulus arrays are discrepant, resulting in “input
conflict, with its attendant lack of specificity, and . . . the need for
inferential processing” (sect. 3.3.3). I do not question the exis-
tence or formal structure of the global array, or even the possibility
that animals might use the global array to guide behavior. Instead,
I question the assumption that insufficiencies of single-energy ar-
rays require an appeal to a global stimulus array. A theory of direct
perception does not require that reality always be adequately
specified in stimulus arrays, because perceptual errors may often
be traced to inadequacies of information. Furthermore, it is illog-
ical to dismiss current formulations of specification in favor of the
global array on the basis that information in single energy arrays
does not adequately specify reality, because the global array may
also inadequately specify reality.
When reality structures two or more arrays differently, then ac-
cording to S&B (sect. 3.2), “at least one of the structures must be
wrong, in other words, not specific to reality.” From their per-
spective, any position that allows for structure in energy arrays to
inadequately or incorrectly specify reality (i.e., that allows for in-
put conflict) is fundamentally flawed. The motivation for their po-
sition seems to revolve around one implicit assumption: The only
satisfactory account of specification is one that eliminates the po-
tential for inadequate information. S&B seem to imply, further-
more, that because direct perception (Gibson 1966; 1979/1986)
depends upon specification, then in order for perception to be di-
rect, stimulus information cannot be inadequate or deficient.
Neither of those positions is necessary for a direct account of
perception. There are numerous instances where the information
contained in energy that reaches a perceptual system is somehow
insufficient (i.e., does not specify reality). When this occurs, per-
ceptual error may result. Consider the classic “bent stick illusion”
– a straight stick partially submerged in water appears to be bent,
because the light that reaches the eyes contains inadequate infor-
mation (due to refraction). The information that specifies a bent
stick is inadequate because it specifies a false state of affairs (Gib-
son 1966). From a direct perception perspective, the illusory per-
ception is not problematic, because perception can only be as ac-
curate as the information that is detected (cf. Kennedy et al. 1992).
S&B argue that a theory of specification is unsatisfactory if it al-
lows inadequate specification. Because of their interest in inter-
modal perception, the example of inadequate specification that they
focus upon is input conflict. However, input conflict is but one ex-
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ample of inadequate information; many other forms exist (Gibson
1966). The concept of the global array avoids input conflict, but it
does not avoid other forms of inadequate information. For instance,
there is nothing about the global array that would predict an ob-
server to perceive a partially submerged stick as being straight
rather than bent. The global array is not immune to some forms of
inadequate specification, and therefore is potentially ambiguous
with respect to reality. By their own criterion – the elimination of
ambiguity with respect to reality – S&B’s global array is just as un-
satisfactory as other specificational accounts. In my opinion, the
possibility of inadequate specification is not a problem with the
global array (for the same reasons it is not a problem for single ar-
rays), but it demonstrates faulty logic in S&B’s motivation for re-
jecting current accounts of specification in favor of the global array.
S&B state that perceptual errors might imply a need for per-
ceptual learning rather than a lack of specificity. While this may be
true in many circumstances, it does not, in general, rule out the pos-
sibility that some perceptual errors are due to a lack of specificity.
For instance, it is not clear how any amount of improvement in the
ability to discriminate structure in a stimulus array would prevent
the bent stick illusion. Surely, one may come to know that the stick
looks bent because of refraction, but no amount of perceptual
learning could cause the stick to appear straight, rather than bent,
because the light that reaches the eyes specifies a bent stick.
An additional issue related to inadequate information and per-
ceptual learning deserves brief mention. It has been empirically
demonstrated that over the course of perceptual learning, people
may base their initial responses on nonspecific stimulus variables,
but eventually shift to basing their responses on variables that
specify the object or event being perceived (Jacobs et al. 1999;
Michaels & de Vries 1998). S&B (sect. 7) concluded that such a
pattern of responses would be “contrary to and unnecessary in
ecological theory,” presumably because it would involve a reliance
on inadequate (nonspecific) information. I disagree, and instead
suggest that this result supports the ecological perspective by
demonstrating that the acquisition of accurate perceptions is
closely tied to the discovery and utilization of relevant, macro-
scopic stimulus variables. When responses are not based on these
variables, they are typically inaccurate and/or unreliable.
In sum, I question the logic of S&B’s motivation for and devel-
opment of the global array concept, rather than the concept itself.
Sensitivity to a global array is a plausible idea and the construct
might have explanatory power. One suspects that ultimately the
matter will become an empirical one. With respect to that possi-
bility, I raise a final concern. The novel methodologies that S&B
propose in order to test for sensitivity to the global array may not
be compatible with the study of phenomena that have driven a
substantial portion of research on intermodal perception – adap-
tation to transformed stimulus arrays and intermodal discrepan-
cies (e.g., prism adaptation). Adaptation and global array method-
ologies seem to place incompatible demands on experimental
protocols. Can empirical and theoretical connections between the
global array and adaptation to intermodal discrepancies be made?
The generality of specificity: Some lessons
from audiovisual speech
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Abstract: The global array might prove to be an important and even nec-
essary concept for explaining some multi-modal phenomena from the
specificational perspective. However, we suspect that specification exists
in energy arrays detectable by single or multiple sensory systems. We ar-
gue for a more general modality-neutral perspective and review results
from recent research on audiovisual speech perception.
Kudos to Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) for addressing the problem
of multi-modal integration from a specificational perspective. Many
Gibsonian-based explanations of multi-modal effects – including
our own (e.g., Rosenbium & Saldaña 1996; Rosenblum et al. 2000)
– have provided only a rough sketch of how specification might be
instantiated cross-modally. S&B’s thoughtful examination of these
issues provides an invaluable step toward solving the problem. Re-
garding their solution, we suspect that the global array does exist
and that it can provide specificational information to guide be-
havior. However, we are doubtful that specificity exists only at the
level of the global array, and take issue with S&B’s arguments for
this claim. We suspect that specificity for behaviorally-relevant en-
vironmental properties exists in energy arrays that can be appre-
hended by single or multiple perceptual systems.
S&B build a strong case for the ubiquity of multi-modal per-
ception in even the most seemingly unimodal tasks (e.g., change
in visual fixation). We are also generally supportive of the global
array concept, and believe it might prove a useful tool for the spec-
ificational perspective in explaining some cross-modal effects. We
suspect that there are properties of the environment that are only
specified in higher-order relations across energy arrays. However,
it is the proposed universality of these properties where we begin
to take issue with S&B’s proposal.
S&B argue that the global array is the only level at which spec-
ification can exist. They motivate this argument with examples
that ostensibly show conflictual cross-modal specificity. However,
we are not likely the only readers to note that many of S&B’s ex-
amples are based on laboratory contrivances (moving rooms, ro-
tating drums, flight simulators, McGurk effects), or recent human
invention (cars, airplanes, elevators, weightless environments). It
is unlikely that the evolution of human perceptual systems could
have anticipated these scenarios. While theories should ultimately
be able to explain how perception occurs in these artifactual set-
tings, it would seem erroneous to build a theory of specification
around these examples.
In other examples, S&B enlist global array properties in lieu of
thorough descriptions of single-energy arrays. Consider the traf-
fic scenario in which a thorough description of the acoustic array
(including ambient and reflected sound), could reveal structure
that is specific to the (relatively) stationary environment as well as
to moving cars. With this fuller description, the acoustic array
could be considered sufficient for specification. Similar criticisms
could be applied to S&B’s global array explanations of (kinesthet-
ically) detecting upright stance on an inclined board, and (visually)
detecting Tau for both target distance and head movements.
Finally, while not all aspects of an event scenario might be avail-
able unimodally (e.g., concurrently perceiving self-movement and
having the awareness that it is driven by a simulated display), in-
formational properties most relevant to any single action might be
available to a single sensory system. Consider the case of driving
a car and apprehending one’s position relative to both the car and
outside world. This example highlights the importance of con-
struing events, and their perception, as nested. We suspect that
for many situations, each nested event is specified unimodally,
while the nesting relationship itself might be specified in the
global array (thought it need not). Construing events as nested
could relieve the problem of conflictual specification occurring in
more natural settings.
From this analysis we can summarize our own perspective, a
perspective similar to Gibson’s. Information itself is modality-
neutral. It can be instantiated in specificational structure that is
available to a single sense, available to multiple senses simultane-
ously (and redundantly), or available only across senses (non-
redundantly). Fortunately for animals, the second case is the most
common: redundant information across modalities allows for a
graceful degradation from sensory impairment and diminished
ambient arrays (fog, noisy rooms). The latter case – global array
specification – is more rare, less relied-upon, and may be idiosyn-
cratic to particularly higher-order stimulus properties (e.g., aes-
thetic) and relations between tasks (e.g., in artifactual situations).
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A modality-neutral1 perspective could account for multimodal
perception without requiring internal mediation across modali-
ties. A type of information (e.g., inverse rate of change informa-
tion for time-to-arrival, time-varying kinematic pattern informa-
tion for speech articulation) can be instantiated as structure in
multiple arrays (visual; auditory), but perceiving is concerned with
the information, not the energy array in which it is available. In
this sense, “cross-modal” integration is not something that occurs
in the animal, but occur in – and as a property of – the informa-
tion itself. This would be true whether the specifying structure ex-
ists within a range of energy detectable by a single sensory system,
or across a range of energy detectable only by multiple sensory sys-
tems. Specificity is general.
We feel that much of the neurophysiological and behavioral ev-
idence cited by S&B are also supportive of a modality-neutral ac-
count (e.g., Fitzpatrick et al. 1994; Stein & Meredith 1993). The
same seems true of recent neuropsychological and behavioral
findings on audiovisual speech perception. Recent brain imaging
research shows that visual speech can change auditory cortex ac-
tivity during audiovisual integration and even silent lipreading
(Calvert et al. 1997; Sams et al. 1991). Also, mounting perceptual
research suggests that the audiovisual streams are integrated very
early, possibly at the level of information extraction (see Green
1998, for a review). The sensitivity to modality-neutral informa-
tion also seems to occur at a very young age. Infants detect audio-
visual correspondences in phonemic properties (Kuhl & Meltzoff
1984), and portray McGurk-effect-like behavior (Rosenblum et al.
1997). These latter findings should also be encouraging to S&B:
they suggest that sensitivity to the specificity existent across
modalities is a fundamental perceptual ability.
But what of the McGurk effect itself? Would not the global ar-
ray concept explain how a /d/ can be perceived from the concur-
rent visual specification of /g/ and auditory specification of /b/?
In fact, here we must tip our hats to S&B: it is likely that the re-
sultant perceived /g/ is specified in the structure existent across
optic and acoustic arrays. For an ecological explanation of the
McGurk effect, the global array could save the day. However, con-
trary to S&B, we do not think that the global array can provide in-
formation about the experimental manipulation itself. It is unclear
what type of perceptual exploration might reveal the audiovisual
discrepancy, short of seeing the audiovisual dubbing procedure.
Furthermore, research shows that it makes little difference
whether subjects are asked to report “what was said” or “what you
heard”: audiovisual influences still occur (e.g., Massaro 1987). We
find the inability of the global array to specify the McGurk ma-
nipulation encouraging: Perceptual encapsulation evidences the
lawful nature of specificational information.
In conclusion, we think S&B have posed an important challenge
to specificational approaches. A specificational account must ex-
plain how multiple sensory systems simultaneously extract struc-
ture from energy. However, we will put our money on modality
neutral information existent in all forms of specificity: whether de-
tectable by single or multiple sensory systems.
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NOTE
1. We prefer the term modality-neutral over “amodal”: while percep-
tual information is not modality-specific, it cannot exist without instantia-
tion in some energy array (excepting ESP).
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Abstract: Stoffregen & Bardy’s proposal that perceptual systems can use
information defined across two or more sensory domains is valuable and
urgent in its own right. However, their claim of exclusive validity for global-
array information is superfluous and perpetuated for incorrect reasons.
The seeming ambiguities of individual arrays emanate from failures to
consider relevant ecological constraints and higher-order variables.
James Gibson’s (1950; 1966; 1979/1986) demonstrations of speci-
ficity and the associated refutation of the ambiguity dogma were
made possible by two brave intellectual advances: Gibson recog-
nized that useful information could reside in higher-order prop-
erties of the ambient arrays (a breakaway from elementarism) and,
furthermore, that by restricting analyses to natural conditions a
wealth of meaningful and reliable information could be brought
in evidence. The latter amounts to an invocation of ecological con-
straints, in addition to the laws of nature.
Stoffregen & Bardy’s (S&B’s) proposal that relevant information
can reside in a global array extending across energy array borders
falls well within Gibson’s approach in the first respect. If useful
specifying variables can consist of relational properties across a
single array and over time, it follows naturally that they could also
extend over two or more types of energy arrays. Thus, S&B’s pro-
posal of a search for global invariants is laudable as such, as is their
claim that properties specified by such invariants could be directly
perceived. This enterprise gains urgency from the recognition that
the senses operate simultaneously and that information from dif-
ferent arrays is often necessary for the control of action.
However, S&B not only proffer global invariants, they also
make extensive claims that specificity occurs exclusively with such
invariants. We disagree, and argue that S&B’s failure to find spec-
ification in individual arrays follows from their failure to apply
Gibson’s insights concerning ecological constraints and non-
elementarism. The groundbreaking contributions by Gibson and
others concerning information in individual arrays should remain
a valid basis for perception research.
Ecological constraints. All specificity is contingent on con-
straints (“constraints as grantors of information,” Runeson 1988;
1989; cf. Barwise & Perry 1983). Moreover, the specificity they en-
gender pertains to properties, not the structures or media as such
(cf. Bingham 2000b; Turvey 1992). Potentially, constraints can be
any lawfulness or regularity, ranging from laws of nature, via eco-
logical universals such as textured environmental surfaces to, say,
local conventions. Thus, relations of informative specificity vary in
degree of universality depending on the scope and stability of the
constraints that grant them.
It follows that specificity can not be meaningfully investigated
without acknowledging the questions: specification of what prop-
erties, under what conditions? Without restricting analyses to par-
ticular properties and conditions, specificity will be hard to find.
We question the relevance of universal, unconstrained delibera-
tions on specificity for the understanding of perception and action.
Apparently, S&B do not consider the role of constraints in their
discussion of specificity. Thus, we are not impressed when they
take the hypothetical existence of perfect virtual-reality devices to
prove optic array ambiguity. To be consistent, they should also
have considered the possibility of slightly more complicated de-
vices as proof against specificity in the global array. What if light
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would not propagate linearly? What if an evil genius were distort-
ing arrays? If one allows such arguments there will always be rea-
sons to reject specificity (cf. Dretske 1981).
An ecological stance does not proffer specificity because injec-
tion of yet higher order variables can outweigh such arguments,
but because it dismisses non-ecological circumstances as irrele-
vant. Constraints at the ecological level grant specificity to infor-
mative variables, whether single- or multi-array. It is biologically
irrelevant whether a variable that specifies a useful property of the
organism-environment system is granted by ecological constraints
or by physical laws alone.
Culture and technology add and break constraints. Traffic lights
add specification of safe street crossing. Conversely, virtual-reality
gear and swinging rooms deliberately break a basic ecological con-
straint by decoupling the visible environment from the earth and
thus makes the optic array lose some of its specificity. Inadvertent
cases also occur, as in elevators. This presents new possibilities and
challenges to perceivers. Will they be able to educate their atten-
tion to detect other information – in the global array – that spec-
ifies the new situation? Interestingly, the success of virtual-reality
technology will rely on people’s failure to do so.
Non-elementarism. S&B’s failure take advantage of Gibson’s
nonelementaristic approach is evident in their dismissal of so-
matosensory specificity concerning body sway versus tilting of the
surface of support: Ankle rotation can be due to either of them.
However, in many other somatosensory variables, the two events
have distinct effects. For instance, standing on a slanted board
produces force components parallel to the surface with corre-
sponding shearing skin deformations, varying in proportion to the
angle of tilt. Conversely, sway produces alternating shifts between
heels and toes in the perpendicular skin pressure component. Am-
plitudes and directions of ankle joint load forces will also differ dis-
tinctly. Somatosensory ambiguity has certainly not been demon-
strated.1
S&B’s claim that the acoustic array can only specify relative mo-
tion between other cars and one’s own is similarly vacant. One can
hear quite a bit about how one’s own car is moving, in particular
whether it is moving or not. The acoustic array is structured by re-
flection and occlusion of sounds among cars on the road and
among terrain features. These multitudinous effects are a poten-
tial source of informative variables in the acoustic structure, which
S&B have dismissed offhand.
We do not claim that we have shown or can show that specificity
exists in those cases. Our point is that S&B have not provided any
proof for the claimed ambiguities. In principle, ambiguity in nat-
ural arrays is not the kind of thing that can be proved, because
there is no way to ensure that all possible higher-order variables
have been tried and all relevant constraints have been considered
for their information-granting potential (Runeson 1988). Ambi-
guity could become a tenable claim only after long and hard at-
tempts to prove specificity have failed.
Finally, we notice that S&B’s reasoning is remarkably congru-
ous with that of the classical, no-specification tradition. The pos-
sibility of specification is brushed very lightly, often by letting a
single variable (mis-)represent the informative potential of a
whole energy field. With non-specificity seemingly proved, a case
is made for the standard remedy: invocation of something more.
Traditionally, the recourse has been to memory and constructive
inference – S&B instead bring in additional sensory domains as
remedial necessities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writing of this commentary was supported by grants from the Swedish
Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences (HSFR), from
the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NOW, grant no.
575-12-070), and from the Estonian Ministry of Education.
NOTE
1. It would be tempting to call this reasoning of S&B’s “pre-Gibsonian,”
however, also Gibson (1966, pp. 62f) failed to consider the shearing force
component. When related to the perpendicular component it specifies
slant of the surface of support without recourse to gravito-inertial infor-
mation.
Perceptual systems: Five1, one, or many?
Nigel J.T. Thomas
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Abstract: The target article’s value lies not in its defence of specification,
or the “global array” concept, but in its challenge to the paradigm of 51
senses, and its examples of multiple receptor types cooperatively partici-
pating in specific pick-up tasks. Rather than analysing our perceptual en-
dowment into 51 senses, it is more revealing to type perceptual systems
according to task.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) can and should not hope to persuade
us that the traditional five senses (plus, presumably, a few more,
like vestibular sense, proprioception, etc.) just do not exist. Clearly
for many purposes it is valid and useful to think of the senses in
this way. The circularities they point to, arising from defining the
senses in terms of receptor types or energies transduced, do not
seem to be vicious.
However, their argument opens up a very important pragmatic
and heuristic question that has received almost no previous atten-
tion: Is thinking of our sensory endowment as consisting of 51 in-
dependent perceptual systems the most useful and perspicuous
way to view the mechanisms of ecological perception? Here S&B
make a good case for a negative answer, challenging deeply en-
trenched and, up to now, virtually unexamined assumptions. They
show that certain important, real-world perceptual tasks require
the coordinated deployment of more than one type of receptor. If
we think of the senses as 51 channels, our attention is diverted
from such cases (which may well be the rule rather than the ex-
ception), and even if we do notice them, the separate senses
framework leads us to posit unnecessarily complex and conceptu-
ally suspect inferential or computational theoretical accounts of
them.
But if 51 senses is not the most useful picture of things, does it
follow that the heuristic alternative is to think of the perceptual
environment as a single global array, presumably to be perceived
by a single global perceptual system? S&B apparently think that if
the ambient energies available to our perceptual system do not un-
ambiguously specify what is really out there then we must be
doomed to perceive the world only “indirectly,” our experience
mediated through representations and inferential processes. They
are thus led to the notion of the global array in the hope of find-
ing an information source sufficiently rich to ensure specification.
But unless we understand “direct perception’’ to mean “invariably
veridical perception” (in which case perception certainly is not di-
rect) it simply does not follow that directness requires unambigu-
ous specification. In fact, we do not ultimately rely on mere per-
ception to tell us what is really out there, we rely on science, which
certainly involves inferential processes. Specification is a red her-
ring, and the theory of the global array is a (probably inadequate)
solution to a non-problem.
Of course, the global array undoubtedly exists, and our sensory
endowment as a whole undoubtedly exists too. Thus, (granting the
general framework of Gibsonian direct perception theory) it will
inevitably be true to describe any perceptual episode as the pick-
up of an invariant of the global array by the global perceptual sys-
tem. But this is not to say very much. In fact, it is surely the case
that many instances of perceptual information pick up do make
use of only one receptor type, and even the examples given by
S&B each involve only a small subset of the receptor types we
have. To insist on treating ambient arrays and perceptual systems
only as “global” wholes would be to obscure this point, and threat-
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ens to be just as misleading as the paradigm of 51 independent
channels.
A more revealing analysis might be to type perceptual systems
in terms of the specific sorts of environmental information that
they gather. The target article’s examples suggest that, instead of
saying “this is an instance of vision, this of audition,” and so on, we
might do better to say things like “this is an instance of perceiving
that your conveyance has come to a stop,” “this is an instance of
perceiving that a surface affords sitting,” and so on. In this vein,
we can think of our sensory endowment as comprised of a num-
ber – probably quite a large number – of perceptual instruments,
each specialized for the pick up of particular sorts of environ-
mental information, and actively deployed as and when that 
information is needed for the guidance of behavior. A perceptual
instrument (alternatively a “smart perceptual mechanism” [Rune-
son 1977] , or “smart sensor” [Burt 1988] ) is a complex of anatom-
ical and cognitive structures that is capable of actively testing for
the presence or amplitude of some specific type of environmental
property. It consists not only of receptors, but also of efferent sys-
tems that “tune” them, the musculature that orients them and
moves them so as to sample the ambient energy arrays appropri-
ately, and the neural structures and algorithms that control these
“tunings” and movements and orchestrate appropriate responses
to the receptor outputs (Thomas 1999). I take it that by switching
neural algorithms, and thus the way in which receptors are de-
ployed, our fairly limited array of receptor types can be recruited
to do a large number of different perceptual jobs, or putting it an-
other way, to form parts of a large number of perceptual instru-
ments (cf. Ballard 1991 on “sensor fission”). We do not so much
have 51 general purpose senses as a large array of anatomically
overlapping, specialized perceptual instruments, a capacious “box
of tricks” (Ramachandran 1990).
From the entrenched standpoint of the orthodox paradigm of
51 senses, this theoretical perspective must seem strange and
counterintuitive, but S&B throw that paradigm into deep ques-
tion. Furthermore, they direct our attention toward the signi-
ficant but previously under-explored possibility that many per-
ceptual instruments may cooperatively employ more than one re-
ceptor type. The considerable value of the target article lies, I
think, in these challenges to entrenched orthodoxy, rather than in
the unnecessary and heuristically rather unhelpful notion of the
“global array.”
“The assumption of separate senses”:
Pervasive? Perhaps – Persuasive? Hardly!
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Abstract: We show that Stoffregen & Bardy’s arguments against the as-
sumption of separately functioning senses have more historical antecedents
than they give credit for, and that multimodal functioning – primitive in
perceptual and brain development – does not require this assumption.
What is needed is evidence that biological organisms are indeed detecting
and acting upon information in a multimodal (or global) array.
The fact that the various senses have, since the turn of the cen-
tury, been described and investigated separately hardly reflects a
“pervasive” underlying assumption that the senses also function
independently as Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) suggest. Further-
more, S&B’s attempt to overcome the difficulty by redefining per-
ception in a manner that fits their proposition – that is, “as the
pick-up of information that exists in irreducible patterns across
different forms of energy” (sect. 1) – is both circular and unper-
suasive. Perception and action also tend to be studied and de-
scribed separately, although most scholars would not want to claim
that either could function independently of the other.
Drawing on random examples from the history of psychology,
we will first show that there has been more explicit awareness that
the senses do not function separately than S&B give credit for,
whether the umbrella be amodal, cross-modal, or multimodal
functioning. Subsequently, we will show that there is ample evi-
dence that cross- or multimodal functioning is primitive in per-
ceptual development in infants, and that modern theories of brain
development build heavily on multimodal sensory input to the
nervous system as the foundation for the establishment of func-
tional neuronal groups.
Historical antecedents of multimodal functioning. That S&B’s
position – and their postulation of a global array – may not be par-
ticularly novel is attested to by Titchener (1901) in his classic text
on experimental psychology, in which he takes an even more rad-
ical view. To his mind, “perception is not simply an aggregate or
group of sensations; it is an aggregate or group of sensations put
together under certain conditions, arranged or harmonised upon
certain patterns. The conditions are found in the physical world
about us and the arranger or harmoniser is Nature herself”
(p. 128). Sensations, he argued, are joined together by our physi-
cal environment, not by “anything psychological [that] has inter-
vened between the sensation and the perception” (p. 129). He fur-
ther suggested that the psychologies, “by the mere fact that they
treat of perceptions one by one, in separate paragraphs” (p. 127),
have contributed to the popular misbelief of separate senses.
Earlier, Stumpf (1890), in his theory of tonal fusion, went even
further both in criticising existing positions and in attempting to
provide neural justification for his ideas. He introduced the notion
of synergies of the cerebral cortex – “determinate modes of co-
operation of two nervous structures having its ground in the struc-
ture of the brain, of such a kind that whenever the two structures
give rise to their corresponding sensations there arises at the same
time a determinate degree of fusion of these sensations” (p. 214).
He discusses the way in which such synergies might have been
built up over evolution so that what were once separate sensations
became, over time, synergies – an issue to which we will return
below in a development context.
Sensory functioning in early development. S&B argue that the
concept of amodal specification “implies a comparison between
information obtained via different perceptual systems” that must
have been “independently generated,” and that “the postulation
of such a cross-modal comparison requires a prior assumption that
the senses work separately in such a way that their outputs can be
compared” (sect. 3.3.3). This is a misrepresentation both of the de-
velopmental work to which they refer and of other work in this do-
main that makes no explicit assumption that the senses function
separately. On the contrary, E.J. Gibson has argued against such
breaking down of the world and then inventing “processing mech-
anisms” to put the world together again (Gibson 1977). Her work
on perceptual development emphasises time and again the multi-
modal character of perceptual events, the multisensory conse-
quences of behaviour, and that there exists no learning or devel-
opment that is strictly within modality (Gibson 1988; 1992; Gibson
& Walker 1984).
Reviewing empirical work on perceptual development provides
compelling evidence that multimodal functioning is primitive in
infancy, illustrating “a kind of unity of the senses in the newborn”
(Thelen & Smith 1994, p. 191). Finding evidence of cross-modal
functioning at such young ages argues against the necessity – or
even likelihood – of inferential cognitive processing in order 
for cross-modal matching to occur, as S&B would have it. By way
of example, newborns match visual with auditory information
(Spelke1976), they orient visually towards a heard sound
(Mendelson & Haith 1976), and both visual and auditory stimula-
tion summate to produce neonate arousal (Lewkowicz & Turke-
witz 1980). Furthermore, newborns match oral and visual infor-
mation with respect to textured pacifiers (Meltzoff & Borton
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1979) and with respect to rigid versus elastic cylinders (Gibson &
Walker1984). In contrast, there is evidence that modality-specific
attributes of objects begin to be differentiated only later in infancy
(e.g., Walker-Andrews & Gibson 1986). The results of these stud-
ies shed light on an issue that S&B raise in the last section of their
article: Are infants initially sensitive to structure in single-energy
arrays, with experience leading to the pick-up of structure in the
global array? Although the developmental work cited here uses
the concepts of multimodal, cross-modal, and intermodal func-
tioning rather interchangeably, they do attest to development pro-
ceeding in the opposite direction, that is from multimodal to
modality-specific functioning. Ontogeny, from Stumpf’s (1890)
perspective, thus seems to proceed in the opposite direction to
phylogeny. Following S&B’s own argument, the direction of this
developmental trend leads to a conclusion opposite to theirs,
namely that “the assumption of separate senses” (sect. 7) is not
necessary for cross-modal functioning to occur.
Multimodal input as the basis for brain development. S&B
make a convincing case that the assumption of separate senses is
incompatible with physical reality and the notions of specification
and direct perception. However, as argued above, the postulation
of cross- or multimodal functioning does not rest on this assump-
tion. Furthermore, with their definition of the global array, the au-
thors provide an example of how multimodal functioning can ex-
ist without requiring inferential processing that would make
perception mediated rather than direct. Support for the latter no-
tion has been provided by Edelman (1987; 1992) in his concept of
reentrant mapping – the anatomical interrelating of several si-
multaneous perceptual and motor representations – which pro-
vides a neural mechanism for brain development that has an ex-
plicit foundation in multimodal input to the neural network in
order for further development of the brain and its functions to oc-
cur.
In Edelman’s theory of neuronal group selection, perceptual
categorisation is the most fundamental psychological task of de-
velopment that forms the basis for further development of human
cognition and action. As all perceptual events have a multimodal
character and all behaviour has multisensory consequences (cf.
Gibson 1988; 1992), the nervous system is continuously bom-
barded with multisensory stimulation that is temporally corre-
lated. This time-locked nature of multimodal input, together with
the reciprocal activation of neuronal groups by reentrant mapping
of motor activity along with sensory information from many
modalities, lies at the heart of category formation (see also Thelen
& Smith 1994). In early development of the brain, movement and
sensory signals are completely coupled and act together to form
the global maps that are the basis of further development. Neu-
ronal groups thus get strengthened through their association in
the real-world, which forms the basis for experience-driven per-
ceptual categorisation. In other words, the perfect temporal asso-
ciation of multimodal information is the primary link between the
mind and the world, thereby providing a neural mechanism for
(the development of) specification and direct perception.
In conclusion, in their rejection of the assumption of separate
senses, S&B have, historically, a number of bedfellows; their the-
sis has more empirical support than they are prepared to give
credit for, particularly in the field of perceptual development.
What remains to be demonstrated, as the authors are fully
aware, is the tenability of the second main idea in the target arti-
cle, namely, that biological systems are directly sensitive to, and
make use of, structure in the global array.
Abolition of the senses
Nicholas J. Wade
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Abstract: In advocating an extreme form of specification requiring the
abolition of separate senses, Stoffregen & Bardy run the risk of diverting
attention from the multisensory integration of perception and action they
wish to champion.
Science progresses by building on and then making breaks with
the past. The emphasis is placed on the latter in the target article
by Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B). They stake a bold claim for a single
perceptual system that utilizes global arrays of energy. In order to
support their position, they need to dismantle the sensory edifice
built up over more than two thousand years. This is a tall order:
you have to be very sure of your ground if you are to argue that
everybody has got it wrong until now. If the theoretical position
advocated is considered wanting in regard to singular sensory
specification, then the force of the theoretical integration that fol-
lows is irremedially flawed.
The arguments against the separation of the senses address
three aspects of function – the physics of the stimulus (energy),
the structure of the receptor system (anatomy), and the responses
to stimulation (neurophysiology). S&B state that they have been
unable to find an explicit justification of the assumption of sepa-
rate senses, and then they cite Aristotle’s deliberations, which are
directed specifically to this point. S&B seem to be presenting a
theory of Aristotle’s “common sensibles” rather than of perception
generally. They do not refute Aristotle’s statements about the spe-
cial objects of sense.
It is surprising that the authors did not cite the work of the
“common sense” philosopher, Thomas Reid (1710–1796). He
made the distinction that S&B are trying to sustain – that per-
ception is distinct from sensation, and that the former does not in-
volve cognition. However, Reid does maintain that there are rep-
resentational stages in perception:
Although there is no reasoning in perception, yet there are certain
means and instruments, which, by the appointment of nature, must in-
tervene between the object and our perception of it; and by these our
perceptions are limited and regulated. First, if the object is not in con-
tact with the organ of sense, there must be some medium which passes
between them. Thus, in vision, the rays of light; in hearing, the vibra-
tions of elastic air; in smelling, the effluvia of the body smelt, must pass
from the object to the organ; otherwise we have no perception. Second,
there must be some action or impression upon the organ of sense, ei-
ther by the immediate application of the object, or by the medium that
goes between them. Third, the nerves which go from the brain to the
organ, must receive some impression by means of that which was made
upon the organ; and probably, by means of the nerves, some impres-
sion must be made upon the brain. Fourth, the impression made upon
the organ, nerves, and brain, is followed by a sensation. And, last of all,
this sensation is followed by the perception of the object. (Reid 1764,
pp. 424–25)
Advocating the unity of perception and action need not involve the
abolition of the senses.
It is difficult, in an historical sense, to imagine originating a clas-
sification of the senses that did not depend on anatomical and per-
ceptual distinctions. Such a classification would have preceded
others based on energy because the characteristics of perception
were described long before there was an adequate understanding
of energy sources in the environment. These categories were later
reinforced by evidence from neuroanatomy and neurophysiology:
specialized receptors respond to features of the stimulus and these
are analysed in discrete regions of the brain. Subsequent cortical
and subcortical analysis certainly integrates signals from different
sources, but this does not call for denying the specificity of the
senses. The examples of binaural localization and binocular stere-
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opsis functioning “in a unitary manner” are not surprising, but
they are unlikely to be treated as evidence against separation of
the senses. In the context of neurophysiology, concern should be
given to receptor systems and their cortical projections rather than
higher cortical functions which integrate signals from the sensory
projection areas. The arguments for unitary perception are more
forceful than those for a unitary sense.
Most detailed examples of perception given in support of S&B’s
approach understandably derive from their own research, al-
though they are from a narrow range of visual-vestibular interac-
tions. Moreover, many are artificial in a real sense since they
mostly involve vehicular motion. Any theory that is based on the
global array and its use should restrict the phenomena to those
that occur in the natural environment rather than incorporate di-
mensions that are unique to one species. Since an evolutionary
perspective is implied by the authors, they should confine their
analyses of perception and action to those which do not incorpo-
rate artificial devices.
The vestibular system provides a telling example of the manner
in which our understanding of perception has been advanced 
by the specification of sense. It was the first increment in two mil-
lennia to Aristotle’s five senses. The anatomy of the vestibular
labyrinth was described long before its function was appreciated;
between these two events the visual consequences of vestibular
stimulation were subjected to observation and experiment (see
Wade 2000). Rotating the body to induce vertigo resulted in post-
rotary nystagmus and apparent visual motion, the directions of
which were dependent upon head orientation during rotation.
These responses to body rotation could be interpreted when the
hydrodynamic theory of semicircular canal function was advanced
in the 1870s. Would such understanding have been achieved with-
out the specification of a separate vestibular sense? It is the case
that Stoffregen and Riccio (1988) have denied the link between
vestibular stimulation and perceived orientation, but there are
those inclined to dispute their claims (see Curthoys & Wade 1990).
Infants, too, are global perceivers
Arlene Walker-Andrews
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Abstract: Infants are global perceivers. They detect patterns in stimula-
tion that allow detection of many affordances of the environment. Pick-up
of structural patterns across forms of ambient energy awaits maturation of
sensory systems and improvements in motor skill, but development pro-
ceeds rapidly during the first year. Researchers in perceptual development
must devise and refine existing tools to examine infants’ abilities.
When I first examined infants’ emotion perception using an in-
termodal task (Walker 1982), I was asked why I compared an in-
fant’s looking time to a happy facial expression projected alongside
a sad facial expression and accompanied by a happy vocal expres-
sion to that shown in the opposite setup. That is, the comparison
was with the infant’s looking time to the happy expression when it
was projected alongside the sad expression, but accompanied by
a sad vocal expression. The expectation instead had been that I
should use, as baseline, looking at a facial expression when it was
presented as one of a silent pair. I have struggled to answer this
question, never able to furnish an argument that convinced al-
though I was certain of my choice. I have argued that (1) two fa-
cial expressions and one soundtrack and (2) two facial expressions
– comprise only two very different events. Stoffregen & Bardy
(S&B) provide the rationale I have been seeking: the whole is not
only greater than but is qualitatively different from the sum of its
parts. The integrated action of seeing and hearing leads to the per-
ception of an “irreducible” product, in the present example an
emotional expression that affords opportunities for action.
The target article is the paper I almost wish I had written. S&B
present a logical, well-supported argument for specification. They
point out how many of us have been unable to escape the as-
sumption that the senses are separate channels even as we claimed
we were rejecting that accepted wisdom. They clarify for me why
it has been so difficult to maintain precision with such terms as
“intermodal,” “crossmodal,” “amodal,” and “multimodal.” I have
tried, for example, to reserve “crossmodal” for situations in which
an observer viewed something and subsequently heard or felt it, a
situation that may require the kind of inference that most theories
assume.
S&B make additional points that speak to the common fallacy
that infants will be unable to “process” information when they en-
counter in the lab a stimulus event such as a moving, computer-
generated disk punctuated by a beep at the lowest point in its tra-
jectory, flanked by another disk that is not. The usual assumption
is that infants must compare information obtained via vision to
that obtained via audition to determine which icon is consistent
with the sounds, and that this will tax their abilities (Bahrick 1992;
Lewkowicz 1993). Infants at a specific age may indeed fail a spe-
cific intermodal task, but not because they cannot deal with si-
multaneous presentations of separate optic and acoustic arrays.
Sensitivity to a higher-order pattern is required, not internal com-
parisons of information derived from single-energy arrays.
Two aspects of S&B’s paper could be improved. First, although
they acknowledge that James Gibson (1966) provided the original
example for information in the global array, they do not describe
the scope of his contribution. This may represent misinterpreta-
tion, ambiguities in the theory, or evidence for the growth of 
Gibson’s own thinking. Congruent with the latter, Gibson (1979) 
himself described the theory of information pick-up as in an “un-
developed state.” But he went on to say: “Information is not 
specific to the banks of photoreceptors, mechanoreceptors, and
chemoreceptors that lie within the sense organs. Sensations are
specific to receptors and thus, normally, to the kinds of stimulus
energy that touch them off. But information is not energy-
specific” (p. 243). He asserted that we directly perceive the qual-
ities of things in the world, especially their affordances. S&B take
up these ideas and propel them much farther along the path Gib-
son had begun to clear.
Second, S&B little attend to developmental research. Consider
results from Walker-Andrews and Lennon (1985) and Pickens
(1994). In the earlier study, 5-month-olds observed videotapes of
a Volkswagen (VW) moving toward or away from them accompa-
nied by a noise that increased or decreased in amplitude. Infants
looked preferentially at the videotape consistent with the engine
noise – the approaching VW when the noise grew louder, the re-
ceding VW when it softened. Note that the rate of change in am-
plitude was correlated with movements of both vehicles, but in-
fants responded to directional information as well. Pickens (1994)
introduced critical refinements – a condition in which a toy train
changed in size only (rather than moving in depth), another in
which each film’s brightness varied, and one in which the trains
moved up and down. Infants looked appropriately for motion in
depth and, less so, for size changes. They did not show preferences
related to brightness changes or vertical movement. Five-month-
olds were sensitive to ecological relations specifying approach ver-
sus retreat and did not generalize to intensity or metaphorical re-
lations.
Although S&B fail to capitalize on the wealth of infant data, they
simultaneously present a challenge to developmental researchers.
The authors proffer but dismiss the possibility that infants are ini-
tially sensitive to structure in single-energy arrays and develop
sensitivity to the global array because this assertion demands the
corollary that there are separate senses. In fact, infants appear to
be sensitive to the global array. They detect some invariant pat-
terns in the first few weeks of life (e.g., Gibson & Walker 1984;
Meltzoff & Borton 1979). Months later they can detect arbitrary
relations such as those contrived between the color and taste of a
substance (Reardon & Bushnell 1988) or a label and a moving ob-
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ject (Gogate & Bahrick 1998). There is continued debate about
the role, if any, of modality-specific information during infancy
(c.f. Bahrick & Lickliter 2000) as well as the acknowledgment that
although all sensory systems are potentially functional prenatally,
they mature at different rates. Taking a lead from the present pa-
per, however, those of us who study infants should consider more
carefully how we present perceptual problems. It may no longer
suffice to construct multimodal displays and test whether infants
appreciate invariant relations. S&B suggest some alternatives, but
designing such studies given infants’ limited behavioral reper-
toires will be difficult.
In closing, S&B have contributed an important essay in the de-
bate about the nature and origins of perception. They make a con-
vincing case for specification and for an active perceiver, one not
hobbled by the imposition of energy-specific stimulation but free
to sample the global array and detect affordances.
Motion, frames of reference, dead horses,
and metaphysics
A. H. Wertheim
TNO Human Factors, 3769-ZG, Soesterberg, The Netherlands.
wertheim@tm.tno.ni
Abstract: Various annoyingly incorrect statements of Stoffregen & Bardy
are corrected, for example, that perception researchers commonly use the
term “absolute motion” to denote motion without any frame of reference,
confuse earth-relative and gravity-relative motion, err with respect to the
frame of reference implied by their subject is motion responses, believe in
sense specific motion percepts, and do not investigate sensory interactions
at neurophysiological levels. In addition, much of the target article seems
to concern metaphysics rather than empirical science.
Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) state that “a common concept . . .
among many researchers, including myself, is . . . the idea of ab-
solute motion” not defined in terms of any frame of reference
(S&B use the term referent). But neither I nor anyone else that I
know has ever embraced such a peculiar idea. The relativity of mo-
tion has always been my explicit point of departure (Wertheim
1981) and I have argued that a theory must he flawed if it yields a
concept of motion that is not definable in terms of a frame of ref-
erence (see e.g., my discussion of the “hidden reciprocity as-
sumption” in Wertheim 1994, sect. R2). S&B call on researchers
always to mention the particular frame of reference in terms of
which they define motion. But this is what everybody has been do-
ing all along (see e.g., Swanston & Wade 1988, Wertheim 1994,
and many of its accompanying BBS commentaries, also sects. R5
and R6). In the literature (e.g., Kinchla 1971; Wertheim 1994, p.
302) the term “absolute motion” denotes motion defined in terms
of the three-dimensional (3D) frame of reference dimensioned by
the earth’s surface and the direction of gravity. Other names might
have served just as well: for example, “motion relative to absolute
space,” “Newtonian motion,” “exocentric motion,” or “earth-rela-
tive motion.” This is perfectly in line with Einstein’s claim that the
idea of frameless motion has no meaning. When S&B defend Ein-
stein’s views vis-à-vis those of perception researchers (see also
Stoffregen 1994), they beat a dead horse.
The same can be said about S&B’s elaborate argument that
there can be motion relative to the earth without it being relative
to the direction of gravity (i.e., when perpendicular to the direc-
tion of gravity). To my knowledge nobody has ever equated earth-
relative motion with motion relative to the earth’s gravity.
S&B also criticize many researchers, including me, for stating
that the perception of visually induced self-motion is often illu-
sory. What those authors mean is that in the presence of a large
optic flow field, one often experiences a perception of self-motion
relative to the earth’s surface, while, physically speaking, one re-
mains stationary relative to that surface. The most common ex-
ample of this illusion occurs when an earth-stationary observer is
seated inside a rotating optokinetic drum. S&B claim that this is
not an illusion, because the relative motion between the drum and
the observer is correctly perceived. It is, but that is not the illusion
which concerns a different percept, namely, perceiving self-mo-
tion relative to the earth’s surface. S&B seem to believe that this
is not really perceived inside the drum, although experimenters
believe it is. They claim that there is no illusion; only a misunder-
standing between observer and experimenter as to the frame of
reference relevant to the observer’s percept, a misunderstanding
which should disappear when the frame of reference is explicitly
stated in the perceiver’s verbal report.
However, whether S&B like it or not, earth-relative self-motion
really is experienced by observers inside an optokinetic drum: they
believe that they are moving relative to the floor of the experi-
mental room in which the drum is located (and perceive the drum
as stationary relative to that floor). Since this is not physically the
case, the term illusion is correct.
Contrary to what S&B suggest, researchers in the field of visual-
vestibular interactions and self-motion (including myself ) are al-
ways careful to correctly ascertain the frame of reference in which
subjects report self-motion percepts. They either specifically ask
about it, or use non-verbal methods (e.g., by asking the subjects to
continuously keep a joystick pointed toward where they believe
the door of the experimental room is located). In fact, these re-
searchers were the first to recognize the dangers of verbal ambi-
guities about frames of reference; terms such as “exocentric” and
“egocentric” originated from their work. S&B’s accusation that re-
searchers “routinely exclude correct responses from their analysis
. . . because of verbal ambiguities in their subjects’ reports,” re-
veals a shocking lack of knowledge. This is not even kicking a dead
horse, but kicking a nonexistent one.
Another problem is S&B’s claim that my analysis of percepts of
“absolute motion” is sense-specific (see also Stoffregen 1994), that
is, requires only one sensory system. This is incorrect. In my
model (Wertheim 1994) the retinal coordinates of image motion
are recalibrated into the 3D coordinates of the frame of reference
defined by the earth’s surface and gravity. This is brought about
with what I termed “reference signals.” These are compound sig-
nals constructed from sensory afferents generated by various sen-
sory systems (somatosensory, vestibular, and visual). In addition,
retinal and reference signals themselves have no perceptual
meaning. It is their interaction which yields percepts of motion.
Consequently, on the perceptual level, one cannot speak of sep-
arate senses. This is also implied by other inferential theories,
which use the theoretical forerunners of reference signals (“extra-
retinal signals,” “corollary discharges,” “efference copy signals”).
Hence, no inferential theorist assumes that motion perception is
sense-specific (see Wertheim 1999, for a more detailed analysis 
of this issue). Nor do vestibular researchers – who, for decades
now, are trying to unravel the way how retinal, somatosensory, 
and vestibular afferents interact to bring about particular percepts
of self-motion – assume that motion perception (of any kind) is
sensory-specific (see e.g., Sauvan 1999). On the contrary, these
sensory interactions are their core business, both on the percep-
tual and on the neurophysiological level.
Hence, it is not at all surprising that S&B have been unable to
locate an explicit justification of the assumption of separate senses
in the philosophical, behavioral, or neurophysiological literatures.
Who would want to justify a false assumption? S&B’s call to search
“for neural units that respond to patterns of activity that extend
across different kinds of receptors, such as the retinae and the
vestibule,” again is out of touch with the literature. Here too the
authors beat a dead horse.
Finally, it is difficult to make sense of S&B’s discussion of vari-
ous possible relations between an energy array and (aspects of) re-
ality – a relation which is “prior to and independent of . . . psy-
chological processes.” The point is that, reality per se is unknown.
This is metaphysics, not empirical science. Reality can only be as-
sumed: we assume that what we perceive is reality. For all practi-
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cal purposes, the array itself is reality (or as close as one can get to
it). What else can S&B’s mean when they say that the array is “not
a hypothesis but a fact”? For empirical ecological psychology, an
array’s relation to reality (whatever this means) is irrelevant.
Instead, it takes the concept of an energy array as its point of
departure, and then tries to investigate what sort of information
(e.g., motions, frames of reference, etc.) can be recognized in its
structure and how it might be picked up by a perceiver. For in-
ferential theorists, who do not shun cognitive evaluations of in-
coming sensory signals, the issue is different: How do percepts of
the various kinds of object- or self-motion arise from the neuro-
physiological and cognitive processes that operate in association
with our sensory systems? As I have shown (Wertheim 1994), the
answers offered by these two approaches are not mutually exclu-
sive, for they refer to different percepts: relative motion between
objects may be perceived from retinal information only, but per-
cepts of “absolute motion” (as defined above) require non-retinal
information as well. To describe these kinds of information in
terms of many energy arrays or a global multidimensional one is
merely an exercise in semantics.
Authors’ Response
Specification in the global array
Thomas A. Stoffregena and Benoît G. Bardyb
aDepartment of Psychology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221;
bDivision of Sport Sciences (STAPS), Université Paris Sud-XI, Orsay Cedex,
France. stoffrta@email.uc.edu benoit.bardy@staps.u-psud.fr
Abstract: We discuss issues raised by the commentators, such as
specification in single-energy arrays, task-specific pickup of infor-
mation, general principles of the ecological approach to percep-
tion and action, and how specification may be constrained by the
facts of physical relativity. While the commentaries raise many im-
portant issues we conclude that they do not undermine our argu-
ment that specification exists solely in the global array.
R1. A general theory of perception and action
We seek a theory of perception and action that is internally
consistent and general. General, in the sense that it applies
to all perception and action, across situations, across indi-
viduals, and across species. Internally consistent, in the
sense that concepts used to explain one aspect of percep-
tion and action must be compatible with concepts used to
explain other aspects (e.g., Shaw et al. 1982).
Although many of the commentators work toward gen-
eral theories of behavior, some seek to understand percep-
tion and action primarily in humans (e.g., Ahrens; Pallas;
Wade), while others focus their explanations of perception
in “natural” circumstances (Runeson et al.). Perception
and action are known to be adaptive in a great variety of
species that exhibit an astonishing diversity of perceptual,
motor, and neural anatomy, and in a great variety of situa-
tions, such as teleoperation (McMichael & Bingham) and
orbital flight, which do not seem to fit any credible defini-
tion of natural. It is our belief (cf. Gibson 1966; Shaw et al.
1982), that a single theory of perception and action can and
should apply to all of these.
Commentators who appeal to human perception or to
the nervous system do not appear to be moving toward a
theory of perception and action that is general across
species (contra Wade, we seek a theory of perception and
action that is general across species). For example, Ahrens
defines sensation as the “transduction of ambient energy
into a spatiotemporal pattern of neural activity,” which
seems to imply that sensation is limited to species that have
neurons. This would seem to require that we develop sep-
arate theories to explain perception in species that have
neurons and those that do not. This is problematic in the
simple sense of not being general. It also raises the ques-
tion of the evolutionary development of perception, since
species with nervous systems evolved from predecessors
that did not have nervous systems (Reed 1996). Similarly,
Lewkowicz & Scheier assert that “no behavior is possible
without the brain.” While this may be true for humans and
other chordates, it is not true for behavior in general (Berg
2000; Pittenger & Dent 1988). The development of a cen-
tral nervous system is one way in which living things have
achieved adaptive control over the animal-environment in-
teraction, but it is not the only way and, most importantly,
it is not a sine qua non for the adaptive success of species
(Reed 1996). Adaptive behavior requires perception and
control of the animal-environment interaction. Given this,
and given the fact that many successful species do not have
central nervous systems, a theory of perception and action
that is general must be based on principles that are not lim-
ited to the properties or activity of any particular neural ap-
paratus (Gibson 1966; Reed 1996).
It is important also to consider the fact that the nervous
system is an effect of behavior, at least as much as it is a
cause (Berthoz 1997; Pailhous et al.). This is true at the
ontogenetic level: As Reed (1966, p.69) argued, “it is not the
animal’s brain that organized its world, but the evolutionary
ecology of the animal that organized its brain.” This is also
true at the phylogenetic level, that is, in terms of individu-
als, as is illustrated in the examples provided by Kujala and
Pailhous et al.1 We do not suggest that the nervous system
is wholly plastic; that this is not true is again shown by Ku-
jala. However, together with Pailhous et al., we reject the
very widespread assumption that the nervous system is pri-
mary. Perception and action (including adaptive learning)
occur in species that have very different nervous systems
from ours and, indeed, in species that have no nervous sys-
tem at all (Berg 2000; Pittenger & Dent 1988; Reed 1966).
For this reason, a general theory of perception and action
cannot be rooted in the nervous system.
Several commentators (e.g., Kujala; Vereijken & Whit-
ing) suggest that existing neurophysiological research sup-
ports our arguments about the global array. We agree that
such research may be consistent with the pickup of infor-
mation from the global array. However, existing neuro-
physiological research is not likely to be suitable for theory
testing with respect to the global array. Much of the exist-
ing neurophysiological research is consistent with a wide
variety of divergent theoretical positions (as pointed out by
Mergner & Becker). An example is the research on blind
people cited by Kujala. While this work impressively illus-
trates the flexibility of the nervous system and the role of
experience in CNS organization (Pailhous et al.; Ver-
eijken & Whiting), it provides no information about the
parameters of sensory stimulation to which the nervous sys-
tem is sensitive. There is, however, existing neurophysio-
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logical and neuroethological research that supports the
general premises of the ecological approach to perception
and action, adopting an a priori decision to focus on natural
(i.e., nonlaboratory) perception-action in response to natural
(i.e., nonreductionist) stimuli. This research has demon-
strated the existence of neurons (for example) that react to
high-order, low-dimensional patterns in ambient energy
(e.g., Camhi 1984; Saito et al. 1986; Tanaka & Saito 1989).
This research has been conducted in the context of single-
energy arrays. As stated briefly in the target article (sect.
6.2.4) and in several commentaries (Wade; Kujala, and
others), new research of this kind is needed that is specifi-
cally designed to permit empirical contrasts between neu-
rophysiological sensitivity to structures in the global array,
as opposed to sensitivity to structures in single-energy ar-
rays.
R2. Ecological psychology: General issues
Several commentators raise questions that are relevant to
the ecological approach to perception and action, in general,
rather than to our analysis of the global array, in particular
(e.g., Ahrens; Feldman & Lestienne; Oie & Jeka; Pal-
las). As noted in section 1 of the target article, the ecologi-
cal approach is an established theory with a well-developed
set of principles (see e.g., Goldfield 1995; Michaels & Carello
1981). These often differ in fundamental ways from the
principles that guide more traditional theories of percep-
tion.
A common misconception is that the ecological approach
rejects the possibility that perception may be influenced by
or dependent upon mental activity. Internal, experience-
dependent influences on perception and action are an es-
sential fact of life, even in single-celled animals (Pittenger
& Dent 1988), and any theory of perception and action
must take these into account at a fundamental level (contra
Pickering). The ecological approach does this, mainly
through the theory of differentiation (Gibson 1969; 1988).
The question is not whether mental activity exists, or whe-
ther mental activity is essential (Oie & Jeka). The question
is about the nature of mental activity, and this is intimately
related to the issue of specificity. If specificity does not ex-
ist, that is, if potential sensory stimulation is ambiguous with
respect to reality, then mental activity must be inferential
(e.g., associative). However, if specification exists then
mental activity need not be inferential, that is, it may not be
necessary to “process” information in order that perception
be accurate. This is the essential distinction. We agree with
Oie & Jeka that behavior is not always “dominated” by per-
ceptual information, but this is not directly relevant to the
issue of whether reality is specified; the existence of speci-
fication is not a psychological issue (sect. 1), and cannot be
confirmed or rejected on the basis of behavioral experi-
ments. Similarly, specification cannot exist or be created in
neural activity (Mergner & Becker; Peper & Beek); this
would be equivalent to indirect perception on the basis of
ambiguous stimuli.
Dynamical systems theory is useful for describing per-
ception-action phenomena, but it is not helpful in resolving
the theoretical debate between direct and indirect per-
ception (cf. Ahrens; Oie & Jeka). This is because dynam-
ical systems theory is neutral with respect to the directness
or indirectness of perception; dynamical descriptions are
compatible with either position (e.g., Bardy et al. 1999; Jeka
et al. 1998; Kelso 1995).
Researchers have sometimes suggested that it may be
possible to integrate ecological and Helmholtzian theories
of perception (e.g., Mergner & Becker; Wertheim 1994;
cf. Oie & Jeka; Pickering). We disagree, and believe,
along with James Gibson (1966), that the basic premises of
the two theories are not reconcilable. The ecological ap-
proach to perception and action is incompatible with in-
ferential (i.e., Helmholtzian) approaches. A major reason
for this is that specification and non-specification motivate 
separate and incommensurate theories of perception. If
specification exists, then there is not a clear theoretical mo-
tivation for the existence of inferential processes (e.g., as-
sociation) in mentation (Myin). Students of neurophysiol-
ogy often assume that perception begins when energy is
transduced at receptors. That this assumption is not only
controversial but flatly unnecessary has been argued by
ecological psychologists for decades (e.g., E. J. Gibson 1969;
J. J. Gibson 1966; Michaels & Carello 1981; Reed 1996).
The division of information pickup into sensation and
perception, which is often taken for granted (e.g., Ahrens),
is in fact a controversial assumption (Gibson 1966; Reed
1996). The fact that stimulation of receptor surfaces gives
rise to neural activity does not necessarily mean that the ac-
tivity is “entirely mechanistic,” or that “no meaning is con-
veyed” (Ahrens). The existence and operation of the ner-
vous system does not imply that neurological function and
mentation are mechanistic. Similarly, the ecological ap-
proach to perception and action explicitly rejects the as-
sumption that knowledge about reality is calculated (Pal-
las).
Neelon & Jenison review a common argument that the
existence of specification does not explain “the achieve-
ment of perception,” and we agree. Specification (in the
global array or elsewhere) is not a theory of perception but,
rather, a fact that has implications for theories of perception
(e.g., Runeson & Frykholm 1983). As we noted in section
6.2, if specification exists, then there is no theoretical moti-
vation for invoking “statistical estimation” in order to per-
ceive the world. Similarly, if specification exists in the global
array, then there is no theoretical motivation for combining
“multiple inputs.”
In the target article, we considered the possibilities that
specification exists always, or never. Oie & Jeka and Pick-
ering (see also Michaels & Oudejans; Runeson et al.)
take a contrasting position, suggesting that specification
may exist in some circumstances, but that it is not a gen-
eral phenomenon (what Cabe refers to as “non-absolutist”
specification). This may seem tempting, but it is not with-
out problems. As we noted in the target article (sect. 1), the
question of specification in ambient arrays is not a psycho-
logical question but, rather, a question of ecological physics.
Ecological physics is a branch of physics that deals with
phenomena on the scale of, and with reference to, actual or
potential perceiver-actors. With regard to specification, the
question is whether there is a unique relation between as-
pects of reality and the structure of ambient arrays, as a con-
sequence of the physical laws that govern the generation,
propagation, and reflection of energy. Because ambient ar-
rays are part of physics, the hypothesis that ambient arrays
are “partially,” or “occasionally” specific to reality is equiv-
alent to a claim that the laws of the generation, propagation,
and reflection of ambient energy are sometimes in effect,
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but at other times not in effect. More generally, the hy-
pothesis of partial or occasional specification requires some
principle that can predict when specification exists, and
when it does not. We know of no principled basis for such
a claim; Pickering and Oie & Jeka offer none, and do not
cite any. Note that our position does not require that every-
thing be specified at every instant, or at every point of ob-
servation. The consequences of this for perception are dis-
cussed in section R6.
R3. Specification in the global array
With respect to specification, the thread of our argument
has been nicely summarized (with one exception) by Cabe:
Stoffregen & Bardy discredit all existing perceptual theories,
because each allows input conflict (input ambiguity) and there-
fore implies cognitive (indirect) processes. The syllogism is: If
array structures (AS) conflict, then perceivers must choose be-
tween alternative world structure (WS) interpretations; choice
implies cognitive processing; therefore, input conflict implies
cognitive processing. The main focus is intersensory conflict,
but any AS ambiguity yields the same conclusion. Because all
existing perceptual theories entail such ambiguities, they all en-
tail cognitive processes.
We endorse this summary, with the exception of Cabe’s
reference to cognitive processes. As we will argue below,
the ecological approach to perception and action does not
reject the reality of cognitive activity. Rather, the ecological
approach rejects the assumption that cognitive activity
must be associative, inferential, or computational. This as-
sumption is based, both logically and historically, on the
prior assumption that in Cabe’s terms, there is ambiguity
between world structures and array structures. If, as we ar-
gued (sect. 6.2.1), the animal-environment system is speci-
fied by structures in the global array, then there would be
no theoretical motivation for postulating that mental activ-
ity is inferential, associative, or computational.
R4. Constraints on specification
Runeson et al. claim that specification may exist in single-
energy arrays, basing their argument on the idea that spec-
ification occurs under the influence of different types of
constraints. We endorse the general concept of constraints,
and agree fully that they are critical to specification. How-
ever, their argument ignores our discussion of the indepen-
dence of physical referents (sect. 4). The independence of
different physical referents is a profound constraint on
specification. Other types of constraints must be posterior
to this, as we argued in section 5. We assume that any evil
genius must obey the laws of physics; if not, then the “laws”
are not laws, and we must either re-open the search for the
actual laws of physics, or abandon the idea that physics is
lawful. Runeson et al. ask about nonlinear propagation of
light, as if this were hypothetical, when it is known as a fact:
The bending of light by strong gravitational fields is a ma-
jor confirmation of Einstein’s theory of relativity. Never-
theless, light, like an evil genius, obeys the laws of physics.
Runeson et al. (cf. Shaw et al. 1982, p. 218) place strong
emphasis on “natural” constraints. We regard this as a prob-
lem, because of the difficulty of defining natural. As one ex-
ample, consider cinema. In the movies, recorded samples
of the optic array are reproduced on a screen. One common
feature of films is an instantaneous cut between images
recorded by cameras in different positions, or by a single
camera at different times (Anderson 1996). A cut produces
an instantaneous change in the optic array. This type of
change is physically impossible outside the cinema, due to
the fact that living things have inertia, and so cannot achieve
an instantaneous shift from one point of observation to an-
other (Stoffregen 1997). In an evolutionary sense, cuts in
film must be grossly unnatural. Yet for millions of contem-
porary humans, optical shifts of this kind are a common-
place of daily life, and have been essentially from birth, in
film, television, home video, computer graphics, and so on.
For individuals, cuts in film can be classified as unnatural
only if natural can exclude typical, or ordinary. We know of
no basis for such an exclusion. More generally, Runeson et
al.’s argument is viable only if they can develop a rigorous
definition of natural.2
Runeson et al. (see also Costall et al.; Michaels & Beck
1995, p. 274), suggest that virtual reality devices, moving
rooms, rotating drums, and other such devices cause the
optic array to “lose some of its specificity,”3 and suggest that
in such devices perception is illusory or erroneous (this ar-
gument appears to apply to the cinema, as well). Each of
these assertions can be questioned. We have argued that in
these devices reality is specified (i.e., the nature of the de-
vices as simulators, and the content of the simulation) and
that this specification exists in the global array (Stoffregen
et al. 2000b). We have also argued that this information is
picked up; this would account for the ability of users of so-
phisticated flight simulators (for example) to differentiate
the simulation from the actual vehicle (Stoffregen et al.
2000a). We would also argue that success at teleoperation
(McMichael & Bingham) is possible in part because the
fact of teleoperation is specified in the global array. Differ-
entiation of the fact of teleoperation (cf. sect. R6) would 
allow the user simultaneously to control different parts of
the body relative to the distal teleoperation environment
and the local gravito-inertial environment (cf. Patterson et
al. 1997; Smith et al. 1997). Are people in moving rooms,
patrons of the cinema, and users of virtual reality devices
really fooled? Can they distinguish motion relative to the il-
luminated environment from motion relative to the gravito-
inertial force environment? In many cases the relevant data
have not yet been collected (Stoffregen 1997; Stoffregen et
al. 2000a).
R5. Constraints on the detection of information
Several commentators (e.g., Brenner & Smeets; Coello
& Rossetti; Foo & Kelso; Runeson et al.), point out that
perception is selective, and that ambient arrays are sampled
for information that is relevant to particular perceptual-
motor goals. We cannot agree more and, as Myin notes, we
made several references to this in the target article. Our
own research has emphasized the task or goal-dependent
nature of perception and action (e.g., Bardy et al. 1999;
Marin et al. 1999; Stoffregen et al. 1999; 2000b). However,
the pickup of information is posterior to the existence of in-
formation. As noted in the target article (sect. 1), our argu-
ment about the global array is an argument about the in-
formation that is available for perception. It is not an
argument about the psychology of perception (e.g., when
information is picked up by perceivers, or the basis for the
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selective pickup of information). The ecological approach
of perception and action has already provided, in varying
degrees of detail, explanations and theories of information
pickup, including the fact that perception is selective and
that selection is based on task-specific criteria (e.g., Gibson
1988). These explanations can be applied to the pickup of
information from the global array.
Classically in the ecological approach, what is specified
and what is picked up are two different questions, and the
second cannot be asked before the first is answered. Simi-
larly, what is picked up and how it is picked up are different
questions, but again, the first should be asked before the
second. Our contribution deals primarily with the “what”:
what is specified, and thus, what is picked up.
We also agree with Coello & Rossetti that perception
and action are inherently related, and that people (and
other animals) perceive meaningful properties of the animal-
environment system (i.e., affordances, Stoffregen 2000a;
2000b, cf. Michaels & Oudejans; Walker-Andrews).
The failure to perceive accurately arbitrarily chosen prop-
erties of the physical world, such as velocity (Runeson
1974), or brightness (Oie & Jeka), may result not from any
absence of specification per se, but from the experimenter’s
assumption that these are proper objects of perception (cf.
Shaw et al. 1982).
This brings us to the issue of what is specified. We can
detect only the information that is available, that is, the in-
formation that exists. Thus, ecological theory predicts that
we can perceive only those things that are specified. Those
things will be specified which structure ambient energy ar-
rays in lawful ways. It may not be the case that this is true
of all possible states of the universe (e.g., Runeson 1974;
Shaw et al. 1982). This point leads to predictions for per-
ception. It should be impossible to perceive directly things
that are not specified. We argued that the global array is
structured by aspects of the animal-environment system
(sect. 6.1). This statement was deliberately vague, in part
because we regard the issue as being beyond the scope of
the target article, and in part because it has been addressed
elsewhere (e.g., Shaw et al. 1982; Stoffregen 2000a; 2000b).
We agree, however, that the issue of what is specified is 
of fundamental importance (McMichaels & Oudejans;
Riccio et al.).
R6. Learning, exploration, and 
perceptual-motor errors
It is noted by Cabe (see also Pickering and Riley), that
some error in perception and action is tolerable. Errors in
perception and action exist at all developmental levels
(Adolph et al.). But the existence of error does not imply
a lack of specificity in ambient arrays (contra Pickering,
Riley, and Thomas, inadequate detection does not imply
inadequate specificity), and it does not imply what Cabe
refers to as “non-absolutist specification.” As we noted in
section 7, errors in perception and action can (and do) arise
from failures in the pickup of information. An essential 
requirement in perceptual motor learning is the differ-
entiation of information that is task-relevant from informa-
tion that is irrelevant to the task at hand (e.g., Foo & Kelso;
Leighty et al.). For two reasons, this differentiation takes
time.
First, and most important, specification exists in space-
time, rather that at any given instant or moment (Adolph
et al.). Instantaneous or arbitrarily brief structures in am-
bient arrays may be ambiguous with respect to particular
aspects of the animal-environment interaction (Riccio et
al.; cf. Runeson 1988). Similarly, not everything is specified
to any given point of observation. One reason that percep-
tion is active is that activity on the part of the perceiver is
often necessary in order to generate the information that
specifies task-relevant aspects of the animal-environment
interaction (e.g., Schmuckler & Tsang-Tong 2000). Second,
information pickup takes place in spacetime, and both time
and movement are required (e.g., Gibson et al. 1987; Oude-
jans et al. 1996; Pittenger & Dent 1988; Riccio 1993; Riley
et al, 1997; cf. Mark et al. 1990). Thus, the shape of the back
of an object may not be specified in the global array that is
available to an observer standing in front of it. Similarly, the
dynamics of an automobile may not be specified when it is
not in operation, regardless of the point of observation
adopted by an observer (this is why potential purchasers in-
sist on test-driving a car, rather than merely examining it in
the showroom). Perceptual-motor error may result from a
failure to pick up accurate information that is available, or
from a failure (or inability) to engage in exploratory actions
that will generate or reveal the relevant information (Ric-
cio et al.). These examples are consistent with the well-
documented fact that the accuracy of perception is greatly
improved when observers are permitted to engage in ex-
ploratory activity. For example, circular vection (the expe-
rience of earth-relative egorotation when presented with a
rotating optical display) is a frail phenomenon that is de-
pendent upon restraint of the head (cf. sect. R7). Similarly,
illusory experiences associated with the Ames distorted
room depend almost entirely upon severe restrictions of
perceptual exploration (Runeson 1988).
The most general examples are provided by Adolph et
al., who describe relations between perceptual-motor error
and the growth of differentiation. Their examples are gen-
eral in at least two senses. First, the situations, percep-
tions, and actions involved are all characteristic of daily life 
outside the laboratory. Second, every able-bodied person
learns to perceive and control locomotion across a variety
of surfaces (as do the young of many other species). Adolph
et al. also underline the importance of exploratory behavior
(see also the classic study of Held & Hein 1963). How
would the perception and control of locomotion develop if
infants were restrained?
Perception and action need not be perfect, as noted by
Cabe, and by Brenner & Smeets (cf. Pickering and Ri-
ley). In a Darwinian context, it is necessary only that per-
ception and action be accurate enough to ensure survival.
We agree with this, but it is not directly relevant to the is-
sue of specification. Specification is part of the environ-
ment in which life evolved. Life came into existence in the
context of certain pre-existing aspects of reality, such as
rocks, water, and the laws of physics that govern the gener-
ation, propagation, and absorption of ambient energy. The
existence of specification does not require that perception
and action be flawless. Specification guarantees the avail-
ability of accurate information, but does not guarantee that
the information will be picked up or that, if picked up, it will
be used accurately. The example of the “bent stick illusion”
proposed by Riley is appropriate. In contradiction with his
interpretation of the illusion, we do not believe that the
light reaching the eye contains “inadequate” information.
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This is because information, as we defined it (i.e., as an ob-
jective property of the animal-environment system) cannot
be inadequate. As acknowledged by Riley, the light reach-
ing the observer’s eye contains information about a stick be-
ing in water. In this context, what is inadequate is not the
information, but the detection of the information (e.g.,
Michaels & Carello 1981).
R7. Relative motion
A large portion of the target article concerns relative mo-
tion; indeed, it is the fulcrum of our argument against the
existence of specification in single-energy arrays (sects. 4
and 5). For this reason, we were surprised that motion rel-
ative to different physical referents was not addressed by
commentators who argue that specification exists in single-
energy arrays (e.g., Michaels & Oudejans; Peper &
Beek; Rosenblum & Gordon; Runeson et al.). Thus,
our argument for the absence of specification in single-
energy arrays remains unanswered. The formulation of a
response to our arguments about relative motion is a seri-
ous challenge for scientists who argue that specification ex-
ists in single-energy arrays. In particular, it would be nec-
essary to indicate how structures in, for example, the optic
array, could provide information sufficient for the control
of action relative to referents that do not structure that ar-
ray (e.g., motion relative to the acoustic environment, or
relative to the direction of balance).
Among all the commentaries only one is concerned with
issues relating to relative motion, and for this reason
Wertheim’s contribution is especially welcome. We ac-
knowledge that many researchers, including Wertheim, try
to take into account some of the facts of relativity
(Wertheim cites some of the same ones that we cited in the
target article). However, in terms of the information avail-
able for perception, these researchers generally consider
motion relative to a single class of referents, the hypothet-
ical sensory reference frames (e.g., Soechting & Flanders
1992; Wade & Swanston 1991; Wertheim 1994). For exam-
ple, Wertheim (1981, p. 106) concludes that motion is
perceived “relative to the magnitude of . . . extraretinal sig-
nals,” and he distinguishes between the “perception of mo-
tion” relative to sensory reference frames and the “physical
determination of motion of an object” (p. 107). Wertheim
(1981; 1994), does not discuss or consider the possibility
that motion might be perceived directly relative to physical
referents. To be sure, motion can be measured relative to
the retina, the eardrum, and so on. However, as we noted
in the target article, if specification exists, then sensory ref-
erence frames can be irrelevant to perception of motion rel-
ative to physical referents. This is because specification
would allow motion relative to physical referents to be per-
ceived directly, so that sensory reference frames would be
unnecessary. This reprises James Gibson’s (1966) argument
that sensations, while real, are irrelevant to perception (see
Mace, for an historical treatment).
In the target article (sect. 4.2) we pointed out that the
surface of the earth and the earth’s gravitational field are
distinct physical referents for motion and that, conse-
quently, it is possible to move relative to one while being
stationary relative to the other. For this reason, we argued,
motion relative to these two referents cannot be equated.
We are encouraged that Wertheim appears to appreciate
these facts of physics, and by his confidence that “no one
has ever equated earth relative motion with motion relative
to the earth’s gravity.” However, he did not respond to our
quotations from behavioral scientists that appear to reflect
just this confusion. Dichgans and Brandt (1978, p.758)
equated “orientation with respect to . . . gravity,” with “po-
sition of object and the observer on the earth surface,” and
Wertheim himself defined absolute motion as “motion rel-
ative to external space [i.e., 3D, Newtonian space, as de-
fined by the horizontal surface of the earth and its gravita-
tional field” (Wertheim 1994, p. 302)]. Moreover, in his
commentary he defines a reference frame “dimensioned by
the earth’s surface and the direction of gravity.” We are at a
loss as to how Wertheim’s statements can be reconciled.
As a matter of empirical practice, experimenters rarely
define for the experimental subject the frame of reference
to be used in making judgments about motion (e.g., Brandt
et al. 1973; Ohmi et al. 1987; Wong & Frost 1978). For ex-
ample, in Wertheim (1981, p. 102), subjects were asked to
rotate a potentiometer to indicate that they perceived a
stimulus to be moving or stationary, but there is no indica-
tion that subjects were given any instructions as to the ref-
erents for these judgments (i.e., moving and stationary rel-
ative to what?).
Wertheim points out that when exposed to optical flow
rotating around an axis parallel to earth gravity, experimen-
tal participants experience an illusion that they are rotating
relative to the earth. We acknowledge the existence of this
illusion. However, our interpretation of it differs from
Wertheim’s. He treats it as a basic perceptual phenomenon,
and used it as a building block for a general theory of the
perception of object motion (Wertheim 1994). In our view
(cf. sect. 7), this illusion is a superficial experience that re-
sults from the participant’s inability to engage in normal per-
ceptual-motor exploration (that is, to engage in movements
that will create the relevant specificational structures in the
global array). The illusion is possible because of a highly con-
ditional ambiguity in potential sensory stimulation (cf. sect.
R6). As we indicated in the target article (sect. 4; cf. Dich-
gans & Brandt 1978; Stoffregen & Riccio 1988), potential
sensory stimulation is identical during constant velocity mo-
tion of the self relative to the gravito-inertial force environ-
ment and relative to the illuminated environment. For this
reason, these situations are fundamentally indistinguish-
able. However, potential sensory stimulation during motion
relative to these two referents is not the same when there is
acceleration. This explains the fact that the illusion of bod-
ily rotation relative to the earth is robust only when acceler-
ation is prevented, for example, when the head is subjected
to passive restraint (e.g., Brandt et al. 1973; Ohmi et al. 1987;
Wertheim 1987). The illusion is eliminated by head move-
ments, and is often suppressed even by eye movements (e.g.,
DiZio & Lackner 1986). Similarly, it is largely because sub-
jects in moving rooms are not restrained that we suggested
that their perceptions may be veridical (sect. 5.2).
In the target article we argued for the independence of
different physical referents for motion, and we proposed
that different aspects of behavior might be perceived and
controlled simultaneously, relative to different physical ref-
erents. Recent research has demonstrated simultaneous
differential control of the head and body with respect to in-
dependent, referents (Patterson et al. 1997; Smith et al.
1997). During simulated visual flight maneuvers (i.e., turns
when the aircraft was controlled by looking out the win-
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dows), pilots tilted their heads (relative to the torso), so that
the head remained aligned with the horizon, while simulta-
neously they controlled the torso so that it remained aligned
with the aircraft as the latter rotated relative to the horizon.
In each case, the referent chosen for the control of orien-
tation was task-specific: Aligning the head relative to the
horizon made it easier to monitor aircraft altitude relative
to the ground, while aligning the body relative to the air-
craft minimized the effort required to control bodily orien-
tation. Changes in the task yielded changes in the referents
for control (cf. Coello & Rossetti; Foo & Kelso; Rune-
son et al.): Under instrument flight conditions, pilots
maintained head alignment with the vertical axis of the air-
craft (i.e., with the vertical axis of the instruments that they
were reading).
R8. Specification in single-energy arrays
Several commentators (mainly, students of the ecological
approach to perception and action) argue for the existence
of specification in single-energy arrays (e.g., McMichael 
& Bingham; Michaels & Oudejans; Peper & Beek;
Rosenblum & Gordon; Runeson et al.). James Gibson
(1966) endorsed two positions, as noted in our sections
3.3.2 and 6.1. On the one hand, he argued for amodal spec-
ification, while on the other, he described a structure in the
global array. We have argued that these positions are mu-
tually exclusive. Ecological theory must either accept our
conclusion, or explain how the two positions presented by
Gibson can be reconciled. The ecologically-oriented com-
mentators did not directly address this (though Runeson
el al. appear to reject Gibson’s claim that somatosensory
stimulation, taken in isolation, is ambiguous with respect to
body sway).
In addition, these commentators (together with Thomas)
present arguments that do not acknowledge or take into ac-
count the fact of the constant, simultaneous stimulation of
multiple perceptual systems (sect. 1). Much of this multi-
modal stimulation is critical for the perception and control
of the body and its parts (e.g., head, hand). This stimulation
is not ignored, that is, it is easy to demonstrate that it influ-
ences the control of the body (e.g., Berthoz 1993; 1997).
One implication of this is that any given parameter existing
within a single type of ambient energy is never either the
sole stimulus, or the sole information that is picked up. If
specification did exist in single-energy arrays (a point which
we continue to dispute), this would still leave open the is-
sue of how the animal deals with the fact of constant, si-
multaneous stimulation of (and pickup of information
from) multiple perceptual systems. We have argued that
this can be accommodated in an ecological theory only
within the concept of the global array (i.e., cooperative
pickup of global structures); anything else implies internal,
inferential “integration,” or comparison (e.g., Feldman &
Lestienne). Defenders of specification in single-energy ar-
rays did not address this issue.
Generally, commentators who defend the hypothesis of
specification within single-energy arrays do not address our
arguments about the assumption of separate senses (e.g.,
Runeson et al.; Neelon & Jenison), that is, they offered
no argument why this assumption should be retained 
(cf. Thomas). In the target article, we provided mathe-
matical examples of structures in the global array that pro-
vide information which is not available in the structure of the
constituent single-energy arrays. One of these (Eq. 1) was
taken from the work of Peper et al. (1994), while another
(Eq. 2) was taken from the work of Bingham and Stassen
(1994). In arguing for the existence of specification in sin-
gle-energy arrays, neither Peper & Beek nor McMichael
& Bingham refer to these examples, which nevertheless ap-
pear to support our position.
R9. Falsifiability of specification and ambiguity
Cabe (see also Runeson et al.) raises the question of
whether specification is a falsifiable concept. At the level of
individual parameters the concept of specification is not fal-
sifiable; it is always possible to argue that some other,
unidentified parameter has the specificational relation.
Runeson (1988) made essentially this argument. Similarly,
any claim of specification can be voided by a single excep-
tion (for instance, the claim of Burton, and Costall et al.,
that pheromones are specific to particular insects is voided
by the fact that pheromones can be presented in the ab-
sence of the insects, as in pesticides or perfumes). This ar-
gument applies to any version of the concept of specifica-
tion; it is not peculiar to the possibility of specification in
the global array. However, the disproving of an instance
does not disprove the general concept, because a thing that
is not specified by one parameter might be specified by
some other one. When one candidate fails, it may be in-
cumbent for researchers to look for another candidate,
rather than to conclude that specification does not exist.
The problem with this is that no matter how many candi-
date parameters are falsified, it is always possible that some
other, as yet unknown candidate will do the job (Runeson
1988). This is similar to the problem, in inferential theories,
with the claim that perception and/or cognition are based
on mental calculations or any other inferential process.
Whenever it is demonstrated that a given calculation or in-
ference is either unnecessary or counterproductive (e.g.,
Mark), it is always possible to claim that, rather than being
direct, some other inferential calculation is being executed.
We acknowledge that, at this level, this is a problem for the
concept of specification and, thus, for any theory of direct
perception. However, scientists who do not accept direct
perception theories should be equally rigorous in acknowl-
edging that the same problem applies to the falsifyability of
theories of indirect perception.
While specification and ambiguity appear to be unfalsifi-
able at the level of individual parameters of ambient energy,
we believe that the issue of falsifiability extends beyond this
level. The concept of specification may be falsifiable at the
larger level of general principles. If the laws of physics are
general and are in fact laws, then it may be possible to ar-
gue that specification, which is a consequence of these laws
is as real and valid as the laws themselves. Specification,
then, would be falsifiable in the same sense that laws of
physics are falsifiable. The concepts of inferential calcula-
tion, association, or other processing are wholly psycholog-
ical, making no appeal to physical reality and thus may be
fundamentally resistant to falsification.
Several commentators (Brenner & Smeets; Michaels
& Oudejans; Runeson et al.; Riley; see also Michaels &
Beek 1995) suggest that some parameters of potential sen-
sory stimulation are partially or totally nonspecific to real-
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ity. With respect to the global array, we disagree. We accept
the claim that a parameter may not specify the particular as-
pects of reality that concern the authors, but we point out
that the same parameters may specify something else, that
is, some other aspects of reality. If this is the case, then it
may be that all parameters of the global array are specific
to some aspects of reality. While any given parameter A may
not be specific to any particular aspect of reality X, it may
well be specific to some other aspect of reality, Y (Michaels
& Oudejans). This leads us to predict that subjects will
perceive Y. This could be a problem if the experimenter as-
sesses only the perception of X; when X is not perceived,
the experimenter may (incorrectly) conclude that percep-
tion was erroneous and, hence, that A did not specify any-
thing. This possibility reinforces our recommendation that
experimenters be cautious in evaluating perceptual reports
as being “right,” or “wrong” (sects. 5.2 and 6.2.6).
R10. Amodal specification?
Mace, together with Costall et al. and Vereijken &
Whiting, describe the history of the term amodal. We ac-
cept these historical accounts. Our discussion of the hy-
pothesis of amodal specification, however (sect. 3.3.2), is
drawn from the contemporary literature, which may di-
verge from the historical sources.
The assumption that stimulation is redundant across per-
ceptual systems is widespread, extending beyond the con-
cept of amodal specification. For example, redundancy is
commonly assumed by students of intersensory interaction
(e.g., Mergner & Becker), by researchers who study per-
ception and action in simulators and virtual environments
(e.g., Kennedy et al. 1990), and in the literature on motion
sickness (e.g., Oman 1990). A serious problem with the con-
cept of amodal specification is that redundancy across any
two single-energy arrays is rare (contra Flom & Bahrick;
Rosenblum & Gordon, and Mergner & Becker; for an
extensive discussion and list of examples, see Stoffregen &
Riccio 1991). We noted that the amodal specification view
has not addressed the consequences of nonredundant rela-
tions among single-energy arrays (sect. 3.3.3). Commenta-
tors who support the concept of amodal redundancy (e.g.,
Flom & Bahrick; Lewkowicz & Scheier; Rosenblum &
Gordon; Vereijken & Whiting), did not respond to this
problem. Focusing exclusively on cases that appear to ex-
hibit amodal redundancy is not likely to lead to a theory of
perception that is general.
Our view of amodality resembles James Gibson’s view of
static perception. “Static” perception is not opposed to “dy-
namic” perception. It is a specific case (i.e., the limiting
case) of perception. Similarly, we believe that redundant re-
lations among single-energy arrays are limiting cases of
nonredundant relations among single-energy arrays. They
exist, that is, there are a few situations in which the pattern
in one single-energy array is isomorphic with the pattern in
another single-energy array (e.g., Flom & Bahrick).4 But
these redundancies may be irrelevant to perception, if per-
ceivers are directly sensitive to the global array. Amodal re-
dundancy in single-energy arrays corresponds to a pattern
in the global array which may be detected. This would dif-
fer qualitatively from picking up separate patterns in differ-
ent single-energy arrays, and then (internally) determining
that they were (or were not) redundant.
An analogy can be made to the difference between geo-
metric figures and the lines that they comprise. A triangle,
for example, comprises three lines, but a triangle is more
than three lines; it is three lines forming a closed figure. In
our analogy, each line can represent the stimulation avail-
able to an individual perceptual system. If specifications ex-
ists only in single-energy arrays, then perception of the tri-
angle, as such, would require the separate perception of
each line, followed by some form of internal process that
would “recover” the fact of triangularity (that is, permit the
perceiver to differentiate “three lines forming a triangle,”
from “three parallel lines”). Amodal redundancy would oc-
cur when the three lines were of equal length (the result-
ing figure would be an equilateral triangle). By contrast, the
pickup of information from the global array would be akin
to perception of the triangle as such, that is, perception of
a three-sided closed figure. Perception of this kind would
not require that triangularity be “built up” through the in-
tegration of separately perceived lines. Moreover, equilat-
eral triangles are not “special” in the sense that amodal in-
formation is thought to be special. If triangularity is
perceived as such, then equilateral triangles need not have
any privileged status (as is often attributed to amodal re-
dundancy); they are just another type of triangle. Similarly,
if perception is based on the pickup of information in the
global array, then patterns that correspond to redundancy
at the level of individual perceptual systems would have no
special status, and would be neither easier nor harder to de-
tect than any other patterns in the global array.
Walker-Andrews understands that the global array dif-
fers qualitatively from putative amodal specification. The
global array makes it possible, in principle, for perception
to be accurate without any comparison of the activity of dis-
tinct perceptual systems. As Walker-Andrews notes, per-
ception based on the global array depends upon sensitivity
to higher-order patterns, and not upon comparisons be-
tween modalities.
R11. Dimensionality of the global array
Hughes and others (e.g., Burton; Costall et al.; McMi-
chael & Bingham; Peper & Beek; Pittenger) raise im-
portant questions about the dimensionality of the global 
array. They argue that there are a variety of different global
arrays, each having a different number of dimensions, that
is, each including a different constellation of types of ambi-
ent energy. This argument is based on the facts of sensory
loss. Hughes argues that blind people, for example, are 
exposed to a different global array than sighted people, with
one global array including optics while the other does not.
We disagree. The arguments of Hughes, Burton, McMi-
chael & Bingham, and Peper & Beek suggest a confu-
sion between the existence of information, on the one hand,
and the sampling or pickup of information, on the other.
This is clear in Burton’s question about how many percep-
tual systems are necessary to have a global array, and in
McMichael & Bingham’s suggestion that sensory attenu-
ation or absence can influence the structure of the global
array. The global array is not made up of perceptual sys-
tems; it is made up of patterns of ambient energy that may
be sampled by perceptual systems. There is only one global
array. It includes relations among all forms of ambient 
energy.
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Different perceivers sample different parts of the global
array, depending on their needs, interests, and abilities. This
is well understood in the context of single-energy arrays. To
maintain the context of sensory loss, consider persons who
are color blind. They are not sensitive to the full range of fre-
quencies sampled by the normal human eye, yet no one
would suggest that color blind people are exposed to an op-
tic array that is any different from the one sampled by the
color sighted. There is only one optic array, which is sampled
differently by the color blind and the color sighted. Varia-
tions in frequency of light are related to the colors of things
in the world. Color blind people cannot pick up this partic-
ular type of information, and for this reason often do a poor
job of controlling their behavior with respect to the color of
things. Similarly, there is only one global array. It is sampled
differently by people (and species) having different percep-
tual capabilities. Animals without functioning visual systems
(e.g., moles, earthworms, and blind people), will be exposed
to the global array, just like other animals. These animals
cannot detect or control behavior relative to the illuminated
environment, but that does not mean that they are unable to
sample the global array. The example of moles and earth-
worms is important because it illustrates the close functional
relation that exists between the capabilities of action and
perception systems. As noted in the target article (sect.
6.2.3), the ability of moles and worms to sample the global
array is entirely adequate for them to achieve adaptive be-
havior. That is, these animals can perceive their behavior
and control it relative to the same subset of physical refer-
ents. In general, each species and each individual can detect
certain portions of the global array, which enable it to per-
ceive and control its actions relative to a certain set of phys-
ical referents. This explains why blind people walk differ-
ently from sighted people: The blind cannot perceive (or
control) motion relative to the illuminated environment.
R12. Research methodology
Our theory will succeed to the extent that it can inspire use-
ful research (as noted by Pallas; cf. Leighty et al.; Pit-
tenger; Riley). In discussing the conduct of research we
focus on three issues.
McMichael & Bingham assert that analysis of struc-
tures in single-energy arrays is a prerequisite for use of the
perturbation paradigm in research on perception, but they
offer no argument as to why this should be so. As we noted
in the target article (sect. 7; cf. Fouque et al. 1999), the per-
turbation paradigm can be and has been used in research
contrasting the pickup of information from single-energy
arrays and from the global array. More generally, perturba-
tion of any single-energy array will simultaneously perturb
the global array; this cannot be prevented. The theoretical
and empirical question is which of these perturbations is
detected by perceivers. This has general consequences for
research on perception. When an experimenter employs a
manipulation of structure in one or more single-energy ar-
rays, that manipulation will also alter (or perturb) the struc-
ture of the global array. Thus, effects resulting from such
manipulations could be caused by structure in the single-
energy array(s), or by structure in the global array. This is
why existing research generally cannot be used to evaluate
perceptual sensitivity to the global array or, we would argue,
to single-energy arrays.
As noted in the target article (sect. 7; cf. sect. R1), new
research (and perhaps new research methods) will be re-
quired in order to conduct direct tests of the hypothesis that
perceivers detect structures in the global array. Mark’s sug-
gestion to use techniques for establishing perceptual inde-
pendence (Ashby & Townsend 1986) is welcome in this
context, and should be pursued.
It is also the case that existing methodologies can be
adapted to be relevant. Research should begin with an a pri-
ori derivation of information, either qualitative or, prefer-
ably, quantitative, that exists in the global array. For our ex-
ample we will use the global array parameter identified by
Peper et al. (1994), and discussed in section 6.1 of the tar-
get article. Equation 1 relates to a situation in which a per-
son must extend the hand laterally (relative to the torso) in
order to catch a ball. The relation between optics and hap-
tics expressed in Equation 1 is specific to the affordance for
interception (that is, to the hand velocity needed to move
the hand to the right place at the right time to make the
catch). Neither optics alone nor haptics alone provides the
needed specificity.
There is an analogy between the relation of ball move-
ment and hand movement, in this situation, and the relation
between distance and velocity in time-to-contact. Time-to-
contact is a consequence of the relation between distance
and velocity, but it is not necessary to perceive either dis-
tance or velocity in order to perceive time-to-contact. It is
sufficient to perceive the higher-order relation between the
two.5 McLeod and Ross (1983) and Schiff and Detwiler
(1979) tested the hypothesis that knowledge about time-to-
contact might be derived from mental calculations based on
perceived distance and velocity, as opposed to being based
on direct sensitivity to time-to-contact. Subjects viewed
films depicting impending collision with the viewer. The
films ended before collision, the subjects’ task was to indi-
cate when the collision would have occurred. The results in 
each study were consistent with direct perception of time-
to-contact, and inconsistent with calculation of time-to-con-
tact from independent percepts of distance and velocity.6 If
it is possible to perceive time-to-contact without perceiving
either distance or velocity, then it may be possible to per-
ceive the required velocity of hand displacement without
perceiving, either time-to-contact, or current hand position.
That is, in terms of Equation 1, it may be possible to per-
ceive the left-hand side of the equation without having dis-
tinct sensitivity to the separate terms of the right-hand side.
Experiments can address this question empirically. Here,
we propose one such experiment. As in the experiments of
Peper et al. (1994), subjects would be instructed to catch
balls that approach at an angle to the line of sight (i.e., so
that the arm must be extended laterally, relative to the
torso, in order for catching to occur). Catching would re-
quire the subject to adapt Vh, the lateral velocity of the
hand, to the ratio between the instantaneous sideward ball-
hand distance and t, the optical parameter related to time-
to-contact.
The essential manipulation would be to vary the values of
the optical and haptic parameters in Equation 1, but to do
so simultaneously in such a way that the required velocity of
the hand would not change. The t parameter could be ma-
nipulated using the deflating ball paradigm (e.g., Savels-
bergh et al. 1991), and Xh could be manipulated by chang-
ing the perceived direction or location of the arm through
the manipulation of eigenvectors of its inertia tensors (e.g.,
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Garrett et al. 1998; Pagano & Turvey 1995; Riley & Turvey,
in press; Turvey 1996). The crucial manipulation would be
to combine a later (perceived) arrival of the ball (by deflat-
ing the ball during its approach) with a closer (perceived) lo-
cation of the hand. These manipulations could be combined
so that they co-varied, that is, so that the value of Equation
1 remained constant across the variation in its constituent
parameters. When this was the case, we would predict that
catching (and, by implication, hand velocity) would be ac-
curate (that is, that subjects would respond on the basis of
the constant value of the global array parameter), despite
the fact that t would not be specific to time-to-contact and
Xh would not be specific to hand position. That is, the ma-
nipulation would produce an overestimation of the place of
contact if subjects relied on the haptic information only, and
an overestimation of time-to-contact if they relied on opti-
cal information only. Specific predictions (both quantitative
and qualitative) could be made in situations like this to vali-
date the use of global array in ball catching, and, more gen-
erally, in the perceptual guidance of action.
R13. Concluding remarks
Is the animal-environment interaction specified in patterns
of ambient energy? As emphasized by many of the com-
mentators, the answer to this question is central to any the-
ory of perception and action. We have argued that specifi-
cation does not exist, and cannot exist, in patterns that are
confined to any single form of ambient energy. This is due
to the facts of motion in a relativistic universe. As reinforced
in our response, behavior is controlled relative to many
physical referents that are independent of one another, so
that motion relative to one referent may be independent of
motion relative to another. Crucially, motion relative to any
given referent often does not create or alter structure in all
forms of ambient energy. This means that, as a matter of
physics, it is not possible for the structure of pattern in any
given form of energy to be uniquely related to an animal’s
motion relative to the physical environment. If scientists as-
sume that each form of ambient energy constitutes a qual-
itatively distinct “input” to perceptual systems, then the 
absence of specification in single-energy arrays would pre-
clude any theory of direct perception, and would require
that theories of perception include some mental mecha-
nism that could “recover” information about reality from
impoverished or nonspecific stimulation.
We have presented a very different view of the stimula-
tion available to perceptual systems. We have pointed out
that forms of ambient energy, while they differ qualitatively,
do not exist independently. Just as there is structure within
any given form of energy, there also is structure across or
between forms of ambient energy. We have argued that
these multi-energy patterns, which make up what we call
the global array, are uniquely structured by the animal-
environment interaction. If this is true then specification
exists, and it is possible, in principle, for perception to ex-
ist, to be direct, and to be used (through exploration, differ-
entiation, and learning) in the guidance of adaptive action.
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NOTES
1. Pailhous et al. believe that our position is that pickup of in-
formation from the global array is “localized in associative areas.”
This is not our position.
2. The same problem applies to Wade, who discounts exam-
ples that we drew from vehicular travel as being “artificial.” Hu-
mans (together with their domesticated animals) have routinely
traveled using vehicles, such as ships, for thousands of years. To
refer to vehicular travel as artificial begs the definition of the term.
Note that we do not claim that everything is natural; rather, we
stress that the distinction between natural and unnatural or artifi-
cial is meaningful only if it can be defined.
3. This suggests that Runeson et al. may endorse the concept
of partial or occasional specificity (sect. R2).
4. Amodal redundancy may be less common than is supposed
by supporters of the amodality view. Consider speech, which is of-
ten thought to give rise to redundant patterns in optics and
acoustics (e.g., Rosenblum & Gordon; Walker-Andrews). The
acoustic waveform that reaches the ears is structured by the ac-
tivity of several anatomical structures, including the lips, tongue,
jaw, and larynx. The tongue is often not visible, or only partially
visible, and the larynx is never seen. This means that the visible
part of speech (e.g., movements of the lips and jaw) corresponds
to only a portion of the acoustic waveform. In other works, the
acoustic and optical patterns are not identical; they are not
amodally redundant.
5. For similar reasons, the hypothesis raised by Brenner &
Smeets that detecting information in the global array should take
more time than in single-energy arrays may not be correct. It may
well be the case that the detection of higher-order relations
(within- or between-energy arrays) take less time than the detec-
tion and combination of their constituent parts.
6. Estimates of collision time were strongly correlated with col-
lision time as depicted in the films, but tended toward underesti-
mation of collision time. This might suggest that perception of
time-to-contact was inaccurate and, therefore, not based on the
(nominally accurate) information available in the stimulus films.
An alternative interpretation of the underestimates is that they are
artifactual results of the use of a paradigm in which subjects made
judgments, rather than using perception to control action. This 
is supported by the extraordinarily precise levels of timing that 
are regularly observed in research on the control of interceptive
action (e.g., Bardy & Laurent 1998; Bootsma & van Wieringer
1990).
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